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Wm. J. D.

29.7.43

To: Brig. General Wm. J. Donovan

July 27, 1943

From: Captain Robert H. Aleorn

Subject: British Currency

With further reference to our conversation of this afternoon concerning the entire question of Special Funds, and more particularly with reference to Colonel Rehm's plan to send British currency direct to me, I am enclosing herewith correspondence on this matter.

Under present British currency and banking control, it seems decidedly ill-advised for our organization to indulge in the purchase of British currency below the legal rate of exchange and to run the attendant risk of sending that currency into the country by pouch. It should be recognized that the Special Funds accounts which are now held in my name for our organization are registered accounts and as such are subject to a certain amount of scrutiny by the British Treasury and Foreign Exchange Control. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that any large amounts of cash in my possession not directly chargeable to those accounts could cause us considerable embarrassment.

Currency above denominations of £5 does not now circulate legally in this country, a fact which Colonel Rehm has recognized in his advice to me to dispose of the £100 notes "with discretion". Such notes are a dead loss for operations here and only with difficulty have I been able to dispose of them successfully.

Frankly both Colonel Bruce and I feel that our Government is not benefitted by taking advantage of exchange rates which are extra-legal, when by so doing, the whole structure of our security and good faith with the British Government is threatened. Further more, as the person directly responsible for the handling of these funds in the London Mission, I do not wish to be placed in a position of receiving funds from sources which may be questionable when those same funds may be obtained in the open market at current exchange rates in bona fide transactions.

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I had hoped that Colonel Rahm would be in London while you were here in order that we three might discuss the matter fully and with this in mind I had withheld a reply to his letter of June 23. I trust you will discuss the matter with him on your return to Washington.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 23, 1943.

ALL FORN

Captain Robert Aleson,
American Embassy,
London, England.

Dear Captain:

I am in receipt of your letter of June 11 in which you take up the question of our pouching to you English currency. While I agree with you in principle, I am sure it is the wrong position from a practical viewpoint. I am positive the British are doing the same with us. I am informed that on Prime Minister Churchill's last visit here his entire retinue brought into this country plenty of American currency. David Williamson told us the other day that he knew that the British were buying up U.S. currency in different points in the world and were pouching it over here for their use. If the British do it, why can't we.

So far as our sending British currency to our London Office goes, we have been told that so long as we do not disturb the price here of English notes, in terms of dollars, we are not interfering with British financial measures here. So far as your possessing funds in London which are sent to you by the U.S. Government, I cannot feel that this would give rise to any serious enquiry from the British authorities. If the inquiry should become serious and if it is a matter of high level British financial policy, I feel that a little airing on this point would prove beneficial to both sides. However, I can see no harm in the British making inquiry. The answers that you might give are many.

1. Are not the British happy to have their currency removed from possible enemy hands in world markets and repatriated through friendly channels where no enemy can get it for secret use within England.

2. If they do not feel that we should, in order as reasonably as possible to finance our expenses in connection with the war effort in London, buy English currency at prevailing discounts and send it to England, why should they indulge in the same practice so far as the dollar is concerned.

In conclusion, I believe we are rather naive on this subject and the British expect us to be, and play upon it.

I regret that operating your office on a cash basis adds to your burdens but even in England there is a benefit in paying some expenses in cash.

I wish you would discuss this matter of currency again with Col. Bruce in view of the above, bearing in mind that this is a way of saving our Government some money (the better to carry on lend lease).

Best regards.

(Sgd) W.L. Ream,
Lieut. Colonel, AUS.

CONFOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

June 11, 1943.

Dear Colonel Rehn,

Your letter of May 31, has just arrived and with it the 500 pounds sterling in five 100 pound notes.

The 2000 one pound notes arrived on June 8 without prior warning and caused some speculation. Needless to say, I was glad to get your letter explaining the situation.

I have discussed this operation with Colonel Bruce and he agrees with me in feeling that you should not send cash to me in this manner. From my limited knowledge of British currency control I am certain that such purchases are highly irregular and definitely counter to open market procedures in foreign exchange.

Both Colonel Bruce and I feel that I should not be in possession of any funds which might conceivably give rise to enquiry from British authorities. Further, it is much more desirable on my part to have all credits to my account go thru regular banking channels for two reasons:

1. It enables me to rely on an established bank for the accuracy of my own records, and
2. It relieves me of the burden of checking large sums of cash which are not needed at the moment for current expenses as practically all payments can be made by check.

Though we fully realize that the cash operations is one which offers a more advantageous rate of exchange, Colonel Bruce and I do not feel that the saving merits the risk involved.

The cash now at hand will be used and the 100 pound notes will be handled with discretion, but we request that all funds hereafter be placed to my credit thru regular channels at the current rate of exchange.

Sincerely,

Robert Hayden Alsorn
Captain A. U. S.

Lt. Colonel W. Lane Rehn

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 31, 1943.

AIR FORCE

Captain Robert Alcorn, AUS,
American Embassy,
London, England.

Dear Captain:

Attached hereto please find five 100 £ sterling notes or a total of 500 £'s sterling, in currency.

We are sending you by courier in four packages 2,000 £'s sterling, in currency, in one £ notes. The green one £ notes are, we are told, a discontinued issue but pass currently in England.

The one £ notes cost us \$3.50 per £ and the 100 £ notes cost us \$295.00 each.

As no one is allowed to go into England officially with more than 10£'s, these bills of large denominations sell here, as you can see, at very material discounts. They should be handled with discretion in England or else questions may be asked as to how you came about acquiring them. I am certain that an Officer of the American Army will not be questioned.

We are charging the London Office \$8,475.00 - the cost of this currency - and this charge takes the place of a \$10,000 cable transfer.

These 2,000 £'s, together with the \$40,000 which we cabled you on May 28 make the equivalent in sterling of \$50,000 (the cost \$8,475) at approximately today's official cable transfer rate and are available to the London office for current expenses.

We are contemplating repeating this operation as it shows us a real economy. If you disagree with this procedure, will you please advise us promptly.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd) W.L. Rehm,
Lieut. Colonel, AUS.

Enclosure.

South America - 8912

X Angus, George

X Argentine

X Chile X Brazil

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH

315 - 15th Street

Washington, D. C.

Personal

August 24, 1943


Brigadier General
William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
25th & E Sts. Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

The report which you have on Argentina, signed by Angus, has proved to be reliable up to date. In connection therewith I was interested in the attached clipping which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune on August 23. It certainly substantiates statements made in the report in regard to the attitude of the British from a commercial, political and diplomatic standpoint. It is amusing to note that this article points out that the United States will be a "large customer and bear much of the financial burden of the purchased meat surplus, but ... the British received full credit at Buenos Aires for the transaction."

With warmest regards,

Yours as ever,


George A. Garrett

GAG:MP

Enclosure

NEW YORK HERALD

Britain Scores Comp Over U.S. In Argentina

**Gets Full Credit for Allied
Pact on Meat; Steer Sells
for \$12,500 at Exposition**

By Herbert M. Clark

By Wireless to the Herald Tribune
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BUENOS AIRES, Aug. 23.—The success and the permanence of both Argentina's "prudent neutrality" and Great Britain's policy toward this country were apparent this morning in the Palermo Park auction ring when Sittlyton Choice Baron, the grand champion short-horn of the fifty-seventh annual livestock exposition, sold for 80,000 pesos, \$12,500, or the equivalent of \$7 a pound on the hoof.

The price was the highest paid since 1928, and was directly related to the fact that the United Nations have agreed to purchase Argentina's entire exportable meat surplus for two years, beginning retroactively Oct. 1, 1942. The manner in which the agreement was announced and received here apparently guarantees continued British pre-eminence in Argentina, and in many quarters is taken as indication of lack of a real accord between Washington and London on policy toward Argentina.

While it is reliably understood that the agreement was reached a fortnight ago, it was announced Saturday at the climax of the stock show. Observers who believe the announcement was withheld for the occasion expressed the opinion that the British government had scored a major propaganda success of the war in its timing.

It is interesting to note that the British victory was achieved partly through American money and markets. The agreement, which assures customers for products which normally form the bulk of Argentina's export at guaranteed good prices as well as helping packing industries here, was signed by the British as agents for the United Nations. The United States will be a large customer and bear much of the financial burden of the purchased meat surplus, but, except for one newspaper, the British received full credit at Buenos Aires for the transaction.

Indro C. ...

October 21, 1942.

Dear Colonel:

About ten years ago a new generation of brilliant young men decided that the time had come for the Argentine to grow within herself and cut off outside influence. It is necessary to realize and understand the change that has taken place in order to make a report with any degree of accuracy regarding the political, social and financial affairs of the country. In submitting this report, I would like to have it clearly understood that the points of view expressed are those of important officials or other outstanding and reputable people in the Argentine with whom I have talked. The opinions are not to be construed in any way as being my own.

In talking with several of my friends who are important in the Castillo administration, they seem to agree that Argentina is headed for the worst crisis she has had since 1880. Recognizing their weak defenses and vulnerable economic position, they realize the importance of making every effort to grow strong internally. To do this they must make an all-out effort to protect their sovereignty. This would not be possible if they were to join the loose federation of South American nations suggested by the United States. As the twenty nations have such diverse interests, races and characteristics, it would be almost impossible to bring them to a sound basis of understanding and cooperation. In explaining this point, a prominent official expressed himself as follows:

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"To me a country is like a woman--when she loses her virginity she is not a virgin ever again. For me when a country loses any part of her sovereignty she is no more a nation. I would rather take the chance on losing the country completely--seeing it sunk, wrecked--my family lost, my fortune ruined, than to try to save her existence by losing part of her independent individuality by linking with a federation of countries--identifying herself as a part of a group--or by becoming an economic semi-colony, taking her cue on how to trade or produce from a big power. Let her be invaded, and go down, fighting with honor. Let her perish from the face of the earth. But never for a minute should she, through fright and desire of protection or for the convenience of a big power, give up one inch of her sovereignty."

He went on to say that the very word federation meant giving up one's complete liberty to the common need for coming to common decisions and therefore means loss of complete liberty in self rule. Any plan of action made for all has to include compromises from everyone. Since twenty nations of such varied types cannot live exactly by each other's method--it would have to be a general melange of everything, and then none would be free to use exactly his own particular methods of governing and trade.

"Argentina can only exist as a nation by standing alone," he said. "She loses her identity as a nation by connecting up with federations or submitting to a big power. If she's taken by force she at least sinks honestly. She must, to stand alone, fortify herself internally. We've got to find a way--economically..... somehow....."

When I arrived in Buenos Aires I found my old friend, Doctor Felipe Espil, Argentine Ambassador to the United States, who told me that he had been asked by his Foreign Office what Washington generally and the Administration in particular thought of his countrymen. "I told them," said he, "that the opinion generally held in the States was that the Argentines were Nazis." Last year I spent ten weeks in Argentina and visited many of the provinces of the country north of Tierra del Fuego. I was there two weeks

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on this visit, and on neither occasion had I any reason to believe that the Argentines were pro-Nazi. On the contrary, since our entry in the War, I would say that 75% of the Administration in the Argentine and 90% of the people generally sympathize with the United Nations. I do not mean to imply by this statement that they are pro-Ally, but I can say without hesitation, they are pro-British. Above all they are pro-Argentine and determined to keep out of this War. The only member of the Cabinet that might be considered sympathetic to the Nazis whom I met was the Foreign Minister and former Ambassador to Rome, Dr. Enrique Ruiz-Gulíen. His attitude no doubt reflects the reports he receives from his representatives in Europe, most of whom I am told hold that the Axis nations are winning the War.

Ramon Castillo, President of Argentina, is a man of culture, character and ability. He is absolutely fearless and has gathered around him the top talent of Argentina to administer the affairs of the country. In his cabinet are mature men of experience. Most of the executive positions under the cabinet officers are filled with the outstanding younger men of the Nation. This entire Administration is profoundly nationalistic, and have infected their countrymen with their intense patriotic zeal. The record of accomplishment of Castillo's administration, spiritually, socially and financially, is unsurpassed. His term of office expires in 1943, and elections will be held there next October. As he filled out the unexpired term of Roberto Ortiz, it is not clear under the Constitution whether he can be a candidate to succeed himself. He is sure to be elected if he runs. It is believed, however, if he fails to stand for election, that he will throw the field wide open to an honest vote for the first time in history, and the candidate of the Radical party, whoever he may be, will succeed to the Presidency. The Radical party in Argentina can be compared very closely to the Democratic party of

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the United States during the Wilson administration. Here it is timely to comment on the antics of former President General Augustin Justo, who returned during my visit from a trip to Rio de Janeiro, where he offered his services to the Brazilian Army shortly after Brazil declared war on the Axis. As a publicity stunt, Justo's junket was a dud. I speak with authority on this point, as his private car was attached to the train on which I was returning from Entre Rios, and I saw the reception accorded him at the station in Buenos Aires. Four days later President Castillo and members of his cabinet returned from a conference held on the border of Argentina and Bolivia, and his arrival was the occasion of a tremendous demonstration of popular acclaim. It is interesting to note that Justo's propaganda implies that he is Pro-Ally and that Roosevelt is pro-Justo. From responsible sources in Argentina, however, I am assured that while he has the solid support of the Communists, his chances for election are slight.

From an economic standpoint, the situation in the Argentine is, to say the least, confused. Beginning in May of 1941, conditions began to improve, but the upward trend flattened out about the time our State Department published the Blacklist. Without discussing the merits of the Blacklist, I can say that it is generally conceded even by the British in Buenos Aires that it has thrown many firms directly into the arms of the enemy, and for this reason has probably done more harm than good. In fact, the British question the effectiveness of the Blacklist, and the additional economic pressure which is being exerted by our people would tend to indicate the list has failed to achieve the object for which it was designed. Responsible British representatives pointed out that they preferred a system of "control" as being more useful in handling the bad

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boys. They found with their own representatives posted in a plant they were able to direct affairs all the way from raw material through to the manufactured article. There were instances, to be sure, where a percentage of the goods slipped through from controlled concerns to Axis firms or agents, but even these slip-ups proved advantageous in disclosing information of value and pointed the way to improved administrative supervision.

In addition to Blacklists, our country is putting the screws on various other concerns by denying them the materials which they need. This action on our part is throwing many men out of work--but instead of creating discontent against those in power in Argentina, it has only served to broaden and increase the resentment against the United States, as all these workers are fully informed regarding the retaliatory tactics adopted by our diplomatic officials. Argentina has, through negotiation mostly with Italy, built up a sizeable merchant marine, and the operating profits from this industry are fabulous. Arrangements have been made to take the idle back to the land, as the Administration looks for an early break-up of the War in Europe, and are preparing for the enormous prosperity they feel sure will come to agriculture for several years following an armistice abroad.

The cattle industry is prosperous, and retail business is above average, but will soon be affected by a shortage of luxury goods. The country is flooded with money coming from all corners of the globe, and if the Peso were not so efficiently "controlled," it would easily sell at two for the Dollar as against its present controlled ratio of four to the Dollar. Money rates have dropped from 7% to as low as 4% on the better than average run of mortgage loans, and the banks generally concede that they find the immense increase in deposits to be far more burdensome than helpful to the Nation's economy.

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From a diplomatic standpoint there is an obvious feeling of suspicion between the two countries that is regrettable. Friction has developed, and the diplomatic attitudes of both countries have reached the jittery stage. Our Ambassador to the Argentine, Norman Armour, is held in high esteem. His ability is well known to all, and his patience and understanding have endeared him to the very sensitive, cultured and realistic people of Chile and Argentina. It is, of course, terribly disappointing to him that these two countries where he has served as Ambassador are the only South American republics who have refused to join up in Western Hemisphere solidarity. While the Argentines respect Armour's ability and feel that he is honest with them, they distrust our other diplomatic officials, and a resentment has been growing ever since 1936, when the mission from this country concluded a visit to Buenos Aires by promising the Argentines they would purchase from them an amount of their beef equal to 2% of the cattle produced in the United States.

Doctor Felipe A. Espil, the Argentine Ambassador to the United States, was called back to Buenos Aires early in August, at which time our Ambassador to the Argentine was on leave in this country. The Foreign Office felt Espil was not doing a good job here, and had offered the post to a friend of mine, Dr. Angel Sanchez-Elia. Sanchez-Elia is violently pro-British, and for this reason declined this offer and would decline any other post that was tendered him because he is not in sympathy with the policy of Ruiz-Guiñazu. The post in Washington was then offered to Miguel Angel Carcano, who is now Ambassador to England. Carcano was in Buenos Aires when I was there, having come for the wedding of his son. Both Espil and his wife broadcast generally that the Administration and people of Washington went out of their way to be rude to the staff of the Embassy here. In fact,

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Espil related an incident where he approached our Secretary of the Treasury with a friendly "Good evening, Henry," and an extended hand. Morgenthau, he said, drew himself up and refused to shake his hand and replied very coldly, "Good evening, Mr. Ambassador." Senora Carcano added a spicy bit to this persecution propaganda by relating the experience that she had with our Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, in Rio de Janeiro a little over two months ago. Senora Carcano is a talented woman. Her husband has twice been the Argentine Ambassador in France, and she is today returning with him to his post in England.

"My husband has been treated wonderfully by the English during the past six months while he was en poste in London. You have had an opportunity to see how courteous and attentive the British Embassy staff in Buenos Aires are to me. They have taken care of every detail of the journey which my husband and I and my two daughters are about to take to London via New York. Your Ambassador, Mr. Caffery in Rio de Janeiro, was inexcusably rude to me when I visited there two months ago, and for this and other reasons my husband has decided to return to the Court of St. James."

Just before leaving Buenos Aires, word came that Norman Armour was on his way South, and the Foreign Office decided to re-assign Espil to his post in Washington.

Let us take up now the set of questions in which you are particularly interested. I repeat here the eleven questions, as I will refer to them by number in answering them on the following pages:

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1. What American firms are strongly positioned with the local government?
2. What Argentine firms are pro-American and yet do business in Europe.
3. What individual Argentines in strong position are (a) friendly to us, (b) would be willing to establish connections abroad?
4. What individual Argentines or Americans living there would be able to obtain information from abroad?
5. What are the important Argentine financial and industrial houses that are in communication with Germany or Italy?
6. Are there any German or Italian representatives or other foreign nations acting for those countries now in Argentina and with whom are they in contact?
7. What transport services (ship or aeroplane) operate between Argentina and Europe?
8. Would there be any possibility of making use of these lines for our purposes?
9. Are there any members of the Argentine diplomatic corps or other officers of government who are pro-American and who would be willing to obtain information abroad for us?
10. Is there any evidence that Argentines, Government or private, go to Japan?
11. What is now the means of transportation between Argentina and Japan?

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(1) The American firms most strongly positioned in Argentina are Swift International, Armour and Company, First National Bank of Boston, duPont, and the National City Bank of New York.

(2) Swift International and Armour.

(3) There are numerous individual Argentines in strong position that are friendly to the United Nations if not actually friendly to us. I don't believe any of those listed, with one possible exception*, would be willing to establish connections abroad. A list of these individuals will be handed to you under separate cover.

(4) There is an interesting man in Buenos Aires named Girton. He came there from England as Vice President of Swift International, having served abroad for eighteen years in Germany, Italy, France and England. I was anxious to get in touch with Girton and finally located him in the Royal Mail Building, which is leased to the British for the business end of the Embassy. I then checked on his nationality and learned that he was born either in Milwaukee or Chicago and is an American citizen. He has had the experience and background that should make him unusually valuable to us. The fact that he is working for the British I would say was "sufficient" if any confirmation were needed.

Another man in South America that would be able to obtain information from abroad is Count George Potocki, now living with his wife in Lima. He has sent letters to his Mother abroad addressed as follows:

Countess Botka Potocki,
Lancut,
General Government.

These letters have been mailed on Swedish ships, and he has received letters from her. Potocki, to my knowledge, speaks seven languages, and has made

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application to Norman Davis for a post in the Red Cross. He is bored to death in Peru, and I can hardly blame him for that. However, his wife and her family have numerous holdings in the country sufficient to keep the Count occupied and interested, but as he stated to me, and as Norweb confirmed, "nothing can move in or out of Peru without the consent of the Embassy of the United States." I may be wrong, but I don't believe the Red Cross can take on anyone except an American citizen. For this reason you might keep Potocki in mind if you think he could be used to advantage elsewhere. In this connection, however, it should be born in mind that as his older brother Alfred "was never in politics," he and his Mother are living peacefully and happily in Lanout.

There are only three Argentines left in France, Countess Roatta de Gagne, her brother, Louis de Demberg, and Alfredo Bustos. The de Demberg family have enormous investments in France, and I feel certain they are so scared of jeopardizing their interests as to be unwilling to lend a hand-- although I feel they are most sympathetic to the cause of the United Nations. What Bustos might be able to dig up in Paris is problematical.

(5) Any important Argentine financial or industrial house can communicate with Italy or Germany, either by radio or through the mails. I think our Treasury Department is fully aware of this fact.

(6) Both the German and Italian Embassies in Buenos Aires have enormous staffs of diplomatic Commercial, Naval and Military Attaches. Working constantly, I am told, they miss very few tricks. They entertain often and sumptuously. One of the outstanding women of Buenos Aires who is sympathetic to us, said that in the past year the German Ambassador had adopted the practice of sending elaborate floral gifts to the important older women of Buenos Aires on the occasion of their birthdays.

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(7) There is no aeroplane service in operation between Argentina and Europe. Steamship services are the various British lines, the ships of the newly created Argentine Maritime Company, Swedish Line, the Spanish and Dutch.

(8) With the exception of Swedish ships, it should be possible to make use of all the other lines operating in the Atlantic. The "neutral Swedish ships" not only carry the mails, but also items of freight that I understand are not all they should be under existing conditions. However, they seem to get navicerts from the British, so that's that.

(9) Yes.

(10) No.

(11) There is no transportation whatsoever between Argentina and Japan.

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As communications with the Axis out of Chile as well as Argentina has become such a controversial subject, I think it would be well to amplify this point. The Administration in Argentina make no attempt to deny that messages go out over the regular airways to the Axis nations in code. Messages also go out to the United Nations in code. They proclaim, however, inasmuch as the representatives in our State Department find this to be the one point on which they condemn their neutral stand, the Foreign Office is looking into the possibility of placing a ban on all code messages. I was told that Chile years ago adopted such a measure and they refer to this act as the precedent they would use as a basis should they adopt the plan they now have under consideration. Aside from this one point, they are unwilling to concede that the United States has any logical basis for criticizing their neutral stand. On numerous occasions I was reminded that the War had been in progress for twenty-eight months before we were attacked at Pearl Harbor; and that it was their considered opinion had it not been for this treacherous attack the United States would have remained neutral in this War.

The Naval strength of Argentina is pathetic in comparison with the coast line they have to defend. The Military strength at present consists of 80,000 officers and men. As they have compulsory military training, it would be possible in a crisis to increase the strength of the Army up to around one million men, and the one thing Argentina is determined to do is to put up a defense against any attempt to invade their land no matter who the foe may be. There are over two hundred thousand Germans living in the country, and I have given you a verbal report as to the plan of action with respect to this colony should the Axis ever attempt an invasion.

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The most pathetic attempt to stir up a favorable emotional reaction is that which has been undertaken by the de Gaullists. In spite of the almost universal love of France which exists in Argentina, the "Free French" under the leadership of Bernard de Seiyès, have been able to accomplish exactly nothing. De Seiyès I understand, in spite of the role he is enacting, still maintains his connections with the Textile industry in Lyons, and is still suspected of being one of the Directors of the Bank of France. Harold Horan scouted the last meeting of the de Gaullists, which he told me was depressing as to size and enthusiasm, and that the Jewish race accounted for over 90% of these present.

The British LColony in Argentina is by far the most important. They own the railroads and furnish all the coal; they own the public utilities, the "undergrounds" in Buenos Aires--their real estate holdings are enormous and they provide a substantial portion of the money loaned on Estancias. They are extremely popular with the Argentines. Senora Santamarina, wife of the President of the Bank of the Nation, told me frankly a year ago that the Argentines didn't mind having the British as their masters, but didn't believe they would relish a change. She went on to explain that the credit which the United States had extended to the Argentine consisting of \$116,000,000 was handed out so freely as to make them suspicious of what we might demand in return for it. I notice that our Under-Secretary of State announced last week that this credit had been cancelled. On the other hand, I learned while in Argentina that not one cent of it had ever been used. The British however, are buying beef and other products from Argentina, while we continue to squeeze them from an economic standpoint. I was astounded to learn that our Ally does not support us.

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our attempt to force Argentina and Chile into the Federation of American republics as opposed to Axis nations. In Argentina, in Chile and elsewhere I was told that the British had indicated that they preferred to have those nations as neutrals rather than hooked to Western Hemisphere Solidarity. They see nothing to be gained in breaking off relations with the Axis. On the contrary, I am told, they find the situation "as is" to be advantageous in many ways.

This is a report, and I have tried to be an accurate and impartial reporter. For this reason I would like to have you check on what I discovered with reference to the British attitude toward the neutral position of Chile and Argentina. As numerous Argentine politicians with whom I talked referred to one Selinto Miller, former Chief of Brazilian police, I think it would be well to look into the present status of this fellow. He is alleged to be a notorious Nazi, and I understand occupies an important job as the Assistant to the Brazilian Minister of War.

Gene Angus

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MARQUIS PIERRE JANCOURT	Arroyo 1099
MARQUESA MARIA JULIA DE SALAMANCA	Florida 1065
JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ	Chapadmalal F.C.S.
MIGUEL MARTINEZ DE HOZ	" "
EDUARDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ	San Martin 195
ENRIQUE E. BULLRICH	R. de Vittoria 2385
FELIZ ALZAGA UNZUE	Cerrito 1441
BERNARD DE CEIYES	Buenos Aires
ADMIRAL BUSTAMANTE	" "
MYER of Armour & Co.	" "
GIRTON of Swift International	" "
FRED SIX, Pres. of Armour	" "
HAROLD HORAN, of Time	567 Ave Roque Rodriguez Pena
WELSH, of National City Bank	Buenos Aires
ANGEL SANCHEZ-ELIA	Chacabuco 833
SEÑORA MARIA M. SANCHEZ-ELIA	" "
SEÑORA CARMEN GANDARA-	Posadas 1669
CAMILLO ALDAO	Buenos Aires
*RODOLFO GARCIA ARIAS	Argentine Embassy, Washington
FATHER LEO HARKING	Buenos Aires.

P.O. to L.O. Chile

October 7, 1942.

Col. William J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel:

President Rios of Chile is en route to Washington for a conference at the White House. It is therefore perhaps timely for me to write you regarding conditions as I found them in Chile before making a report on other South American countries.

On the evening of our arrival in Santiago my wife and I walked straight into Gustava Hanna when we entered the bar of the Carrera Hotel. She left an interesting group to join us for a drink, and was so excited to see some of her former Washington friends she was bursting with chat, and seemed eager to answer any questions we asked. Gustava is the scion of German nobility. Her brother was a high ranking German officer in World War I. She was married to Hanna when he was appointed United States Minister to Guatemala. On his death she inherited a modest estate, but having a fairly accurate knowledge of her income, I can say with assurance it is not sufficient to support her in the manner in which she is now living, even though Chile is "down at the heels" and struggling along on depreciated currency--ordinarily advantageous to those whose income is derived from sources outside. Gustava occupies an elaborate suite on the twelfth floor of the Carrera Hotel, and has a maid. She not only lives well, but looks prosperous. I spoke to Edward Reed about her when I arrived in Buenos Aires, and he thought Gustava was "O.K." For this reason, my wife and I telephoned her when we arrived in Santiago on our way north and invited her to dine with us. She came with an attractive Frenchman of about forty, also

- 2 -

living at the Carrera Hotel. This man was a commissioned officer in the French Army and escaped just before the Germans took over Paris. He came to Santiago one year ago via Dakar--thence back to Lisbon, and embarked from there on a sixty-five day journey which landed him in Chile. He has taken up with the Chilean Minister of Finance and his important assistants the matter of establishing an industry in Chile for the manufacture of chemicals to be used as disinfectants. This man is intelligent and attractive. He seems convinced that Germany, though she may not win the War, cannot be crushed, and that in his opinion it would be suicidal for the United Nations to attempt to open up a second front on the Northern Coast of France. I regret exceedingly I cannot give you the man's name. It should be an easy matter, however, to pick him up through Embassy sources in Santiago, and I am of the opinion that he is worth further attention, either as a useful man for us or as a lead that might possibly disclose some undercover workings of the other side.

Folke Wennerberg and his wife are living at the Crillon Hotel in Santiago. They dined with us the following night at the Carrera Hotel and identified one of the men whom I saw in the group with Mrs. Hanna in the bar of the Hotel when we arrived on our way South. This rather clever looking individual proved to be an Austrian named von Artens, who Wennerberg told me was acting as General Consul for Bulgaria in Santiago. This chap it appears was formerly on the Austrian tennis team--is well known on the continent of Europe. Wennerberg, who is now the Swedish Minister in Chile, confided that von Artens, though popular in Santiago, was "up to no good." The German Ambassador there is Baron von Schoen, who is married to the sister of Mrs. Edward R. Finkenstaedt of Washington. Von Schoen has adopted the myth (that was used so adroitly by the German Ambassador in Paris) of being a

- 3 -

patriotic German, but not a Nazi, and has played it up so cleverly that many of his colleagues are not only friendly but sympathetic. I am told our own Ambassador was numbered among this clique prior to December 7, 1941.

According to the various groups with whom I talked in Chile, the Honorable Claude G. Bowers, our Ambassador, has been of no help whatsoever in persuading the Chilean Government to join up with other South American nations in the solidarity of the Republic in the Western Hemisphere against Axis powers in the War. The sophisticated point of view regarding our Ambassador in Chile is substantially as follows. He came to Santiago from Spain at a time when the Lefts were in complete control of the Government. He took them to his bosom so completely that he was unable to pull out when subsequent events indicated a sideline position on the diplomatic front. He continued to adhere to his original policy of courting the radicals exclusively. During the years he has served in this post the political tide has turned, and sufficient conservatives have been elected so that now there is a strong opposition party in the Government. In the last eighteen months a certain amount of prosperity has crept into the country. As a result the Lefts are not so "Leftish" and the conservatives have consolidated their gains. These sophisticates seem to believe that Norman Armour could have persuaded the Chilean Government to join the federation of Nations, but that Bowers will never make any headway in his efforts in this respect. From the business men with whom I talked, I got the impression that Bowers, while an interesting writer and brilliant speaker, was not a clever diplomat-- that he seemed determined to confine his activities to dull administrative routine, and apparently cared nothing about the social end of his work. Added to an obvious lack of finesse, he seemed determined not to change his

- 4 -

point of view and evidently preferred to buck the trend rather than go with it. I asked the question, "Don't they like Mr. Bowers down here?" and the answer I received was, "He is neither liked nor disliked--he is ignored."

From an economic standpoint, this country has been through a tough period in recent years, but our entry into the War has accelerated a slight boom which started about a year ago. This is fairly general in spite of our black list, but the industry that has been most favorably affected is shipping. The Chileans have gathered a merchant fleet of six ships, each in excess of 10,000 tons capacity, and an unknown number of smaller freighters. Already the share holders have received 25% on their investment this year, and it is expected that an equal amount will be distributed again before the end of 1942. Herein lies perhaps the answer to the forthcoming visit of the Chilean President to the United States. Moreover, the Chileans say, "We have a long coast line which we are unable to protect. We are sympathetic to the cause of the United Nations, but what possible help would we be able to contribute if we broke off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers?" They go on to explain that while communications with the Axis countries are open any Nation can listen in. Furthermore, no code was ever developed that couldn't be broken in ten days. On the other hand, if relations were severed, their life line of shipping would be jeopardized, with a resultant handicap not only to Chile but to the United Nations as well.

The Chilean Administration and the Argentine Administration work closely together. It is believed, however, that Argentina has probably said "No" in a tone that was too brusque. The Chileans are mindful that their President is a clever man, and they want him to come to Washington and explain in a polite and sympathetic way the predicament in which they find themselves

- 4 -

and probable disastrous consequences that would make them to adopt a policy for which they can find no reason other than to satisfy "the vanity of some of our State Department officials."

As I see the picture, there is no probability of Chile's declaring war on the Axis. There is a remote possibility that they might break off diplomatic relations with Axis powers, but not before January first. This latter is the business man's optimistic point of view, but the professional politicians seem to feel that the situation will remain in status quo.

Benjamin Cohen, formerly attached to the Chilean Embassy in Washington--well known as a generous entertainer and dispenser of diplomatic liquor in the Prohibition era, is now the Chilean Ambassador to Peru. I flew with him from Lima to Santiago and learned that he was to accompany President Hion on his trip to the States. Cohen's parents were Jewish immigrants from Russia, so it is needless for me to point out that he is nimble and resourceful.

I suggest one Sergio Humason, Calle Maipo 304, Santiago, Chile, as a man who could be used to advantage.

Yours very sincerely,

Frank Ayres

- 5 -

and probable disastrous consequences that would ensue were they to adopt a policy for which they can find no reason other than to satisfy "the vanity of some of our State Department officials."

As I see the picture, there is no probability of Chile's declaring war on the Axis. There is a remote possibility that they might break off diplomatic relations with Axis powers, but not before January first. This latter is the business man's optimistic point of view, but the professional politicians seem to feel that the situation will remain in status quo.

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I suggest one Sergio Huneeus, Calle Merced 304, Santiago, Chile, as a man who could be used to advantage.

Yours very sincerely,

Gene Angus.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR

BILL DOVOVA:

The President asks me to
thank you ever so much for your
memorandum of June fourteenth and
to tell you that he is very much
pleased.

G.D.T.

June 14, 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please see that this gets to
the President?

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

June 14, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You may wish to be advised that:

1. We have established contact abroad with a number of underground labor organization with networks within enemy and enemy occupied countries--particularly the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF).
2. We have also worked with the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) which maintains headquarters in London.
3. We have had the assistance here of the Railway Labor Executives' Association which co-operates with the International Transport Workers Federation.

William J. Donovan
Director

THOMAS M. JOHNSON
480 WEST 118TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY

6/11/44
Letter to Bill
Very, Thomas M.

July 31, 1944

Dear Bill:

This is my first chance to thank you for your very fine help in the matter about which we consulted you the other day. It was much appreciated by all concerned, not myself alone.

Barrett received us pleasantly, listened to our story, then had another chap listen again. The final outcome is not yet certain but we have hopes. Meantime Miss Luxford called upon the Australian and New Zealand Ministers and some Australian military authorities and found that someone using British War Relief stationery had been writing letters complaining that she was being paid for broadsheeting! Dirty work at the orendoenda-more of it! One Australian replied that he didn't give a damn how much she was being paid. It wouldn't repay what she did for the Aussies for nothing! It is disgusting what methods some people use in what should be patriotic work.

Best luck to you, Bill.

Ever,

Tom

7/1

Mr. Dalles --

Note letter is .
dated two days hence

Also address -
635 Fifth Ave.

LB

C
O
P
YLOVELL 7569
X Switzerland
X DullesMALCOLM R. LOVELL
28 East 38th Street
New York

29th of 7th Mo., 1942.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Dulles,

Why might not the solution of our problem be the assignment by you of your most trusted associate, to go with me and to stay with me at all times, night and day. I would be strictly under his orders, and I would agree to obey him implicitly in all matters. I would be perfectly willing to have him present at any meeting I might have with my friend.

If the information I hope to get is as important as I believe it would be, why might it not be worth your personal time to fly with me and keep me in your personal charge. Your Washington connections and your experience in important matters of state, should be sufficient guarantee that neither I, nor you, could make any mistakes. Perhaps within two weeks from the day we left New York we might have secured invaluable information.

If you were with me you could make quick decisions and instruct me whether or not I should take advantage of a possible opportunity to meet some more important personage, -if not on this matter, then perhaps on the second thought we discussed.

It still seems to me that some way should be found to use my services, as one peculiarly qualified to do something no one else can do, and something that might materially aid our war effort.

Faithfully and cordially yours,

(SIGNED) Malcolm Lovell

Allen W. Dulles, Esq.
Office of Strategic Service
635 Fifth Avenue
New York

Lovell
7567
Dillon
SECRET

July 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JAMES MURPHY
 FROM: MR. ALLEN DULLES

Referring to our conversation of Wednesday with regard to your Quaker friend, I enclose a copy of his letter to me dated July 19th. I understand this letter, with names and details, came to me in the ordinary mail, was opened in the ordinary routine, and found its way to my desk with advertisements and appeals for subscriptions to defense bonds, etc. I gather that our friend has no idea of security and I doubt he has much discretion.

On the whole, in the present state of the war and in the present state of our friend's education in security matters, I think it would be a mistake for us to have anything to do with sponsoring a trip abroad for the purposes indicated by L.

When I mentioned his name to the boss on Wednesday, he expressed himself in no uncertain terms and I gather that you and I would have to feel very strongly on the subject if we were to prevail over his views, and certainly I do not have the conviction that we should try to do so. I do, however, desire to maintain a friendly relationship with the Quaker organization as I think it may prove very useful to us and I am seeing Kershner today. I shall let Lovell down as quietly as I can but I believe he is a very determined fellow and I would not be a bit surprised if he should try the Hopkins -

General Byrnes connection to accomplish his objective. I do not plan to see General Byrnes on the subject unless you think it particularly desirable that I do so.

I shall be in Washington again next Tuesday.

A.W.D.

Wood

19th of 7th mo., 1942

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Since our conversation on Friday I have given much thought to the only serious objection we felt could arise, namely, that my presence in Berne might be construed as a peace gesture by the U.S. Surely that must be avoided.

Under my plan as outlined to you there could be no such construction placed on my visit to Switzerland. I would go as a Quaker, as Executive Secretary of the International Service Council, Inc., to investigate for our group, the food conditions in Unoccupied France and Switzerland. I would not be known to anyone as sent by a Bureau of the United States Government. I would not even be known to the legation in Berne, except, perhaps to the Minister in a most confidential way. Even he should not be told my plans.

I would go most privately to the German Minister in Berne, and tell him I was investigating possibilities of buying milk in Switzerland, and wished to see Dr. Hans Thomsen in this connection. I would ask him to get word to Dr. Thomsen that I was in Berne.

When Dr. Thomsen came to see me, as I am sure he would, I would tell him that I had come to Switzerland solely in my capacity as Executive Secretary of International Service Council, Inc., but that I privately hoped he and I could arrange the matter about which you and I talked on Friday. Should he mention it, I would assure him that so far as I knew, my country was determined to prosecute the war to a military victory, and never, under any circumstances would it consider a negotiated peace.

Please remember, Mr. Dulles, that my success in this effort would result in great secret honor to me in the highest circles in our Administration, and perhaps other missions of great importance might be entrusted to me.

I realize keenly that one indiscretion or carelessness on my part, would end all possibility of my being helpful to my country. It is clear to me, and I would think that it would be equally clear to your associates, that I have everything to gain by discreet and able handling of this mission, and everything to lose if I did poorly. Surely if you ever had reason to trust any man, you now have reason to trust me in this matter.

Should objections arise in the course of your discussions of this matter, I hope you will give me an opportunity to consider them with you, and that you will allow me an opportunity to answer them.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

Malcolm Lovell

Lowell

Yice
Spent 17569
X Security -
X Dulles -

July 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. James H. Murphy
FROM: Allen W. Dulles

I spent a couple of hours this afternoon with your Quaker friend, L. While I have made no independent check, and plan to have a word with Judge Swan and Tom Thatcher, both of whom he says he knows well, I am personally convinced of the man's sincerity and patriotism and would be inclined to feel that the possibility of a conscious double-cross was extremely remote. L. is a man who takes a rather fatalistic view of the war in Europe, feeling that Europe is doomed to be controlled either by Russia or by Germany, and he feels that England will emerge from the war too weak, and is too badly situated geographically to effectively organize the Continent. I also think that he is possibly a little naive and possibly inclined to exaggerate the importance of his German friend, T. Also, I think he would be inclined to accept, without very much critical analysis, what T. might see fit to tell him.

However, having said this, I am not disposed to feel that the project should be lightly dismissed, and even if the T. contact turned out to be of secondary importance, our friend L., in view of his apparent important position with the Quaker organization and through the contacts they might have, might prove a very useful man for us to have in Switzerland or in Occupied France.

Whether L. should be permitted to go to Switzerland when we know that his avowed purpose is to contact T. is a question of high diplomatic strategy, and it is difficult to weigh the possible advantages of this contact, which L. believes would relate largely to the Far East, as against the possible disadvantages if this contact should ever be disclosed, with the attendant implications that somebody was engaged in peace feelers, or the like.

MALCOLM R LOVELL
 30 EAST 38 STREET
 NEW YORK

April 17th, 1942.

Dear Colonel Donovan,

I talked today with Colonel Bertrand-Vigne, Counsellor of the French Embassy. He had phoned to me while he was recently at Oyster Bay, visiting with Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Sr., but I had been unable to see him while he there. As you know, Colonel Bertrand Vigne and I are old and close friends. Since, if Henry-Haye is "recalled for consultation", Colonel Bertrand Vigne will be Charge d'Affaires, these remarks may have interest for the State Department.

Colonel Bertrand Vigne said, "We believe the war in Europe will be over this year (1942). The cataclysmic assault, when it comes, will be so overwhelming that nothing will be able to stand in its path."

"Russia will make peace this year. She will say that, 'Britain and the United States have done little of importance and have suffered defeat after defeat, while she, Russia, has borne the brunt of the war. She has defeated the Germans during the winter (so she will claim) and has proved her valor and courage. Failure of her allies makes it necessary for her to arrange a peace.'"

Col. Bertrand-Vigne continued, "All the blame for this peace will be placed by Russia on the shoulders of Great Britain and the United States."

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
 Co-ordinator of Information
 Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
 Washington, D.C.

Malcolm R. Lovell
File

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
26 EAST 86TH STREET
NEW YORK

April 9th, 1942.

My dear James Murphy,

I owe you some money. How much I do not know. On my last visit to you I telephoned, station to station after seven P.M., to my wife at Darlington, S.C. Expecting at any time to drop in to see you again, I have not written to find out the amount. It now appears that I will not be in Washington for at least another two weeks. I fear my credit may not be that substantial, and I hasten to ask if your nice secretary will send me a "chit", telling me the amount of my debt.

May I thank you for your generous introduction to Mr. Sullivan, of the Treasury. He was very kind to me. I will tell you the details when I see you.

Cordially, your friend

Malcolm Lovell

Hon. James Murphy
Administrative Assistant
Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.

Lovell 3810
8 April

April 1, 1942

Honorable John L. Sullivan
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C.

Dear John:

Mr. Lovell
Lovell was sent to me by Judge
Thomas D. Thattner of New York last September.
What he had to give you will find embodied
in the letters which I send you herewith.

He wanted to be sent abroad. I told
him that he was too gullible and would be used
as an instrument by the Germans.

I know nothing about his tax matter
and, as I told you on the phone, we have no
interest of any kind in his relations with your
department.

Will you please return the letters when
you have finished.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Attachment
Murphy Morey

3/23/48

Mr. Murphy:

Here is the correspondence
Lovell called me about. No doubt he
has talked to you about it.

J.B. Ophala

Mr. O'Connell

Malcolm Lovell

3510

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
20 EAST 88th STREET
NEW YORK

2nd of 3rd. mo., 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan,

In last Sunday's New York Times, the lead Editorial said:

ASIA AWAKES

"Out of this great war, which is even more a war of ideas than of machines and men, one truth appears: men do not die, or risk death, or make great sacrifices, for things that seem to them far away."

I sincerely believe that you need my "Ideas", my resourcefulness, my imagination, my initiative. Through Thomsen I understand the German psychology, and know how to oppose it. I know how to build up our own morale, and undermine the enemy's.

Some day you will use me. I grieve that it apparently must take so long. My country needs me, but evidently does not yet know it.

I will be in Washington on March 11th and 12th. May I come in for five minutes, if only to hear your gentle and kindly "no". I hope some day to wear you down, for we both do love our country, and I am positive that you will discover my value to you, soon.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Co-ordinator
Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.

W

COPY

file
11/11
MALCOLM R. LOVELL
36 East 38th Street
New York

2nd of 2nd mo., 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan,

I will be in Washington on Monday evening February 9th, and all day Tuesday, February 10th. May I have a brief appointment to see you? I am very desirous of discussing with you certain interesting developments which I think you can use to good advantage.

I would appreciate hearing from you this week if possible. In any event I will telephone James Murphy when I reach Washington on Monday afternoon.

Cordially yours,

/s/ Malcolm Lovell

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
26 EAST 68TH STREET
NEW YORK

2nd. of 2nd mo, 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan,

I will be in Washington on Monday evening February 9th, and all day Tuesday, February 10th. May I have a brief appointment to see you? I am very desirous of discussing with you certain interesting developments which I think you can use to good advantage.

I would appreciate hearing from you this week if possible. In any event I will telephone James Murphy when I reach Washington on Monday afternoon.

Cordially yours
Malcolm Lovell

✓

2178
C Lovell Malinda

 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942.

Dear Bill:

Thank you for yours of April 1st and the enclosures relating to Malcolm R. Lovell. In accordance with your request I am returning the enclosures herewith.

With kindest personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

John L. Sullivan

Honorable William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
26 EAST 84th STREET
NEW YORK

15th of 12th mo., 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan,

In order that you may keep in a small corner of your busy mind, the following information, I am writing to confirm something I told you a month ago.

I am the American closest to Dr. Quo Tai Chi, Foreign Minister of China, now in Chungking. We were classmates and close friends all through preparatory school, and then for four years classmates and close friends at college. Since that time we have actively kept up our friendship, and have corresponded voluminously throughout the years. I can show you quantities of the most intimate and friendly letters.

Whenever Dr. Quo has been in the United States he has been my guest, or I his, all of the time when he was within reach of New York. Recently when he came through from London, where he had been the Chinese Ambassador for many years, on his way to China to assume the portfolio of Foreign Minister, I was with him for a full week.

Dr. Quo is the godfather of my eldest son, Malcolm, Jr.

Should the time ever come when my country needs an American close to Dr. Quo, able to visit with him as his guest at his home in Chungking, one who can at all times speak frankly and informally and privately, with Dr. Quo, I will be available.

Should you ever care to do so, you may confirm with Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, that in his

MALCOLM R LOVELL
26 EAST 88TH STREET
NEW YORK

presence, Dr. Quo put his arm around my shoulders,
and said to him that I was his (Dr. Quo's) dearest
American friend.

I hope the emergency will never come
when my President would need me in such a capacity,
but should it come, he may call upon me and I will
drop everything to respond.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Co-ordinator
Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
20 EAST 86TH STREET
NEW YORK

File
NOV 27 1941

26th of 11th mo., 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan,

I will be in Washington on Friday and Saturday, December fifth and sixth. I will dine with Dr. Hans Thomsen on Friday evening. May I see you on Saturday? I hope to have some information for you on the Hamilton Fish matter by that time. I started a very careful inquiry on Monday (the 24th) after I had left you. Naturally I could do no more than touch on the subject. On my next visit I will carefully explore it in full detail.

Would you be so kind as to advise me whether or not you will be in Washington on the sixth of December? If not, might I come to your house in Georgetown after I leave Dr. Thomsen's home, probably about ten o'clock in the evening.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director, Bureau of Co-ordination
of Information
Washington, D.C.

Colonel Donovan

Malcolm

MAILCOLM H. LOVELL
26 EAST 38TH STREET
NEW YORK

2nd of 12th mo., 1941

DEC 3 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan,


I have just received a letter from Dr. Hans Thomsen saying that he is coming to New York on Friday, December fifth. He will dine with us and spend the evening here. He plans to spend the week end in New York. Since you are coming to New York anyway, may I see you here on Saturday or Sunday, and give you my report? This would save me the arduous trip to Washington. I feel that you and I should discuss my effort for your Bureau, and somewhat plan what I am to try to ascertain.

I would appreciate your making an appointment to see me in New York while you are here this week end.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director Bureau of Co-ordination
of Information
Washington, D.C.


The Hotel Hamilton
Washington, D.C.

W. J. Lowell

Dear Mr. MacLeish,

Some months ago
 Malcolm R. Lowell, of 26 East 38th Street
 in New York, was introduced to me by
 a mutual friend, and offered ~~me~~ to
 unofficially, without any connection
 with my Bureau of Co-ordination of
 Information, do some special and
 confidential work for me. The matter on
 which he was engaged is now closed,
 and he would like to offer his services
 to you. He believes that he can be of
 value in your Office of Facts and Figures.
 Mr. Lowell has devoted his life to public
 relations work, and I understand he has
 been rather successful in it. I am
 told that some people consider him
 unusually well qualified in this
 profession.

Mr. Lowell is not seeking salary
 or title, but wishes to offer his services
 out of his desire to aid at this time.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM:

DATE

TO:

December 8th, 1941

SUBJECT:

Dear Colonel Donovan,

In answer to your inquiry regarding Congressman Hamilton Fish. I have twice discreetly brought the matter up with Dr. Hans Thomsen, and the following is the gist of his remarks,

" I have only twice in my life met Hamilton Fish, when we could sit and talk at length. I have met him casually at many social affairs in Washington when Mrs Thomsen and I were not social lepers. Mrs. Thomsen and I were invited and went to his daughter's debut.

" The Fish house in New York, leased for many years by our Consul General, Dr. Hans Borchers, was leased for years before that by Borchers predecessor. Borchers merely continued a lease of a suitable house for the residence of our Consul General"

"I am sure Congressman is a sincere man, always speaking his own mind."

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel Wm.J.Donovan
Director Bureau of Co-ordination
of Information
Washington, D.C.

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
26 EAST 82ND STREET
NEW YORK

10th of 18th mo., 1941

DEC 17 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan,

For the past few months I have meticulously avoided His Excellency, the French Ambassador to the United States, M. Gaston Henry-Haye, due to your expressed wish that I have no contact with him, and I have not seen him once during that period.

However, now that I will not be able to serve you through my contact with Dr. Hans Thomsen, might it be that I should endeavor to gain a close friendship with Henry-Haye, and Colonel Bertrand-Vigne, the Counsellor? I have known both men well, and in the past my wife and I have dined many times with them at the French Embassy, and they with us at our home in New York. It may be of interest for you to know that Miss Bertrand-Vigne, the Colonel's sister, is a close friend of Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, and has recently made a lengthy visit at her home in Oyster Bay. She also has dined at our home before your request that I cease all contact with them.

Of course I am not sure that I now could renew my friendship, as they may feel that my previous breaking off with them has caused forfeit of any friendly claims I may have had upon them. I do believe, however, that I could bring my past contact into new life, and if you request it of me, I will try.

I will only do this if you tell me it is important for you and my President, to gain what confidential information I am thus able to get for you. I prefer not to do this, as I keenly realize that my close friendship with Dr. Thomsen, kept up

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
28 EAST 38TH STREET
NEW YORK

during the past year at the specific request of an official of the State Department, and of one of the President's close official family, as well as to endeavor to serve you, has seriously hurt me with many uninformed citizens who now look on me with grave doubts. Certainly I would not add to their suspicions of me unless it were at the request of my President, through you.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Co-ordinator
Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.

C12/13/41

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I have just left the home of Dr. Hans Thomsen where I lunched with him and Mrs. Thomsen. During a conversation of two hours, he said the following:

"I am not to be attached to the Foreign Office when I return to Berlin. I will be a personal assistant to Hitler. I was formerly one of his personal group and I will now occupy a more important place in his entourage. Naturally I will be consulted on matters of the Foreign Office but that will not be my main job. I do not know as yet what title I will be given.

"I am anxious to hurry back to Germany for one important reason. I will make it my definite aim to persuade the men in the highest places that the air force should not, under any circumstances, bomb the cities of the United States.

"I will endeavor to convince them that no military targets should even be bombed. I feel that we should use every effort to avoid antagonizing the people of the United States as it has always been my policy to try to maintain friendship between our countries, and I believe that the future of civilization depends on the friendly cooperation of the United States, Great Britain and Germany.

"The war will be won by Germany in Europe without the effective obstruction of the United States. When Germany has completed the occupation, and then secured the

-2-

occupation of all European nations in a united Europe, it will be possible to convince the United States that a just peace should be made that will protect the principal aims of the United States.

"I am sure that Germany -- believe it or not -- does not and never has tried to endanger the sphere of the United States in your hemisphere, by not rousing the American people to anger by bombing cities, where I feel that such an everlasting peace is much more possible. Otherwise, it is distinctly possible that the United States will stubbornly fight on for many years even though fighting means only long distance mutual bombing. This would be very sad and useless.

"The German retreat in Russia is to pre-arrange lines where the Germans only can stay the winter in comfort and security. The advance of the Russians is automatic. They will withdraw to these middle lines and you will see that this chance for Russia to gain face by seeming victory over our armies will result this winter in a peace between Russia and Germany. You may dismiss from your mind any hope that Russia will declare war on Japan. I do not know what Litvinov is telling your State Department but you may be sure that no pressure on your part will induce Russia to take on Japan. You may be equally sure that the United States will not be given any base on the Pacific Coast of Siberia. The next war move of the German armies may

December 1, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Edgar:

Here is the file of letters from
Lovell. I will talk to you further about this.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

December 8th, 1941

DEAR COLONEL DONOVAN:

On Friday afternoon, December 5th, 1941, DR. Hans Thomsen came to my home in New York for dinner. I also spent Saturday morning with him. During our conversation of several hours in all, he said the following items which I think may be of interest to the Administration:

"Japan and the United States were near a friendly solution of the Far Eastern problem, when the Chinese stepped in and barred it."

"The Japanese and the Chinese are negotiating right now between each other. They wish to settle their affairs between themselves without help or obstacles from other countries. When they do finally compose their difficulties, it will be done by them, between themselves, without outside interference."

"It is not to Germany's advantage to have Japan go to war with the United States, as this would involve Germany in formal war with the United States. Germany's purpose is just as well served by a state of high tension in the Pacific."

"The main interest of the United States in the Burma Road is the tungsten which comes out of China on return bound trucks. The munitions of war sent in to Chungking are not sufficient in volume, and cannot ever be, to do more than keep China barely going. They are not sufficient to bring China victory over Japan. No heavy munitions are now going to Chungking from Russia."

"If war should come between Japan and the United States, it will be found that Siberia has been dangerously denuded of Russian troops. The Rostov offensive by the Russians was fought by twenty of the best divisions of the Siberian army, taken from vital Siberian points, to strengthen Timoshenko's army. Japan will now have no difficulty in overwhelming the maritime area of Siberia if they decide to move there. Incidentally, the United State has asked for a naval and air base on the coast of Siberia. Japan will never permit this."

"The countries of South America have become alarmed at the occupation of Surinam by United States troops. The DUTCH were not willing to agree to the occupation, ~~Brazilian~~ but were forced to it. They persisted in refusing to permit Brazilian cooperation. They were unwilling to have Brazilian soldiers come into the country."

-2-

"All South American countries are most concerned over the future United States plans for the Continent and the United States will soon find less and less reciprocation over the good neighbor spirit. Germany expects the United States to one day attack in Africa. We do not believe such a move would be successful. We think the point of attack will more likely be Casablanca than Dakar.

"The recent meeting between Marshal Petain and Marshal Goering was not by any means between strangers. They first met at Belgrade at the funeral of the King. They later met again at WARSAW at the funeral of Marshal Pulaski.

Cordially yours,

/s/ Malcolm Lovell

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24th of 11th mo., 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan,

As I wrote you I had dinner on Saturday evening with Dr. Hans Thomsen, at the Mayflower Hotel.

I give you below several quotations:

" The United States is the reason for the Vichy dismissal of General Weygand. The United States had built up General Weygand as the friend of the United States, and had repeatedly sent Murphy from Vichy to be near Weygand. The United States had sent food and supplies to North Africa, all the time emphasizing that General Weygand was not in full accord with the Vichy government and its policies."

" It had reached the point where the world was beginning to feel that General Weygand represented anti-Vichy policy and was close to Britain and especially the United States. This was not actually true, for General Weygand has always been and always will be loyal to Petain, but in order to show the world that France is fully united under Petain, it became necessary to dismiss the man who had been built up by the United States as the discordant element in the French government. It had to be shown that no one man is a factor in the policy of Vichy. General Weygand agreed that his sacrifice was necessary for proper world understanding of French unity under Petain, and he willingly accepted and agreed to this decision that such a dramatic act as his dismissal be done, in order to show, particularly to the United States, that they had erred in thinking he would or could act contrary to Vichy."

" The Germans have no hostility or unfriendly feeling toward General Weygand. His sacrifice was necessary, but not desired."

" Should the campaign in Libya turn out disadvantageously for the Germans, it would not be wholly unfortunate from the German point of view. Such a result would bolster morale in the United States and would tend to remove the present absurd fear that Germany would or could ever be able to cross the Atlantic ocean for an attack on the United States. Certainly such an African decision would not affect the decision of the

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

war in Europe."

" I have read the advance copy of Under-Secretary Welles speech to be made in Baltimore tomorrow. I think it is intemperate in its reference to Hitler. This is really not at all like Welles, and furthermore I believe it is psychologically unsound for American morale. Welles knows better, but he is evidently following orders from higher up."

" The United States may break diplomatic relations at any time, if the Administration feels that British morale is cracking. This severance of relations would be to reassure the British that the United States is fully behind them, and that the breaking of relations is a definite indication that the United States is much nearer actual war. On the other hand it is entirely possible that relations may be continued to the new year, or the spring or even to summer."

" The striking power of the Russians is definitely gone, and gone for good. Russia can make ply wood wings for planes, but no more aluminum. There will probably be no Russian decision until spring at least. There can be no final decision now that severe winter weather has set in. Always barring, however, unexpected collapse."

" As the strongest nation in the world the United States has a perfect right to be interested in the future of Europe and Asia. This is well understood by the Germans and has their sympathy. There is no official German resentment at the United States realization that such intelligent interest in, and participation in world decisions, is vital for the future of the United States."

Confirming my verbal conversation with you, Colonel Donovan, may I note two matters. Dr. Thomsen is very interested in antiques, paintings, old silver pieces, and all art in general. I also love such things. Not long ago he told me that I should

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
26 EAST 38th STREET
NEW YORK

STATION

16th of 11th mo., 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan,

Will you lunch with me at the Carlton, or elsewhere, in Washington on Saturday November 22nd? I will arrive from New York at noon on that date, and I would like to have an opportunity to talk with you in a more leisurely fashion than would be possible in your busy office.

If I am to intelligently aid you in securing information on German affairs and thoughts, you must somewhat guide me as to the kind of data you currently desire. I am willing for you to do this verbally, but I cannot be of the most value to you unless you do in some manner direct my efforts.

Dr. Hans Thomsen has invited me to dine with them at his home in the evening. I feel it would be particularly opportune, therefore, for us to meet before that hour.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director of the Bureau of Co-ordination
of Information
Washington, D.C.

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NATIONAL POWER POLICY COMMITTEE
INTERIOR BUILDING
WASHINGTON

Colonel Don PC

Personal

Dear Colonel:

NOV 14 1941

Here is a draft of letter to Lovell which I thought
might satisfy him and not be hurtful from our standpoint.

Yours,

Ben V. C.
Ben V. Cohen

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

DRAFT LETTER

Dear Mr. Lovell:

I should like to confirm, as I promised, what I told you when you telephoned me from New York last week.

As I understand, you have maintained close and friendly relations with Ambassador Thomsen of the German Embassy for some years and you have found that those relations have been very useful to you on many occasions in getting help for refugees and in other humanitarian work in which you as a Quaker have been interested. But you raise the question whether, in view of the growing tense-ness in the relations you might not be acting contrary to the best interests of your government if you continued to see or communicate with Ambassador Thomsen.

I should think that in your own case your concern about this question was unwarranted or at least premature. Unless and until there is a declaration of war between America and Germany there is of course no legal bar to your seeing and talking as a private citizen with Ambassador Thomsen about refugee and similar problems. So long as you feel that such talks may be helpful in alleviating unnecessary suffering in individual situations without affecting the military situation, I can see no objection to your continuing as a private citizen to maintain friendly relations with the Ambassador for this purpose.

-2-

In order to avoid embarrassment to yourself and others, I should suggest that in your relations with the Ambassador you endeavor so far as possible to keep away from any discussions which might involve our government, and that if the Ambassador makes any suggestions to you regarding the policies of our government you make it quite clear that such suggestions should be made to the State Department and that you cannot act as intermediary in any way between him and the State Department. But with these precautions, as I have said, I myself do not see any objection to your continuing to see and talk with Ambassador Thomsen on the humanitarian problems in which you have long been interested.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Malcolm Lovell, Esquire,
26 East 38th Street,
New York City.

November 13, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

The following is the substance of statements made by Dr. Hans Thomsen on Thursday afternoon, November 6, to Mr. Malcolm R. Lovell:

If Japan goes to war with the United States, Germany will immediately follow suit. The United States has no effective way to wage war in the Pacific. It could not denude the Atlantic to place full fleet power in the Pacific.

If Tokio and Yokohama should be bombed, the Japanese would

The President

Page 2

surely bomb Manila.

When Russia collapses,
the Japanese will occupy northern
Sakhalin. This will alleviate the
oil situation in Japan, as the oil
supply in Sakhalin is substantial
and can be more fully developed.

Japan is trying to gain time
with the United States. In a way this
effort works both ways, for the United
States seems to be trying to gain time
with Japan. In the last analysis,
Japan knows that unless the United States
agrees to some reasonable terms in the
Far East, Japan must face the threat of

The President

Page 3

strangulation, now or later. Should Japan wait until later to prevent this strangulation by the United States, she will be less able to free herself than now, for Germany is now occupying the major attention of both the British Empire and the United States. If Japan waits, it will be comparatively easy for the United States to strangle Japan. Japan is therefore forced to strike now, whether she wishes to or not.

If the United States breaks diplomatic relations with Germany, most, if not all, of the South American countries will do the same.

The President

Page 4

The new United States
 Charge d'Affaires is going to Berlin
 by boat, via Lisbon. Evidently the
 United States is in no hurry to get
 him to Berlin. This probably means
 that no immediate diplomatic rupture
 is planned. It is, of course, always
 possible that a diplomatic break may
 be postponed indefinitely. Japan and
 China so continued for two full years.
 Of course there is always the possibility
 that any government may tire of the
 undeclared war, and may itself break
 diplomatic relations. I think this is
 improbable, however.

William J. Donovan
 I was amused at Stalin's

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
10 EAST 38TH STREET
NEW YORK

9th of 11th mo., 1941

NOV 10 1941

Dear Mr. Murphy,

I am enclosing a most confidential
letter for your pleasant chief. Will you be so very
kind as to personally hand it to him unopened?

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Mr. James Murphy
Administrative Assistant to
Colonel William J. Donovan
Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
28 EAST 68th STREET
NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

9th of 11th mo, 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan

I met Dr. Hans Thomsen on Thursday afternoon, November sixth, at my club. We went to my house for dinner, and spent the evening talking. Dr. Thomsen continues exceedingly lonesome and gratified at an opportunity for any friendly contact. During our conversation he discussed many subjects. The following are a few quotations which might possibly be of some interest to your Bureau.

" If Japan goes to war with the United States Germany will immediately follow suit. The United States has no effective way to wage war in the Pacific. It could not denude the Atlantic to place full fleet power in the Pacific."

" If Tokio and Yokohama should be bombed, the Japanese would surely bomb Manila."

" When Russia collapses, the Japanese will occupy northern Sakhalin. This will alleviate the oil situation in Japan, as the oil supply in Sakhalin is substantial and can be more fully developed."

" Japan is trying to gain time with the United States. In a way this effort works both ways, for the United States seems to be trying to gain time with Japan. In the last analysis Japan knows that unless the United States agrees to some reasonable terms in the near future Japan must face the threat of strangulation or later. Should Japan wait until later to prevent this strangulation by the United States she will be less able to free herself than if Germany is now occupying the major area of both the British Empire and the United States. If Japan waits, it will be comparatively easy."

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
20 EAST 38th STREET
NEW YORK

for the United States to strangle Japan. Japan is therefore forced to strike now, whether she wishes to or not."

" If the United States breaks diplomatic relations with Germany, most, if not all, of the South American countries will do the same."

" The new United States Charge d'Affaires is going to Berlin by boat, via Lisbon. Evidently the United States is in no hurry to get him to Berlin. This probably means that no immediate diplomatic rupture is planned. It is, of course, always possible that a diplomatic break may be postponed indefinitely. Japan and China so continued for two full years. Of course there is always the possibility that my government may tire of the undeclared war, and may itself break diplomatic relations. I think this is improbable, however."

" I was amused at Stalin's radio address. We have definitely taken prisoner, over 3,000,000 Russian soldiers, and these men are now actually working for Germany, building roads, winter barracks, for our soldiers, and other constructive work. We are sure that at least an equal number of Russian soldiers have been killed."

" I am very tired. I need a vacation very much. For three years I have had no rest. I wish we two and our wives could go to Florida for a month to sit on the beach in the sunshine."

I hope this information will be of value to our State Department. Please consider me entirely at your service, but please also realize that I feel insecure in war time to be associating on a personal, friendly, social basis, with the highest representative of the nation with which my country is at war. Like any other loyal citizen I wish to serve in any way I can, but I do wish you would find some method of assuring me of protection in any emergency.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Col. W.J. Donovan
Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.

Colonel Lovell

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
85 EAST 85th STREET
NEW YORK

S. J. Lovell

NOV 6 1941

5th of 11th Mo., '41

Dear Colonel Donovan,

When I reached home on Monday afternoon I found a letter from Dr. Hans Thomsen, and a message to telephone you in Washington. It is fortunate you phoned me, for Thomsen's letter asked me to meet him on Thursday evening, November 6th, at my club here in New York and dine with him. I would have written him that I could not meet him, had you not then told me on the telephone that I might better serve my country by keeping up my contact with him, and reporting to you anything of interest which he might discuss with me.

Dr. Thomsen's letter states that he has been asked by James G. Vail of the American Friends Service Committee, for permission for them to now open a Berlin office. They once had one, but it has been closed for some time. Thomsen states that his reason for seeing me is to get my opinion on the value of this Berlin office to Friends work in Europe, and to aid him in reaching a conclusion as to how to advise his Berlin superiors.

I will endeavor during the evening, to bring our talk to more important current world affairs, so I may perhaps be able to transmit to you, information of some value to you.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.

October 30, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

The following statement was made on the evening of October 22, 1941 by Dr. Hans Thomson to Malcolm R. Lovell, at the German Embassy:

I do not understand the sinking of the Lehigh. An empty boat, sailing in seas far out of war zones should never have been sunk by any submarine of ours. It may have been an accident, but if it was deliberate, I know of no such policy.

Russia has already been permanently eliminated as an offensive factor.

Russian prisoners of war are building winter barracks for the Germans, and roads to supply them. During the last war the Germans and their armies fought for years through Russian winters, and they certainly can do it now. Winter is no German problem.

Russia will have no oil this winter. The Germans may not get any Russian oil, due to oil well destruction in the Caucasus, but this difficulty will be solved by new wells

The President

The White House

Page 2

and by repairs. But the Russians will get no oil at all, now or later.

The people of Russia are facing horrible famine due to the Russian scorched earth policy. The suffering in Russia this winter, due entirely to the Russian destruction of food and housing, will be beyond calculation.

I have come to the point where I will be glad when I am sent home to Germany, although I had hoped to spend my life in the United States. I expect the United States to sever diplomatic relations with us before the new year. I am unhappy here now. My only friends in Washington are a few waiters and some antique dealers. Of course I may have to stay on provided the United States pursues the policy of Japan and China, who kept their embassies open in each other's capitals for two years after open warfare started, closing them only after the recognition of the Nanking government.

The President

The White House

Page 3

I think that the United States will
break with France, at the same time as it
breaks with Germany - or shortly thereafter.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

The President

The White House

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
 22 EAST 68th STREET
 NEW YORK

October 28th, 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan,

On Wednesday evening, October 22nd, I telephoned to James Murphy, telling him that I was dining with Dr. Hans Thomsen, and would endeavor to find out any particular thing you might wish to know. Mr. Murphy tried to speak with you, but he told me that he had been unable to get to you, so it was not possible for me to solve any especial problem for you.

The following bits of conversation may be of some interest to you, and I report them in the hope that this information may be of value to the Administration.

Dr. Thomsen said,

" I do not understand the sinking of the Lehigh. An empty boat, sailing in seas far out of war zones should never have been sunk by any submarine of ours. It may have been an accident, but if it was deliberate, I know of no such policy."

" Russia has already been permanently eliminated as an offensive factor."

" Russian prisoners of war are building winter barracks for the Germans, and roads to supply them. During the last war the Germans and their armies fought for years through Russian winters, and they certainly can do it now. Winter is no German problem."

" Russia will have no oil this winter. The Germans may not get any Russian oil, due to oil well destruction in the Caucasus, but this difficulty will be solved by new wells and by

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
26 EAST 86th STREET
NEW YORK

repairs. But the Russians will get no oil at all, now or later."

"The people of Russia are facing horrible famine due to the Russian scorched earth policy. The suffering in Russia this winter, due entirely to the Russian destruction of food and housing, will be beyond calculation."

"I have come to the point where I will be glad when I am sent home to Germany, although I had hoped to spend my life in the United States. I expect the United States to sever diplomatic relations with us before the new year. I am unhappy here now. My only friends in Washington are a few waiters and some antique dealers. Of course I may have to stay on provided the United States pursues the policy of Japan and China, who kept their embassies open in each others capitals for two years after open warfare started, closing them only after the recognition of the Nanking government."

"I think that the United States will break with France, at the same time as it breaks with Germany, - or shortly thereafter."

The above ends the quotations.

It is hard for me, Lovell, to know whether or not I should ever see Dr. Thomsen again. I feel that my contact may be of real value to my country some day, but since you do not write to me expressing any present instructions or wishes, I do not know that your previously stated opinion that I should, as a private citizen, keep up my contact, still applies now that our country seems to be so definitely at war with Germany. I have told Dr. Thomsen that I probably would not see him again, and unless you, or some other Administration official advises me to the contrary, I will stop all contact with him.

Cordially yours

Col. William Donovan
Bu. of Co-ordination of
Information
Washington, D.C.

Malcolm Lovell

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
20 EAST 88TH STREET
NEW YORK

2nd of 10th mo, 1941

My dear Mr. Murphy,

Will you be so very kind as to
see that Colonel Donovan receives the enclosed
envelope unopened.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Mr. James Murphy
Administrative Assistant
to Colonel William J. Donovan

MALCOLM H. LOVELL
28 EAST 86th STREET
NEW YORK

And of 10th, Mo, 1941

My dear Colonel Donovan,

I am thoroughly convinced that I should at once sever all friendly ties with Dr. Hans Thomsen and should not see him again at all, unless you specifically communicate with me and request me to see him on some matter of importance to your department.

The last time I saw Dr. Thomsen, on Tuesday September 30th, I told him that I thought I might decide not to see him again, and he said that he appreciated that any American having contact with him would be in danger of being misunderstood and possibly of incurring adverse publicity.

This definite danger has always been before me, but up to now I have always thought that the day would come when my contact might be of inestimable value to my government. For this reason I have kept up my friendship, even as actual war approached.

Now that war is here I feel that I should no longer even see Dr. Thomsen, unless it be at the request of the President, through you.

I am quite willing to continue to act as a private citizen, but only as a private citizen obeying the instructions of his President.

I hope I have been of some assistance to you and that information I have secured for you has been of value. If at any future date I may be of further help, I will gladly

MALCOLM N. LOVELL
88 EAST 88th STREET
NEW YORK

obey orders from you, if my services will benefit the state.

Unless I do receive such definite instructions, I will not again see or communicate in any way with Dr. Thomsen, except to write him a last letter explaining that we must drop our friendship until after the war, and if I do not hear from you before the end of the next week, I feel I must write him such a letter.

Please do not fail to call upon me, however, if you ever truly need me. Like all other patriotic Americans I will serve to the best of my ability, in any way my President deems best.

Until then

Most cordially

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.

The following are certain statements made by Dr. Hans Thomsen on Monday night to a friend of his:

He said he expected that the United States would sever all diplomatic relations with Germany by the end of this year. When that happens, he said he would charter a Swedish ship for the trip home. He said the reports they had were that their consuls and their families were ill-treated on the American ship which returned them to Europe. He wants to purchase a large electric ice-box and take it back home with him.

When asked about what he thought the Japanese would do, he said they could not tell yet what they would do; that they were very unsatisfactory Allies; that they were too self-centered and selfish. He said certainly they were watching the Russian situation like a hawk and any break there would make them feel freer from pressure than they do now.

When asked what he thought the German military plans would be after the Russian campaign, he said that the High Command is ready to move in several directions; that they are the world's best opportunists; that unless peace with Britain would follow the collapse of Russia, the next move would be made at the place most vulnerable at that time, and where a defeat of Britain would most vitally affect the war as a whole. He said he could not guess where that would be and doubted if the High Command would be willing to guess; that it was ready to move in several different directions.

Meeting with Dr. Hans Thomsen
beginner on Monday Sept 29th.

I asked him what the German military plans were, after the end of the Russian campaign. Dr. Thomsen told me the following:

"The German High Command has complete plans down to the last machine gun, for campaigns in the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq, Turkey - by agreement or force. Syria, Palestine, Suez. Spain, Portugal, Gibraltar, Britain.

The High Command officers are the world's best opportunists.

Unless peace with Britain follows the collapse of Russia, the next move will be made at the place most vulnerable at that time, and where a defeat of Britain will most vitally affect the war as a whole.

I cannot at this moment even guess where that attack will be made, and I am sure that the High Command could at this time make any guess at

II

Dr. Thomsen said he expects the United States will sever all diplomatic relations between Germany and the United States, by the end of this year (1941).

He tells me that he will charter a Swedish ship for the trip home, and will not accept a trip in an American ship. This is due to his belief that his consuls and their families were deliberately ill treated on the American ship which returned them to Europe.

He has asked me to purchase for him a large electric ice box, well crated, and keep it in the basement of my home until he is sent back to Germany, when he would have it ported to his ship.

MALCOLM H. LOVELL
28 EAST 88th STREET
NEW YORK

Sept. 25th, 1941

My dear Colonel Donovan,

I telephoned yesterday to Mr. Murphy suggesting that you meet George Sokolsky while you were in New York.

Would you like me to ask him to come to Washington to talk with you. He is one of the world's best informed men on Russian and Japanese affairs. His column in the New York Sun and other papers, is widely read.

He believes that before long Britain will make peace with Germany, and that all of Europe and Britain, will be allied, and opposing this hemisphere. His theory is worth some study. And Sokolsky is of sufficient national calibre to warrant some attention.

It may interest you to know that Mr. Knouse, the leading banker of Portugal, said the same thing last week end when he and I were house guests of Ben Smith at Smith's country home. Why do you not meet Mr. Knouse while he is in this country?

These ideas as to Europe are not mine. I merely tell you of them so that you may meet these men should you care to, in your capacity as reservoir of all information, good and bad, true or false. Sokolsky has told me that he is willing to come to Washington if you care to meet him.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
Sixth and Constitution Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Handwritten:
J. Smith
L. Smith
Mr. Lovell
9/29/41
5:00 PM

Handwritten:
L. C.

September 25th, 1941.

GEORGE SOKOLSKY

George SOKOLSKY describes himself for his Who's Who biography as "author, lecturer, journalist, industrial consultant." This seems to be unduly modest, for Kenneth M. Lloyd, Chairman of the American Iron and Steel Institute paid tribute to him as "the outstanding advocate of the open shop in America," and TIME capped this by calling him a "one-man intellectual front for conservative capital." He is essentially a circumcised Fascist. He has a gift for the use of effective words, and he writes well. His willingness to align himself with pro-Fascist forces, which must be alien to him as a Jew, grows out of a conscious prostitution of his talents.

His extreme anti-New Deal and anti-labour bias has made Sokolsky acceptable to the upper ranks of American industry. In 1938 the LaFollette Committee disclosed that he had been hired by the public relations firm of Hill & Knowlton as public relations counsel for the American Iron and Steel Institute. For a fee of \$40,000 he acted as consultant in the preparation of pamphlet material and delivered lectures and radio talks. During the time he was secretly in the employ of the Institute, Sokolsky continued his attacks in the Tribune column on labour's efforts to organize in the steel industry, a practice considered highly unethical by reputable newspaper men.

In recent years Sokolsky has been a spokesman for the powerful Tory group in the National Association of Manufacturers. As such he has worked closely with the American fascist sympathizers, while at the same time emphatically repudiating such avowed fascists as Father Coughlin. His current fight on the use of Dr. Harold Rugg's textbooks in the public schools brings him into the same camp as Merwin K. Hart and Elizabeth Dilling.

In the past, Sokolsky fought the NRA which he said "spelled Fascism:" and the C.I.O., whose "minority control of the United States" he compared to "the maneuverings of the Nazis before they achieved power." The efforts of the Roosevelt administration to help the dispossessed sector of our population he characterized as handicapping the strong and coddling the weak, and asked, "What sort of a people will the progeny of such a doctrine be?"

His column of February 6th, 1939, set forth Sokolsky's attitude toward war. He lumped together indiscriminately as our heritage for the last war "prohibition, the gangsters, Al Capone, Dutch Schultz, over-expansion, the boom flappers, crazy education, Communism, Fascism, class consciousness, the depression, the recovery, the New Deal, government expansion of control of the means of production and distribution, the W.P.A., the P.W.A., debts and taxes, increased debts and increased taxes... lessening of patriotism and a loss of intellectual integrity."

One has not far to seek for the causes of Sokolsky's determination

- 2 -

to keep America neutral. His column of October 2, 1939, written after the war had broken out, reflected his fears and the fears of his bosses. Through his alter ego "Sam" he stated, "... that everything is all ready to bust up private business in this country, the day we go to war. That war board that sits in Washington now... is making the plans and I bet you anything you got that when the President says to Pershing 'Go' those boys will pull out plan No. 94 from their safe and say, 'Hand over the steel plants and chemical plants and the coal mines...' So what will we have? We'll be fighting Hitler to lick his grabbing everything, and to do it we'll let Washington grab everything..."

Events finally forced Sokolsky to the conclusion that "as much as every American hates war, and as much as most of us are opposed to sending an American army to Europe, most Americans are keenly determined that Hitler and his barbarisms shall not dominate the world..." He claimed, however, that aid to England was impossible under the Roosevelt Government. He said, "We now know, after nearly eight long years, that liberal planning has wasted our national wealth, that liberal control of our nation's purse has dissipated our resources, that liberal administration has prostrated industry and that liberal management of our Army and Navy and Air Force has left the nation unprepared... We face as critical a moment as England did when MacDonald got rid of the British New Dealers and France did when she got rid of the Blum New Dealers..."

He regarded H.R. 1776 as "an extension of dictatorial powers and an elimination of Congress from the war policy of the country... The only issue before the American people today is whether such an accretion of power (to the President) is necessary, wise, profitable and morally justifiable. If, as its proponents claim, this step is necessary, then why has the British Parliament not been asked to commit Hara-Kiri?" Again, he stated, "I want to aid Britain... But I do not want Franklin D. Roosevelt and his coterie of superior thinkers to use England's distress to destroy the liberties of the American people, nor do I wish American production and distribution to be socialized as part of war participation, nor do I wish to see the Republican party wrecked by Mr. Willkie because of his personal competition with Mr. Roosevelt in proving that he wants to help England."

Sokolsky's flirtations with the Fascists have included attendance at meetings run by Merwin K. Hart whom he defended in his column. The Sun when Hart's viewpoint was attacked by Congressman Bailey. A time he was involved in Coughlinite Allen Zoll's Council to Keep America out of War, whose pretensions to "neutrality" served to cloak the pro-Nazi sympathies of such of its members as Thomas Blisard, Jr., Philadelphia Coughlinite, the notorious Mrs. Elizabeth Dilling, and Mrs. David D. Good, admirer of General George Van Horn Moseley.

Sokolsky's hatred for the New Deal is apparently greater than his hatred of Hitlerism.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

RELIEVES FRODO & DOOMED

Canadian Premier Says Nazis
Ruling All Europe.

Winston Churchill, Premier of Great Britain, declared the defeat of Hitler in a speech today at a Victory Luncheon in his honor at the Hotel New Yorker. He said, "The President of the United States has said, 'The hour has come when we must go to the aid of Europe.'"

Urging the Americans to defend themselves, he said, "We have the resources, the man power, the brain power and the money. The only thing we lack is the will to fight."

"I speak in behalf of the enslaved peoples of Europe. I speak in behalf of Winston Churchill, who has asked us to join him with the task. To my American friends I say, give the task to Great Britain, be the task is the outpost of Europe. If Britain falls, the United States and Canada will share the fate of Hitler's Europe."

He predicted that ultimately there will be no boundary line between Canada and the United States any more. "The needs of the human mind will bring us closer and closer together."

Socialists associated
with

Sir James Hume
(Toronto)

W. Hephburn (Toronto)
PM

Rev Smith

(Boston) Econ. Research

Blum has
contacts with
Vichy

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
26 EAST 38th STREET
NEW YORK

September 25th, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan
Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.

My dear Colonel Donovan,

I have given much thought to ways in which I can be of help to you. Since our meeting of last Monday I have tried to place in order, the problems involved.

Since my assistance to you requires co-operation on your part may I outline my problem as I see it.

As I have told you, I now consider the United States no longer to be at peace. We may not legally be at war, but actually we are. It therefore follows, to me, that I may not properly pursue the efforts for peace on which I have so consistently labored during these past three years. I feel that I may now logically do one of two things, - "stay in the quiet", as Quakers say, and meticulously avoid all the Germans, Frenchmen, and Britishers I have made friends of during the above period. It seems to me I should also avoid my American friends who are accustomed to discuss international affairs and the relation of the United States to world problems. My exceptionally close friendship with Dr. Hans Thomsen, and my efforts over the years to persuade him and his government to pursue paths of love rather than hatred, logically and realistically lay me open to suspicion in this day when war is really with us.

This friendship naturally leads even men of great wisdom and charity, such as yourself, to fear that I might, now that the United States is at war, give comfort and aid in

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
25 EAST 88TH STREET
NEW YORK

some way to Germany (although you kindly said it would be without my deliberate intention).

It therefore follows that I should at once and all contacts with Dr. Thomsen and the others, or pursue them strictly under definite orders from you. I feel, however, that under the present informal plan, the risk I am taking is great; the actual danger to me and to my family and Religious Society, of mistaken accusation, damaging publicity, suspicion that I may be lending myself to aid for Germany, - is out of all proportion to the protection which you could possibly accord me, in my capacity as a private citizen trying to aid my country.

From all of this comes my thought that if I am to endeavor to secure information for you, or help my government in any way involving personal risk to me and mine, I should be accorded the protection of the United States. In short I should be actually employed in some capacity, secret or otherwise. I should take the oath which government officers take, I should place myself in this position so that any action on my part, not ordered by you, would expose me to a charge of treason, - and this means treason in war time and all that is involved in such a charge.

Unless you can fully trust me to retain your inner secrets, I can be of no real value to you. Unless you give official orders to me as a government officer, you cannot ever feel sure that I will conscientiously follow those orders.

It is my hope that by placing myself as a government officer, under your absolute control, and subjecting myself to the proper discipline of such a position, your doubts, if any, as to my discretion or loyalty will vanish, and you will be able to use me to the full of my abilities.

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
28 EAST 84th STREET
NEW YORK

From the point of view of each of us, I feel that if I am to try to aid you in extremely confidential matters, I should be under oath, subject to all the controls and responsibilities and penalties imposed on a government officer. You must trust me if I am to do anything worthwhile for you, and you must be able to demand obedience to your instructions, and not merely make suggestions as to what you would like me to do. You should always give me definite, written orders, so that I may not misunderstand what I am to do, nor you on your part misunderstand what you have ordered me to do.

Finally, - I will keep the dinner engagement I now have to dine at Dr. Thomsen's home in Washington on Monday, September 29th. I will endeavor to secure the information you requested me to find out, and I will come to see you at your office on Tuesday, or better yet I would prefer to come to your home direct from my dinner at the Thomsens' arriving about ten o'clock at your house. I will telephone Mr. Murphy when I reach Washington on Monday afternoon, in order to ascertain your pleasure.

Unless you and I find some satisfactory solution to my problem, I will on Tuesday tell Dr. Thomsen that we must end our friendship and not meet again, at least until after the war is over and peace rules this world once more.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

P.S. Due to the intrinsic confidential nature of this letter I have typed it myself. I am sure you will excuse the many errors.

Wednesday - Sept. 24th, 1941.

Mr. Lovell called:

Message: Wants you to see George Sokolsky - N.Y. Sun columnist - authority on Russian and Japanese, friend of Ben Smith. Would like to arrange a meeting or lunch in New York or Washington between now and Monday. Says Sokolsky states he has reason to believe that the next move with international moment sometime within the next few months will be a SEPARATE PEACE BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND THE GERMANS, and some sort of a working arrangement that will align Germany, Great Britain and all of Europe against the United States.

9/23/41

Mr. Lovell - could not wait - says unless you want to see him early this afternoon he plans to take the 2:00 P.M. train to New York but could stay until 4:00.

He talked with Mr. Bertram Vigne and with Dr. Thomsen. Both agree upon the sale of the Normandie in return for food to be sent to France, with understanding that U.S. officials may be designated to supervise distribution of food so sent to see that it goes to the ultimate consumers; also with understanding that Normandie will not be used (except in event of open hostilities between U.S. and Germany) for European traffic, but to be used for South American traffic - thus relieving boats now in that service for European travel.

Mr. Lovell says also that he believes the same deal can be negotiated for the French Islands - according to Vigne and Thomsen.

Mr. Lovell wants it clearly understood that he is not advocating anything, does not understand the policies involved, and has discussed the matter with no one other than named. He will do nothing further until advised by Colonel Donovan.

Talk with Dr. T. on Friday Sept. 19th
with Malcolm R. Lovell

Talk with Dr. T. on Friday, Sept 19th
 with Malcolm R. Lovell

"Money for me is not necessary. I am a rich man by German standards." This is the statement he made to me following my suggestion that money might be available under certain circumstances.

He further said, "It has always been my intention to bring about friendship between Germany and the United States. My efforts in this direction are well known both in Germany and the United States." "If the United States had given more political encouragement to Germany against Britain and France, and had backed the German governmental system in 1918, this war in Europe today never would have occurred."

"I have never approved of undercover methods, and I have never taken part in them. I know nothing

2

of them. These undercover operations are run by certain departments under the control of the army and are not in the slightest degree connected with the embassy or under our knowledge or control. The undercover agencies in the United States communicate with Germany directly through their own system, and never through the embassy facilities. I would under no circumstances permit it. I have always believed that such undercover methods by either side promote ill will and gain little information of value for either."

"I might possibly be very interested in financial backing and moral and physical aid in a later effort to gain control

3

of the government, provided internal conditions justified such an attempt. With unlimited funds at my call I might succeed in such an attempt. I would, of course, agree that the government I would set up would pursue a policy consonant with the aims of the United States, and the true interests of the German people."

Dr. T. made it very clear that the above is not his decision. He must have time to consider all phases of this matter, but he will discuss it with me very shortly again, and I may be able to iron out problems as they occur to him.

Dr. T. ~~has~~ ^{uses} that word of these ~~things~~ ^{might be} with

4

out. He says that with the invention of the typewriter all secrets became public. He trusts the discretion of no women and a few men.

~~Only~~ two persons ~~besides~~ ~~may be parties to this~~, - Col. D. and the President.

Should ~~D.~~ decide to explore this matter fully he is willing to meet Col. D. at my home in New York, and later, if it is deemed advisable, drive with me to Hyde Park at night to meet the President and Col. D., with me.

No written memoranda may be made of any of these discussions, and no record of any kind may be kept. He said, "I fear mem

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may some day be written by
Col. Don the President, and I
would discuss nothing unless
I am given a pledge by each
man that no mention will
ever be made of these talks
or any decisions later taken.

Dr. T. makes emphatic statement
that he is a patriotic German, but
he feels certain conditions are
wrong and while he would
personally never be willing to
accept any money for himself,
he conceivably might for the
good of Germany, if this aided
him to save his country from
disaster and chaos.

6

Background

A close personal friendship over a three year period has grown up between us. I am far closer to him than anyone other person in the United States. Some time ago we agreed that after the war he would leave the diplomatic service and we would go into business, in New York as partners. He said that with his European connections and my American, our firm would be hugely financially successful.

He has many many times told me that he wishes to live out his life in the United States and Mrs. Thomsen has stated to both my wife and to me that she never wishes to return to Germany.

Dr T. is more Norwegian

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in spirit than German. His father was full Norwegian. His mother is German. Mrs. T. is Austrian. Dr. T. was formerly secretary to Chancellor Hitler and knows him intimately. Dr. T. tells me that due to my peace work of the summer of 1940, I am well known to Hitler, von Ribbentrop & Goering, and am considered one of the important men of the United States (this is obviously absurd but I think Dr. T. may have given them this impression for various reasons of his own).

~~---~~



BY DIRECT WIRE FROM WESTERN UNION

1238

R. B. WHITE
PRESIDENTNEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARDJ. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS	
DL	Day Letter
NT	Overnight Telegram
LC	Deferred Cable
MLT	Cable Night Letter
	Ship Radiogram

The time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination.

WL 2 25 NT

NEW YORK NY SEP 17

JAMES MURPHY

SORRY COLONEL DONOVAN CANNOT SEE ME THURSDAY I WILL COME TO
WASHINGTON MONDAY MORNING MAY I HAVE SHORT APPOINTMENT AFTER
LUNCH MONDAY OR ANYTIME TUESDAY

MALCOLM LOVELL

819A

Lovell, Malcolm

*Lowell, Malcolm R.
+ Stephenson*

September 15, 1941

Dear Bill:

The man to whom I talked to you is
Malcolm R. Lowell, 26 East 38th Street, New York.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. W. S. Stephenson
British Passport Control Office
995 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

If any question is raised as to the certainty of my loyalty to you and to my country, please permit me to personally and gently answer that in your presence, and in the presence of the member of the group who may have raised such question. I assure you I can fully

MALCOLM R. LOVELL
26 EAST 38TH STREET
NEW YORK

satisfy you on that point, and prove my statements, in short order.

Should you think well of our tentative thought, will you permit me to suggest one or two dignified ways in which I could go abroad. I have certain ideas on this subject.

I await word from you. Whenever you may wish to see me, a telephone call will bring me to Washington in a few hours.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director of
Bureau of Co-ordination of Information
Federal Trade Commission Building
Washington, D.C.

Had appointment 9/19/41

*file
Lovell*

SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT
120 BROADWAY
NEW YORK

September 5, 1941.

Hon. Wm. J. Donovan,
1647 - 30th Street,
Washington D.C.

Dear Bill:

Mr. Malcolm Lovell, whom I have known for a number of years because of his friendship with Judge Swan, has been very active in connection with the work of the Quakers abroad and in this connection has had much to do with the representatives of foreign governments here. He has told me that he thinks he could be of some value to you in your work, and desires to be helpful if you should find him so, without any desire to seek employment, compensation or publicity in connection with any service he may render to you.

I believe it would be desirable for you to meet him some evening and hear his story, of which he has told me a very little. He would be willing to go to Washington or to meet you here, or anywhere else, at your convenience. His address is 26 East 38th Street, New York.

Faithfully yours,

Thomas S. Thacher

JAN 14 1942

L. DEW
J. L. DEW

3303

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Preston E. James
 TO: Colonel Donovan
 SUBJECT: Interview with Raymond Leowy

DATE January 14, 1942

Mr. Raymond Leowy called at your office on January 13, and I talked with him in your absence. Mr. Leowy has just completed a trip with his wife around Latin America by air. He visited in the different capitals the leading American businessmen and newspaper correspondents. From them he derived a gloomy picture regarding our relations in Latin America. He reports that the prevailing attitude is a respect for power; and since Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, the prestige of the United States has fallen to a very low ebb. He said that these persons interviewed recommended that the United States abandon a policy of appeasement and assume a forceful attitude.

Mr. Leowy's address is 580 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Preston E. James
 Preston E. James.

Mr. Kimbel:

12-12-41

Thank you for the reports returned
herewith. Please note Mr. James'
comment on p.2.

JAMES P. BAXTER, 8rd

12-10-41

Mr. James:

For your information. Please return.

Noted PE James

JAMES P. BAXTER, Sr

Loewy, Raymond

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 3, 1941

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MEMORANDUM TO: DR. BAXTER

THE ACCOMPANYING EXCERPTS
FROM LETTERS WRITTEN BY RAYMOND LOEWY BY REQUEST
OF COL. DONOVAN, ARE PASSED ALONG TO YOU FOR WHAT-
EVER THEY MAY BE WORTH.

NOTED.

WILL YOU KINDLY RETURN WHEN

W.A. Kimbel
W.A. KIMBEL



Q
O
P
Y
FIRST LETTER

November 18, 1941

Hotel Tsanjuyu
Guatemala, C.A.

Dear Bill:

When we undertake the designing of an important new product, I like to make - in addition to a thorough regular survey - a quick estimate of the situation as seen quickly and without preconceived ideas. This sort of superficial analysis often proved accurate and most helpful. It is exactly what I have done in the case of the attached notes in regard to Mexico. I hope you take it for what it is and I will be more than delighted if it proves to be of any value to you.

We have some ideas about Guatemala too. Jean is making a terrific hit with her spanish. I will write you again from Peru.

Kindest regards from both of us.

/s/ Raymond

Raymond Loewy

Col. Wm. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I have just left Mexico City and I am sending these notes to my office in New York in an envelope to be re-mailed to you as I am told that many letters addressed to U. S. officials are opened by Mexican authorities. I have met many important business men, mostly American representatives of large corporations I work for. Also many young, aggressive Mexicans, leaders in their fields. These have talked to Jean and myself freely, mostly in French, and as a representative of modern American Design. As I have absolutely no idea whether this is the kind of notes your department is interested in, will you consider this as an experiment. If it is not what you want, please let me know frankly.

a. Contrary to most Latin American democracies, this is a country where the people dislike the U.S.A. Of the total population, only 25 per cent have an opinion, but of these, 70 per cent are pro-Axis.

b. The present government, on the contrary, is pro-U.S.

c. The good-neighbor policy is not popular. They suspect it of being a "Friendly Fifth Column" that will eventually mean no good to Mexico.

d. The unfriendly attitude of many important Mexicans is often due to the rough treatment they got while studying in U.S. universities of the Southwestern states. They were

-2-

Not strictly accurate
Rejames
 treated "like negroes" and it left a bitter taste in their mouths. One notable example is RAMON BETETA, assistant secretary of treasury. He is violently anti-U.S., and is supposed to have an important future, politically.

e. Mexicans should be directed to Northern Atlantic Seaboard universities where they are treated as equals.

f. There are many humorous but bitter stories about the way the British have been running the railroads. Also about the fact that the Pullman Co. is sending to Mexico their most delapidated material. There may, of course, be reasons of economics for it but I had no time to go into that.

g. French people are almost 100 per cent free-French. Commandant SIGNORET former French military attache is the active leader.

h. Some young Mexicans in their thirties have impressed me as being men with a future, and it is corroborated by my friends:

GUILLERMO ARRECHEGA: Head of Mexican Tel. and Tel., which he may some day leave for a political career. Married one of EDUARDO MESTRE's beautiful and wealthy daughters. Ed. Mestre is the man who made a big hit with W.P. Wallace during his visit to Mexico City.

HECTOR MESTRE, son of the above Ed. Mestre, is a brilliant young architect.

JOSE (PEPE) CORTINA: Son of former big landowners, who were expropriated, is operating the remains of his estate in a scientific way; is making a big hit with the indians because he gets up at five am., milks the cows and dresses at night.

-3-

He represents a clever new state of mind. He treats the indians well and works with them in contrast to former hacienda owners who rarely came to their lands and then had nothing but cruelty. May become important, but has Fascist tendencies along the Italian lines. Says that democracy is not adapted to a country with 65 per cent illiterates. Resents the good-neighbor policy.

RAMON CORONA: Architect, very popular, writes books for the Mexican Government on Aztec arts. Interesting because he is a typical representative of the middle class.

EUGENIO PINSON: Representative of coming business men. Very successful as the head of Coty, Inc.

IAN DAVIDSON: British, married to a Mexican and very influential. Has been most helpful to us. Can be trusted. He is in charge of SHELL petroleum interests

1. Everybody places great hopes in Vice President Wallace who made a profound hit with the Mexicans. They hope he does not forget his Mexican friends.

f. Finally, and most important. The "border situation" should be remedied. This seems to be most urgent. Custom and Immigration officials at border stations should treat the Mexican subjects who have the proper papers with more courtesy. It is, a constant cause of vexation and they resent the whole thing very much.

I have heard a great deal about the choice - past and future - of the U.S. Ambassadors in Mexico. This is a subject about which I am reluctant to write. But I do wish it were my business to talk about it. In the meantime I am keeping my

-4-

fingers crossed until I read in the newspapers the name of our new envoy. Jean and I have been wonderfully received in Mexico. Some of our friends were not in sympathy with some of the U. S. policies, but their hospitality and courtesy certainly did not show it. They've been wonderful.

Jean and I send you our regards.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Raymond Loewy

P.S. I will mail this from the Canal Zone where we will arrive tomorrow as I am told that it is even less safe to write from Guatemala.

(On back of same letter)

Dear Bill

You have probably heard the story twenty times over but here is how the Mexicans depict their relationship with U.S. at the moment. "The U.S. is a man who has been sleeping with a woman for years and suddenly discovers she has money," this is not an example, but the Mexicans truly have a good sense of humour.

Many people very fond of America are scared to death that all this cultural business is being done on too large a scale and that the minute the war is over will be dropped with a bang. They would prefer starting on a smaller

-5-

scale that could develop, and could also be continued by the American colony in Mexico, if necessary. Obviously Mexico as all other S. A. countries will be on the side of the winner, but for God's sake when we do win this war, let us not drop our present cordiality. Every one agrees that would be a final blow, and every one is afraid that is what will happen.

A purely personal and perhaps ridiculous suggestion is to have all the people we sent to S. A. as impressive looking as possible, big, husky fellows, or extremely intelligent shrewd looking people. Let them get right away the impression that it would be no fun trifling with us.

We are turning on the charm full blast and I am trying to make everyone realize how much nicer we are than the Germans! The trouble is the Germans stay longer.

I asked a very clever person in Mexico why everyone had gone to such pains to be kind to us. His retort was "I could tell you it is because you are so attractive but the truth is that they all feel you like them; going to the trouble to learn their language is enormously pleasing to them." I think the chap had something there.

Goodbye. I hope all this chatter is not too irrelevant.

Cordially,

/s/ Jean Loewy

SECOND LETTER

Lima, Peru
November 21, 1941

Col. William Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

We have left Guatemala, arrived in Peru. The Guatemalan Fair, pet idea of President Jurge UBICO opened on Nov. 16th; as you know I was in charge of interior decorations and planning of the United States Government building. We opened right on time and the Guatemalan authorities are delighted.

The picture Jean and I found in Guatemala is very much different from what I had been led to expect. Here again as in Mexico, our knowledge of French has been a great help, and I had the good luck to meet people who would talk to me very freely. They don't like to speak too openly to British or Americans, as it seems that many of them are only Germans with a good knowledge of English. Then they get in serious trouble with the Guatemalan authorities. Here is what I have been told from sources that looked quite impressive. I will not make any deductions and I had no time to check. But we got the "dope" far from Guatemala City in the wildest part of the country where coffee planters live.

1. It seems that the country is commercially stable due to the fact that the Government of the U. S. is buying coffee and bananas at the right price.

2. Due to the fact that 60 per cent of the coffee planters are Germans, and on the black list, an interesting manipulation is taking place. The Banco Central de Guatemala

-2-

buys the coffee from the Germans, sells it to the U.S.A. and freezes the funds. The Germans are to get it back later "after the Axis has won the war." One large coffee planter, not on the black list, told me he wished he were. He would sell his coffee much more easily, almost automatically and at a good price.

3. The Ubico government is a complete dictatorship. Life in Guatemala City is so restricted and regulated that we left with a certain feeling of relief.

4. The President, and many of his assistants, are frankly pro-Fascist and pro-Axis. Their philosophies are similar. They act friendly to the U.S., as a temporary policy.

5. This seems to be substantiated by the important fact that according to regulations, coffee planters are authorized to possess arms. It seems that every German "finca" is a real arsenal. Our informant, a planter born in France, of French descent and established here since 40 years, has himself several machine guns of late model, plenty of automatic rifles and ammunition. Due to a little graft, he is going to get a cannon (!) from the local authority. It seems that the government would not tolerate so much armament in German hands if they were not in good terms.

6. The country is overwhelmingly Indian and the Germans work hard on them. Planters live with them, eat with them and make friends. There are lots of kids with blue eyes and blond hair in the wildest parts of the country.

7. The white element of Spanish descent is very pro-United States.

-3-

8. They are completely fed up with the present regime and they would like to see as president the present Guatemalian ambassador to Washington.

Again, I must repeat that I had no time to start checking on all this. But it was so definite, and so surprising that I feel I had better report it to you.

I will write you from Chile in about two weeks. In the meantime, my New York office will tell you where to reach me in case you have a communication to make.

Jean and I send you our kindest regards.

/s/ Raymond Loewy

Loewy 4048

L & M File
Call
+ confirm

WAB48 31 NT

NFJ NEWYORK NY MAR 11 1942

COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION APEX BLDG

IS NEXT FRIDAY'S LUNCHEON IN WASHINGTON WITH MY FRIEND

GENERAL YOUNG, CHIEF OF PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLIES, OKAY?

WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE ANSWER BY WIRE SO I CAN VERIFY

DATE WITH YOUNG. REGARDS

RAYMOND LOEWY.

722AM MAR 12 1942

Commandos

Loewy 4048
X Uniforms

R A Y M O N D L O E W Y

February 27, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

The first uniforms will be ready about March 15th. As soon
as one is available, I will send you a photograph of it.

Then, if you are interested, I will take the uniform to you
in Washington so that you can look at it.

Sincerely yours,

Raymond
RAYMOND LOEWY

RL:HP

CHICAGO

550 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK

LONDON

RAYMOND LOEWY

Loewy Hall
X Uniforms

11-2-42

February 25, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Your letter of February 23rd arrived during Mr. Loewy's absence from town. It will be brought to his attention immediately upon his return.

Very truly yours,

Helen Peters

Secretary to
RAYMOND LOEWY

HP

Loewy 40, 18
uniforms

February 23, 1942

Mr. Raymond Loewy
380 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Raymond:

I am glad to have your message. I wonder
if there would be any chance of taking a look
at the uniform.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

RAYMOND

Loewy
winjau - 4048
111

February 20, 1944.

Mr. William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:


We have just completed preliminary designs for a new type of uniform to be worn by guards for one of our clients, an important railroad company. These uniforms are based upon the fact that the guards will have to get into instantaneous action with a minimum of interference from their uniforms and these uniforms will have to offer a minimum of resistance to movement through underbrush or other retarding handicaps.

We are also working on a sound-amplifying device to be built into the helmet or cap in order to increase the hearing radius of each individual.

I believe that a study made of a specialized uniform for raiding purposes based on an entirely open mind could with imagination and a due respect for the practical angle bring outstanding results. My office would be very glad to help you in this matter in case you are interested.

Jean and I hope to have the pleasure of seeing you the next time you come to New York. With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,



RAYMOND LOEWY

RL:HP

Loewy, Raymond 4048

February 18, 1942

Mr. Raymond Loewy
580 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Raymond:

Thank you for your note. I wish
you would write me briefly what you think
should be done.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

*Loewy, Raymond 1098
X Uniforms*

February 10, 1942.


Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Administration Building
25th & 6th Streets
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

If you are at all interested in the development of really up-to-date and functional uniforms for specialized attack uniforms, I would like to discuss it with you. We have given a great deal of thought to the subject recently and perhaps some time when you are in New York, we could have a drink and a little conversation about it.

Jean and I send you our best regards.

Sincerely yours,



RAYMOND LOEWY

RL:HP

5710
 Information *Julle*

address which could
 be used { 6 Colosseum Terrace,
 London, N.W.1.

2 June, 1942.

Colonel Donovan,
 Coordinator of Information,
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan,

I am sending this letter from London, where I arrived ten days ago, in the hope that it may interest you. In my previous reports, which I turned over to you before they were entirely completed, you asked me to write a memorandum concerning the French spirit of resistance to German pressure and also the possibilities of French collaboration in case an invasion was made on the continent by the United Forces. At that time I lacked precise data on the activities of the Free French in the occupied zone as well as in the forbidden zone. Now, having joined de Gaulle's forces and being in constant touch with their sources of information, I am duly authorized to gather information on said question and to communicate them to you. If you are still interested in being documented on the above questions, I could prepare for you a memorandum before leaving London to take up a command, most likely in the Near East.

In such a case and in order to avoid indiscretions, simply wire me "Hope you are well" and sign any name [for instance "Druse"], which would remind me of the office of the Coordinator.

If you are not interested, kindly send "Best wishes".

Please accept my very best thanks for all you have done for me and, believe me,

Most devotedly,

E. Lombard

E. LOMBARD
 Colonel.

Lynch, John J. 9/94

November 26, 1942

Mr. John J. Lynch
 8 Putnam Street
 Buffalo, New York

Dear John:

I have your letter about your boy and have taken the matter up with the War Department. Under the latest instructions of the Secretary of War, the procedure is as follows for obtaining a commission:

1. Enlist in the Army.
2. Complete three months' basic training
3. Get a grade of at least 110 in the Army General Classification Test.
4. Submit application for officers' training through your commanding officer.
5. If approved, application will be submitted with a regular quota of such applications to Washington. When action has been taken, he will be ordered to Officers' Training School.

I am enclosing circular number 367 which sets forth the procedure in more detail. Since the boy seems to have had a good military background, I believe he would have no difficulty in obtaining assignment to officers training school. I wish I could be of more help, but as you know it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain commissions.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
 Director

Lynch, John J. 9194

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: November 24, 1942

TO: Mr. James R. Murphy
 FROM: Col. Paul J. McDonnell
 SUBJECT: Bennett J. Lynch

I suggest the following reply to Mr. John J. Lynch over Colonel Donovan's signature:

The procedure for obtaining a commission in the Army, under the latest instructions of the Secretary of War, is as follows:

1. Enlist in the Army.
2. Complete 3 months' basic training
3. Get a grade of at least 110 in the Army General Classification Test
4. Submit application for officers' training through your Commanding Officer
5. If approved, your application will be submitted with a regular quota of such applications to Washington. When action has been taken, (you) *Re* will be ordered to Officers' Training School.

Civilians are no longer commissioned direct from civil life unless they possess exceptional or highly technical qualifications required by the Army and which the Army is unable to obtain through their Officer Candidate Schools.

A more detailed description of the procedure for qualifying as an officer candidate is contained in the attached Circular 367.

As Mr. Lynch has considerable military background, he should have no difficulty in obtaining assignment to an Officer Training School.

Attachments - 5
 (Correspondence returned)

Lynch - John J. 9/94

November 20, 1942
8 Putnam Street
Buffalo, N.Y.

C
O
P
Y

Dear Col. Bill -

My oldest son has applied to Adj. General's Office, War Dep't, for a commission in the Armed Forces.

He has contacted the Buffalo Officer here, as directed but was told he had to be 35 years old. He will be 31, Nov. 28, 1942

Capt Howe, the Buffalo officer was very courteous and told him he couldn't do anything but advised him to see other sources if he could, and that is why I am writing you. I don't as a rule resort to influence to get anywhere no do my sons, but this young man is a soldier all the way as you may see by his experience, and his straight forward application.

I have two younger sons 24 and 21 years old. The former a 2nd Liut. in C.A.A.A. and the latter a 2nd Liut in the Infantry. Both are on the Pacific Coast. They graduated in July, and October of this year. These 2 lads enlisted almost immediately after you made the statement that this is the time to uphold the President's hands.

I know these two young men will acquit themselves with credit, but I think that Bennet the oldest if he could get his commission would prove more efficient.

I hope I am not overstepping myself in applying to you for help.

He is well known in Military circles here and his character and ability are excellent.

If you can do this for me, I will appreciate it very much.

As Ever
Your friend

Enclosures

1. Letter from War Dept.
(Form)
2. Application to War Dept.
From Bennet J. Lynch.

(Signed)
John J. Lynch

Nov. 20, 1942

8 Putnam St.
Buffalo, N.Y.

Dear Col. Bell -

My eldest son has applied to
Adj. General's office, War Dept, for
a commission in the armed forces.

He has contacted the Buffalo officer
here, as directed but was told he
had to be 35 years old. He will be
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and that is why I am writing
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do my sons, but this young man
is a soldier all the way as you
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straight forward application.

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21 yrs old. The former a 2nd Lieut
in C.A.A. and the latter a 2nd
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the Pacific Coast. They graduated

in July and October of this year. These 2 lads enlisted almost immediately after you made the statement that this is the time to uphold the President's hands.

I know these two young men will acquit themselves with credit, but I think that Bennett the oldest if he could get his commission would prove more efficient.

I hope I am not overstepping myself in applying to you for help.

He is well known in military circles here and his character and ability are excellent.

If you can do this for me I will appreciate it very much.

As ever

your friend

John Lynch.

Loewy, Raymond 11, 822
x Personnel

RAYMOND LOEWY

June 4, 1943.

Brig. General William Donovan, Director
 Office of Strategic Services
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

The bearer of this letter, Mr. William T. Snaith is in charge of the architectural division and models in my organization. He spent several years in France and is a graduate of the Ecole des Beaux Arts in Paris. He is a lecturer at Yale University on modern architecture.

Mr. Simon de Vulohier whom I have known for fifteen years spent most of his life in France where he fought in the last war. He has the Medaille Militaire and the Croix de Guerre. He is in charge of a design department.

Mr. Maurice Barret, who like Mr. de Vulohier is a French citizen, is one of the foremost city planning experts. He has been at Cornell and Harvard Universities and Cranbrook Academy of Art to give lectures on city planning and French civilization. He has a thorough knowledge of the anatomy and appearance of small villages and towns in France. He has a collection of nearly 500 photographs of such localities and I believe he would be the ideal man for such a project.

The reason for my sending these three gentlemen to see you is that I feel that they will be able to cover any problem that may come up during the discussion, each one in his own field.

I have another assistant, who would be very good on this project, Mr. Maurice Kleinman who lived in France for three years and is also a graduate architect of the Ecole des Beaux Arts.

I expect to be back from California very shortly and will give my

22
 550 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK CITY


Brig. General W. Donovan

-2-

June 4, 1943.

immediate attention to the projects should you decide to go ahead.
In the meantime, you can be assured that my assistants are able to
give you intelligent, fast action.

Best regards,



RAYMOND LOEWY

RL:MP

P. S. We are now doing a great deal of work for the Air Corps,
Research Laboratory at Wright Field.

I was asked ^{Lan 216} to forward
this "dye" re
Me and Mrs. Robert G. Mead
Colonel Lan to
you - in case
his services

Ex-novo (Lar) ... 18, 26 West 44 St New York City

Biographical Data of George Lar, formerly Lieutenant Colonel Imperial Russian Army.

An American citizen, born: May 26, 1892, Isle of Wight, England, of a Russian father and an English mother.

Early Life: Son of a Master of the Horse at the Imperial Court and close personal friend of late Emperor Nicholas II. Educated at Eton and then two years in School of Pages. Commissioned Second Lieutenant in His Majesty's Mousers of the Guard.

War Service: After performing a personal mission for the Emperor in England, was sent by the Emperor to General Headquarters (early in World War I) and was seconded to Department of Operations with the rank of Captain. Applied for and received transfer to front line, in infantry. At Fortress of Ivangorod, recommended for St. George Cross for reconnaissance in enemy's rear. Transferred to Eighth Army in Galicia and did special reconnaissance work with volunteers from Fourth Rikhs Regiment. Attached to side of battalion, and duties consisted of observation, reconnaissance, and special operations in their rear. Injured during raid and evacuated to St. Petersburg. Obtained leave to go home to England, spending most of balance of 1915 in hospital.

January, 1916, Count Paul Ignatieff, head of Russian Military Intelligence in Western Europe, asked and got Col. Lar's services in the Internallies Military Intelligence Bureau, attached to the Deuxieme Bureau of the Paris War Office and later to the Fifth Bureau. Upon Count Ignatieff's return to St. Petersburg, Emperor appointed Col. Lar as direct representative of Russian General Headquarters.

Col. Lar thus became head of a very large espionage unit operating in Germany, and Austria through Switzerland, Spain, Holland, Sweden and Norway.

His organization blew up the Skoda works.

He also initiated and developed plans for German revolution, building up a successful "Fifth Column" within warring Germany.

He gave up Russian service at outbreak first Russian revolution. Came to Canada at suggestion of a Canadian friend to obtain commission in Canadian army.

But there being delay about being sent to front, went to Washington and saw Lord Reading, British Ambassador, and offered services.

Was assigned by Lord Reading to assist in creation of new Polish state, and in that connection worked with Paderewski and British political and commercial sources, being instrumental in working out details of first British plan to help new Polish state financially and commercially.


Civil Life: Returned to England and private life. Came to U. S. after war and operated in Wall Street until recently. First connected in Wall Street with the firm of Redmond & Co. in 1923. Gave a great deal of time to economics and industrial analysis. Worked on new issues, refinancing, etc., also in foreign exchange. Did a great deal of work in secondary distributions and market operations.

Recent Activities for U. S. Government: During the past fifteen months worked for U. S. Army Intelligence, working under the direction of Major Eugene Prince of the General Staff at Governors Island, New York City. These services were voluntarily and without compensation.

References: The Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C.
Major Eugene Princes of O 2 - Governor's Island, New York.
Mr. Rydzaleff, Treasurer and Director of Leval & Co.
George Robinson, Economist - an associate of Mr. William de Krafft of 14 Wall St., New York.
Barbert King, member of New York Stock Exchange, 120 Broadway, New York City.

Has exceptionally good banking and industrial contacts in Europe and South America.

LANGUAGES: Besides English, speaks French, German, Russian, Polish and Spanish.



LAR, GEORGE

December 10, 1941

Mr. George Lar
28 West 44th Street
New York, New York

My dear Mr. Lar:

I acknowledge your letter of December 8th and appreciate the information which you sent me. I shall keep this for consideration when circumstances are opportune. Under present conditions, it would be impossible to apply your experience and abilities in this organization, but if changing circumstances develop an opportunity, I will again communicate with you.

Very truly yours,

William A. Kimbel
Special Assistant to
Colonel Donovan

WAK:EG

Twenty-eight West Forty-fourth Street, N. Y.

Suite 1112

Reginald 9-8693

December 8th, 1941.

Mr. William A. Kimbel
Assistant to Colonel Donovan
Co-ordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kimbel:

In compliance with your request I am sending
you a brief memorandum covering my curriculum.

I should appreciate it if you would give me an
opportunity of complementing this short statement with
personal comments.

Very sincerely yours,

George Laro.

Enc.

Biographical Data of George Lar, formerly Lieutenant Colonel Imperial Russian Army.

An American citizen, born: May 26, 1892, Isle of Wight, England, of a Russian father and an English mother.

Early Life: Son of a Master of the Horse at the Imperial Court and close personal friend of late Emperor Nicholas II. Educated at Eton and then two years in School of Russia. Commissioned Second Lieutenant in His Majesty's Hussars of the Guard.

War Service: After performing a personal mission for the Emperor in England, was sent by the Emperor to General Headquarters (early in World War I) and was seconded to Department of Operations with the rank of Captain. Applied for and received transfer to front line, in infantry. At Fortrees of Ivankovo, recommended for St. George Cross for reconnaissance in enemy's rear. Transferred to Eighth Army in Galicia and did special reconnaissance work with volunteers from Fourth Rifle Brigade. Detachment grew to size of battalion, and duties consisted of observation behind enemy lines and special operations in their rear. Injured during raid and evacuated to St. Petersburg. Obtained leave to go home to England, spending most of balance of 1915 in hospital.

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Recent Activities for U. S. Government: During the past fifteen months worked for U. S. Army Intelligence, working under the direction of Major Eugene Prince of the General Staff at Governors Island, New York City. These services were voluntarily and without compensation.

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Mr. Rydzinski, Treasurer and Director of Laval & Co.
George Robinson, Economist - an associate of Mr. William de Kraft of 14 Wall St., New York.
Robert King, member of New York Stock Exchange, 120 Broadway, New York City.

Has exceptionally good banking and industrial contacts in Europe and South America.
Language: Besides English, speaks French, German, Russian, Polish and Spanish.

LAR, GEORGE

336

Mr. Board

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

November 5, 1941

NOV 7 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Enclosed herewith is a letter to you from George Lar which is accompanied by a biographical statement.

He came in to see me at the instance of Thomas C. O'Sullivan whom I also interviewed. Mr. O'Sullivan is a friend of George Leisure's. In talking to Mr. O'Sullivan, he suggested that Colonel Lar might be of use in the Coordinator's Office. I understand that he has already spoken to Mr. Warburg, and Mr. Warburg says that some of the statements contained in the biographical history are not correct. I personally know absolutely nothing about the man but offered to transmit to you any letter that he cared to write. Inasmuch as he worked in Army Intelligence under Colonel Frank Ross, it should be very easy to get his history from that source.

Sincerely yours,

Russell

RUSSELL B. LIVERMORE,
Executive Assistant

Enclosure

C.

Memorandum.

File
Gen
Personnel
File

Nov. 12.

Re George Lee.

I talked to Colonel Baxton about this individual today. He knows about him, and advises strongly against our using him.

N.T.B.

Nov. 10, 1941.

Colonel Ross:

I would greatly appreciate it if, at your convenience, you would send me a memo regarding any observations you might care to make on Colonel Lee.

D. F. S. Bruce.

11/12/41

Mr. Bruce:

Mr. Lee did some undercover work for me at Governors Island over a period of several months. While I believe him to be reliable, I would not recommend him for any connection with C. O. I.

D. F. S.

Twenty-eight West Forty-fourth Street, N.Y.

Suite 1004

Bryant 9-4693

October 31st, 1941.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Mr. Livermore was kind enough to undertake to deliver this letter to you in person.

I am enclosing for your perusal a brief biography covering the highlights of my activities. I have had quite a chat with Mr. Livermore, and he kindly volunteered to supplement this memorandum by personal comment.

Should you be interested in going into my case further, Colonel Frank Ross, who was until recently the head of G - 2 on Governor's Island, and who is now attached to your organization, will, I am sure, give you an opinion of my work there.

Trusting to have the privilege of an interview with you,

Very sincerely yours,

Geoffrey

Biographical Data of George Lar, formerly Lieutenant Colonel Imperial Russian Army.

An American citizen, Born: May 26, 1892, Isle of Wight, England, of a Russian father and an English mother.

Early Life: Son of a Master of the Horse at the Imperial Court and close personal friend of late Emperor Nicholas II. Educated at Eton and then two years in School of Pages. Commissioned Second Lieutenant in His Majesty's Hussars of the Guard.

War Service: After performing a personal mission for the Emperor in England, was sent by the Emperor to General Headquarters (early in World War I) and was seconded to Department of Operations with the rank of Captain. Applied for and received transfer to front line, in infantry. At Fortress of Ivangorod, recommended for St. George Cross for reconnaissance in enemy's rear. Transferred to Eighth Army in Galicia and did special reconnaissance work with volunteers from Fourth Rifle Brigade. Detachment grew to size of battalion, and duties consisted of observation behind enemy lines and special operations in their rear. Injured during raid and evacuated to St. Petersburg. Obtained leave to go home to England, spending most of balance of 1915 in hospital.

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Col. Lar thus became head of a very large espionage unit operating in Germany, and Austria through Switzerland, Spain, Holland, Sweden and Norway.

His organization blew up the Skoda works.

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He gave up Russian service at outbreak first Russian revolution. Came to Canada at suggestion of a Canadian friend to obtain commission in Canadian army.

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Was assigned by Lord Reading to assist in creation of new Polish state, and in that connection worked with Paderewski and British political and commercial sources, being instrumental in working out details of first British plan to help new Polish state financially and commercially.

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Mr. Kozaleff, Treasurer and Director of Leval & Co.
George Robinson, Economist - an associate of Mr. William de Krafft of 14 Wall St., New York
Herbert King, member of New York Stock Exchange, 120 Broadway, New York City.

Has exceptionally good banking and industrial contacts in Europe and South America.

Languages: Besides English, speaks French, German, Russian, Polish and Spanish.

*Law, Col. George
x Berry*

October 31, 1941

Mr. Walter Berry
c/o Daneyan, Leisure, Newton
and Lombard
2 Wall Street
New York, New York

Dear Walter:

I have your note about Colonel
George Law.

I am sorry that his memorandum
was not acknowledged, and this was pro-
bably for the reason that, on several
occasions from several different sources,
he has been given consideration. However,
it has now been determined definitely
that there is nothing here to suit his
qualifications, and we are sorry that he
cannot be used.

For this reason, I am now return-
ing all of his papers and you may hand
them to him.

Sincerely,

James R. Murphy

M:CC

DONOVAN, LEISURE, NEWTON & LUMBARD
ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS AT LAW
2 WALL STREET

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
COUNSEL

GEORGE S. LEISURE
CARL ELMHOLD NEWTON
J. EDWARD LUMBARD, JR.
RALSTONE R. IRVINE
THOMAS J. McFADDEN
OTTO C. BOERING, JR.
DAVID TEITELBAUM
FRANCIS A. SMICK, JR.
BRANVILLE WHITTLESEY, JR.
GARRETT O'SHEA

CABLE ADDRESS: DONLARD, NEW YORK

BOWEN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

HENRY HENRICK BOND
COUNSEL

NEW YORK, October 29th, 1941

Dear Jim:

Colonel George Lar, Room 1014, 28 West 44th Street, New York, telephoned and said that during August (when I was on a vacation) he left a memorandum with the young lady who was looking after things during my absence to be forwarded to the Colonel. I assume he is or was an applicant for a job and this was a memorandum concerning his career or qualifications. He has never had any acknowledgement and, if the Colonel is not interested, he would like to have the memo returned to him.

Sincerely yours,

W. P.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

February 9, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
23rd and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:


I wanted to again advise you concerning the status of the application of Mr. Louis J. Lawrence of Flushing, New York, who is desirous of being considered for appointment to the position of Special Agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Lawrence was afforded the opportunity of taking the examination in connection with his application in New York City on January 7, 1942. At that time he failed to successfully pass the written examination afforded him. In addition, he was afforded a physical examination and it has been ascertained that his hearing in the left ear is 5/20 instead of the normal 20/20 which would physically disbar him from further consideration for appointment to the position of Special Agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The nature of the work performed by Special Agents of this service makes it necessary that these Agents enjoy good hearing and in Mr. Lawrence's case he has only twenty-five percent hearing in his left ear which would make it impossible for him to meet our rigid physical standards.

I regret that I cannot advise you more favorably concerning his application; however, I am sure you will understand the Bureau's decision in this matter.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely,



Lawrence
2074

December 29, 1941

Colonel George A. Lawrence
68th Regiment, N.Y.C.
68 Lexington Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear George:

After investigation in regard to your letter of December 10 about your son, Louis, I find that he was afforded a written examination in connection with his application in New York in May, 1941, at which time he failed to pass. Also, as far as his selective service status was concerned, he merely had a student deferment.

I am glad to say it probably can now be arranged to have him again contacted to determine his selective service status at this time, and should there be any change in his status whereby he is not subject to induction in the immediate future, he will be

Col. Lawrence

-2-

December 29, 1941

afforded an additional examination in connection
with his application.

Please let me know what happens, be-
cause I am interested.

Very sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

WJD:dyb

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

DEC 24 1941

December 20, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
23rd and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Receipt is acknowledged of your communication of December 13, 1941, submitted in behalf of Mr. Louis J. Lawrence of Flushing, New York, who is desirous of being considered for appointment to the position of Special Agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

From a review of Mr. Lawrence's file it is noted that he was afforded a written examination in connection with his application in New York City on May 9, 1941, at which time he failed to pass the written examination. It is also noted that at that time in so far as his Selective Service status was concerned, he merely had a student deferment.

In view of your interest in Mr. Lawrence, I have arranged to have him again contacted to determine his Selective Service status at this time and should there be any change in his status whereby he is not subject to induction in the immediate future, he will be immediately afforded an additional examination in connection with his application. Should he be successful in passing this examination you may rest assured that I will be most happy to further consider his application as additional appointments are made in the service.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely,

2074

file
Laurence Louis

December 13, 1941

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I have a letter under date of December 10 from George J. Lawrence, a friend of mine who is a Colonel in the 69th Regiment of the New York National Guard.

He states that his son Louis, a graduate of Holy Cross College and of Fordham University Law School and a member of the 69th Regiment of the New York Guard, has had an application pending with the F. B. I. for several months looking to employment there, but that thus far he has heard nothing from it.

I would greatly appreciate it if you would find it convenient to check this application and let me know whether there is a chance of his being accepted by your organization. His father was a medical officer in the last war and I would like to do what I can for his son.

Very sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

DB:VP

Lawrence 2074

filed

December 13, 1941

Colonel George J. Lawrence
69th Regiment, N. Y. G.,
68 Lexington Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear George:

In reply to your letter of December 10, 1941, I am checking on your son Louis' application to the F. B. I. and will let you know the results as soon as I can obtain the necessary information.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

DB:VP

Indorse cc. 2074

Mr. Bruce

HEADQUARTERS
69TH REGIMENT, N. Y. G.
68 LEXINGTON AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y.

December 10, 1941.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information,
U. S. Naval Hospital,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill;-

My son Louis, a graduate of Holy Cross College
and Fordham University Law School, insists upon my writing
to you.

He was rejected for selective service and placed
in class 4F, because of a ruptured ear drum. He is in no
wise deaf or otherwise incapacitated by the condition.

He enlisted in the 69th Regiment, New York Guard
but now feels very strongly that he should be in more active
service and feels that you might find a place for him, some-
where or anywhere.

He has had an application with the F.B.I. for
several months but has heard nothing from it.

With best regards from all my officer personnel,
I am.

*64 Father was Medical Officer in Lawrence.
No what you can.*

Sincerely yours,

George J. Lawrence
George J. Lawrence
Colonel 69th Regiment,
New York Guard.

TELEPHONE 1640

PRINCETON
NEW JERSEY

René Léon
February 21, 1942.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

In accordance with your suggestion to my brother I shall arrange to go to Washington on Thursday next February 26th. Unless I hear from you to the contrary I shall call at your office at two o'clock when I hope you can receive me.

Faithfully yours,

René Léon

René Léon

Col. William J. Donovan,
25th & E Sts.,
Washington, D.C.

Leon Rene J.
Barrett
Chante

February 19, 1942

Mr. Maurice Leon
44 Wall Street
New York City

Dear Mr. Leon:

I have your letter, and, of course, I should be glad to see your brother any time he cares to come down. I don't know at this time whether there is anything we can offer him, but at least I will be glad to discuss it.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Howe him
Cosmo Down
44 WALL STREET
NEW YORK

February 10, 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan:

When W. D. Whitney was here last fall I mentioned to him that Judge William Clark, a neighbor and friend of my brother René Léon at Princeton, who was in London at that time, had intended to put my brother in touch with you that you might consider him for the sort of service in your organization which he was especially fitted to render and which he was willing to render as a really disinterested public service. Those in a position to judge regard my brother as extraordinarily qualified for service in connection with Latin America, particularly Mexico, a country which he has known intimately for many years and where he has many friends among men of standing.

Mr. Whitney advised me to await the return of Judge Clark from London as it would be particularly helpful to have my brother put in touch with you by someone who knew him well. Mr. Whitney said that he would be glad to be of service in the matter subsequently.

I understand that Judge Clark did speak to you after his return from London. Mr. Wallace Phillips, when I saw him on New Year's day, told me that he hoped to be able to arrange an appointment for my brother with you. Almost six weeks have gone by since that time - more than twelve weeks since I talked with Mr. Whitney.

Sunday night during a Washington broadcast I heard a report to the effect that you were planning to resume service in the Army. This leads me to wonder whether the appointment will ever materialize.

2.

I hope it will prove no disadvantage to my brother that possessing the qualifications already mentioned, he is willing to serve without pay and that he is not identified with any interests, even remotely, likely to profit from his serving the Government in any capacity.

I would have preferred to speak to you about this situation rather than write; but the difficulty attending an appointment for my brother has led me to think I might have to wait indefinitely before seeing you.

At the suggestion of mutual friends I sent General Weygand on December 12, 1940 a cable concerning you of which I take pleasure in sending you a copy for such retrospective interest as it may possess.

Sincerely yours,

Maurice D. Weygand

Honorable W. J. Donovan,
25th and E. Streets,
Washington, D. C.

Encl.

COPIE


LO (VIA EASTERN, TANGIER)

NEW YORK DECEMBER 12 1940

GENERAL WETLAND
 RABAT
 MOROCCO

MON CHER COLONEL WILLIAM JOSEPH DONOVAN ARRIVE INCESSAMMENT
 LISBONNE EN MISSION IMPORTANTE POUR GOUVERNEMENT AMERICAIN UN
 DES PLUS GLORIEUX SOLDATS ARMEE AMERICAINE QUI COMBATTIT SOUS
 ORDRE VOTRE ILLUSTRÉ CHEF ANCIEN ELEVE UNIVERSITE NOTRE DAME
 OFFICIER VINGT SEPTIEME DIVISION TROIS FOIS BLESSE TITULAIRE
 MEDAILLE HONNEUR CONGRES WASHINGTON POUR CONDUITE EXCEPTIONNELLE
 PRES LONDRES SAINT GEORGES QUATORZE QUINZE OCTOBRE DIX HUIT
 LEGION HONNEUR CROIX DE GUERRE AVEC PALME SI VOUS VOULIEZ BIEN
 LUI ADRESSER INVITATION AUX SOINS LEGATION ETATS UNIS LISBONNE
 IL VIENDRAIT SUREMENT VOUS VOIR ET SERAIT PORTE PAROLE DES
 INNOMBRABLES AMIS AMERICAINS DE LA FRANCE QUI DESIRENT ARDEMENT
 LA VOIR RETABLIE DANS SA GRANDEUR ET SA PROSPERITE ET CHERCHENT
 MOYENS AIDER stop CONVINCU QUE RENCONTRE SUGGEREE OFFRE
 OCCASION UNIQUE ABOUTIR RESULTATS FRUCTUEUX VOUS PRIE ME
 CONSIDERER TOUJOURS VOTRE DISPOSITION ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE
 EVARTS NEW YORK SENTIMENTS DEVOUES

MAURICE LEON



*Leon 2823*UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUITCHAMBERS OF
JUDGE CLARK

NEWARK, N. J. January 8, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
1647 - 30th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I was pleased indeed to hear from you again. I have, as you remember, given letters to two newspapermen, Harvey Klemmer and Weldon James, whom I thought might be useful to you. Rene Leon spoke to me about his desire to see you and I told him that the next time we met I would talk to you about it. I do not know Garrett, whose aid he seems to have enlisted in the matter. Rene is a brother of Maurice Leon, the New York lawyer whom I am sure you know. He was originally with the Guaranty Trust and later a partner in Cude Winmill, but has now retired. He has been somewhat of an expert on currency and has also written a short monograph thereon. Garrett is correct in saying that Rene has been in both Mexico and South America and that he is thoroughly familiar with the language and customs of those regions. If you have the occasion for that sort of help, he might be useful.

I, too, am very anxious to have a talk with you. I have not been in Washington at all but expect to be there within the next ten days. The reason for that visit will

Colonel William J. Donovan

-3-

January 8, 1948

be to try to persuade the War Department to accept my invaluable services. The matter has now reached the stage of a suggestion from Grenville Clark that McCloy, the Assistant Secretary, take the appropriate action.

Jane tells me that she finally had a telephone conversation with you. If you come to New York perhaps we can all foregather. She rather naturally cannot understand on what theory an inadequate garrison was left in the Philippines. I must say I find it a little bit difficult to comprehend myself, as obviously the troops we have had under training for the last 18 months could quite well have been sent there. However, one gets used to not expecting much from the General Staff over which I wish they would place you. It is hard to hold out much hope for Art except that he is captured intact.

Yours sincerely,

Bill Donovan

Leon, Rene 1925
X Garrett, Leo
X Charles J. J. J.

January 5, 1942

Judge William Clark
U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals
Third Judicial Circuit
Newark, New Jersey

Dear Bill:

I enclose a letter that was sent to me by George Garrett, and which he received from Rene Leon. Can you tell me about it?

I have tried to get you by phone several times but unsuccessfully. Likewise, I have called Jane at least twelve times, equally unsuccessfully. I hope she is not worried about her son. No news in these cases is still good news.

When am I going to see you?

Sincerely,

Murphy:Foy

William J. Donovan

Leon 2823

Telephone 1446

PRINCETON

NEW JERSEY

November 27th

Dear George:

My friend and neighbor, Willie Clark, (Judge, Federal Court of Appeals) recently got back from an eight-week mission to England. He met with Bill Donovan early this week and again brought up my name -- with what success I cannot say. He tells me that Donovan is overwhelmed by job seekers.

Perhaps I ought to go to Washington and then talk with D. to whom, after all, I'm only a name and a strange name at that. What do you think of the idea?

...Have you read John Gunther's latest "Inside Latin-America"? If you see it, you might turn to page 109. "The German Colony in Mexico has been compactly and efficiently organized since 1933, and potentially it is probably the most effective Fifth Column agency in all Latin-America ..."

- 2 -

Footnote on the same page begins "The Germans send some of their best agents to Mexico."

I spent 1918 in Mexico City and observed just that. When I was there in '36 you could see them function under your very eyes.

I happen to know - intimately - the tops in the Mexican banking world; the tops in the merchandising world which is almost entirely Free-French owned; the tops in mining through my Am. Smelting, U. S. Smelting and Am. Metals connections. Sesthemes Behn, whose I.T.T. owns both Mexican 'phone systems, is one of my oldest friends.

Nor do I have to learn Spanish or French to get around. So it occurs to me that the short cut to my objective is to meet Demovan personally. What do you think?

With warm greetings

Yours

Rene'

TELEPHONE 1088

PRINCETON
NEW JERSEYNov. 27th

Dear George

My friend and neighbor Willie
Black (Judge, Fed. Court of Appeals)
recently got back from an eight week
mission to England. He met with
Bill Donovan early, his wife and again
brought up my name. — but what success
I cannot say. He tells me that Donovan
is astonished by John Adams.

Perhaps I ought to go to
Washington and then back to D. to
them, after all. I'm only a name
and a shadow name at best. What
do you think of the idea?

... Have you read John Gunther's
book "Lovers Left - America"? If
you read you will turn to page 109.
"The Mexican Colony in Mexico has been
conspiring and effectively organized since 1933,
and probably it is probably the most effective

"Left Column again, is all Left America"
a fact-note in the same page begins
"The Mexican Revolution is the best of all
to Mexico."

I spent 1912 in Mexico City
and returned in 1913. When I was
there - '32 you were in the position
under your very eyes.

I happen to know - intimately - the
life in the Mexican banking world; the life
in the manufacturing world which is almost entirely
free-ford owned; the life in mining through
my own family, H. S. Smith and his brother
Conventions. Southern States. Since 1913
were told Mexican from before, as we know

about friends.

You do I love to hear Spanish
on French to get around. So it
occurs to me that he stuck out to my
objection is to miss someone personally.
What do you think?

With warm greetings

Yours
Kearney

Love 9089

Bill

November 9, 1942

Dear Bill:

Many thanks for your very nice letter, if you will go to bat for me in this case I will take a chance on my army record being jammed up, and here is the reason why. As you probably know all army posts now are recruiting for boys of 18 and 19, and older men who are specialists. Our Colonel has appointed my CO as Recruiting Officer. I have been detailed by him to take charge of this work. He has asked for a quota of fifty men for the month. I told him that I could increase this 100% if he would let me contact the Legion Officials here, that I had founded several Legion Posts and that as a Veteran of the last war I would be able to talk to them with some authority. His reply was to the effect that if I was allowed to do this that more work would be brought into the office than we could handle. Well the truth of the matter is that we do not have anywhere near enough to do. We spend a large amount of our time just waiting for records to come in. I really should have said that most of the men do. I have on my own time been compiling records that should be invaluable to the army. Hundreds of thousands of dollars are being thrown away because of the fact that the Classification Departments in reception centers and basic training centers are sending men to the wrong schools. (This morning, I have pulled cards of twenty men who have failed there courses here, who should have never been sent here, they were mostly men who were too old to learn radio or men that were skilled in other trades and who were not interested in learning. One was a Welder, and we need them for 10 years with an average weekly earning of \$55.00 per week). Yet I can do nothing about this because I was stupid enough to think that I could do something to help my country if I volunteered my services. (the fact is that I could do more on the outside). If experienced personnel men were detailed to this work, and we have many of them in school here trying to learn to become Radio Operators this condition would not exist, and we could operate more efficiently.

As an example, last week I was detailed to return a prisoner to Des Moines, while in Chicago I had to contact a Major H.M. Randall of the A.G.O. Office, during the course of our conversation I asked him in view of my experience if I could in some way become connected with his office (they handle classification, but have many Air Corps Men detailed to them) his reply was to the effect that he would like to have me but that he could not under present Army Regulations request for any man by name.

Bill, I am in a tough spot, because some damned second lieutenant does not want to work a little harder I am not allowed to show any initiative, because the Colonel is so interested in getting his 32nd Degree in Masonry, all the work that I am capable of doing is going for naught. Captain Shay our Chaplain here has been trying to contact Colonel Rogers for two weeks in regard to me but cannot because of this fact. So if you will do this one thing for me I will thank you from the bottom of my heart. That thing is, get me assigned to either Recruiting or Classification at a Basic Training Center or a Reception Center. I can accomplish something there where here I am only a clerk with no chance to help the effort that we all must put forth if we want

to win this war. Sorry I wrote such a long letter, I know you are terribly busy and that my personal problems are not so important, but as I said in my last letter you really can help me and help the effort if you will assist me in getting this transfer.

Sincerely yours,

James Love

June 4, 1942
X Commission
X Army

✓ 4085-4005-A

October 30, 1942

Mr. James Love
334th HQ and AB Sqd.
AAFTTC
Madison, Wisconsin

Dear Jim:

I have your letter of October 26th, and I can certainly sympathize with your situation. However, I hesitate to attempt to interfere through the Air Corps Staff in Washington. You have had enough military experience to know that this sometimes works to great disadvantage and may prejudice you more than it will help. For that reason I hesitate to do what you ask. Why not try to stick it out for a while longer and see what happens. Certainly your ability will be recognized.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Love 4085a
 X Commission
 X Army

October 26, 1942

Dear Bill:

I hate to keep writing to you asking for favors continuously but you are the only man that I can appeal to that can help me and believe me I need that help if I am going to get anywhere for it is shameful the way an older man gets shoved around. I left a profitable business, split up my home (my wife joined the WAAC) and enlisted in hope that I could use the ability that many years of business experience has given me to benefit in the army, but foolish rules and endless red tape plus the fact that an older man is not considered unless he is a mechanic or an officer have made me waste many dollars of the army's money and valuable months of my time. At the risk of boring you I will tell you my experiences. The first 35 days was spent at basic training, while there I performed a sergeants duties. 5 weeks spent at Parachute Mechs. school, then one week in the office of the school awaiting assignment. Then duty at the AAFTC School at Madison, Wis., where I now perform the arduous work of taking countless cards and writing with pen and ink the date of arrival and the assignment to various squadrons of incoming pupils. I do this with pen and ink whereby it could be done with a rubber stamp in 1/2 or 1 of the time. My CO is a 24 year old 90 day wonder and while he well acquainted with the fact that I have a good record has not even given me and will not give me a chance to meet my Captain, who might possibly give me an opportunity to at least try to demonstrate my ability.

Bill, outside of clerical work, and I would rather do kitchen police ten hours a day, for I am not afraid of work, the only place I have in the army is recruiting, and a terrific campaign is going to be waged for older men (who are specialists) and 18 to 19 year old kids or in the classification of those men and kids at a reception or basic training center and if you could see the misclassifications that I see here you would realize how inefficiently it is being done now.

Bill, as a favor to me and I promise I will never ask another, will you contact some high up official in the Air Corps and get me assigned to one of these tasks, I know that a phone call from you will do the trick and instead of wasting all my time, ability and energy I will be able to use it for my benefit and the benefit of my country. I am terribly sincere when I say that all of my effort at present is for naught.

I am sorry that I have written such a long letter but I am terribly burned up with the way my case and the cases of hundreds of older men in the army are being handled that I felt that I had to state it in full. If there is anything you can possibly do to help me please do it.

Sincerely yours,

James Love
 ASN 19100546

Pvt James Love
 334th HQ and AB Sqd
 AAFTC
 Madison, Wis

Love 4055a
x commission
x army

COPY

September 24, 1942

My dear Bill:

Thank you very much for the letter of recommendation. I presented it along with a letter from my former captain at Camp Kearns today. The officer who received it was very much impressed and rather intimated that I could be commissioned direct from the ranks if I could contact the proper people. That happens to be Major General Couzens who is in command of the Air Force for the West Coast. His headquarters are at Santa Ana, Calif.

If it is not asking too much and if you are in a position to secure an audience with the General, I will greatly appreciate it, as I am confident that I would ably qualify as a commissioned officer.

Thanks again for all of your past kindnesses.

If such an appointment can be made I will be at this address for 3 more weeks.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ James Love

Private James Love,
Parachute School,
Cal-Aero Flight Academy,
Ontario, Calif.

Letter 4085a
 A Commission
 A Army

September 24, 1942

My dear Bill:

Thank you very much for the letter of recommendation. I presented it along with a letter from my former captain at Camp Kearns Dodge. The officer who received it was very much impressed and rather surprised that I could be commissioned direct from the ranks if I could contact the proper people. That happens to be Major General Clegg who is in command of the Air Force for the west coast. His headquarters are at Santa Ana, Calif. If it is not asking too much and if you are in a position to secure an audience with the

General I will greatly appreciate it
as I am confident that I would
ably qualify as a commissioned officer.

Thanks again for all of your
past kindnesses.

If such an appointment can
be made I will be at this address
for 3 more weeks.

Sincerely yours

James Love

Private James Love,
Parachute School,
Cal. Aero Flight Academy,
Ondano, Calif

Love 4085R

x Commission

x Army

September 15, 1942

Pvt. James Love
Parachute School #4-42
Cal Aero Academy
Ontario, California

Dear Jim:

✓ I have your letter, and I am glad you are doing well.

I enclose a recommendation which you are free to use for whatever it may be worth.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

September 15, 1942

THROUGH IT MAY COME

I understand that Private James Love, Parachute School number 4-42, Ontario, California, desires to make application for officers training. I have known Mr. Love for many years, and I am glad to recommend him as a man of good morale character, intelligence and loyalty. If he meets the general requirements for officers training, I believe he would serve as an officer with credit and distinction.

William J. Donovan
Director

Love 4085a
X Commission
Army

COPY

September 9, 1942

My dear Bill:

I did not answer your reply to me letter to you asking for a letter of recommendation any sooner as I did not know at that time who to ask you to address it to. I find now that it should be addressed to "To Whom It May Concern."

So if you could forward such a letter to me at the Parachute School, I will appreciate it greatly.

I have made fairly rapid progress in the Army. I was attached to this school to take a course in Parachute Rigging and while I am still a casual, I am acting a First Sergeant in command of the entire school. I like it immensely and believe I am well qualified to act as an officer.

Many thanks for the splendid help you have given me in this matter.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Jim Love

Pvt. James Love
Parachute School #4-42
Cal Aero Academy
Ontario, Calif.

Love, 4015 a

CAL-AERO FLIGHT ACADEMY

ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA

September 9, 1942

My dear Bill:-

I did not answer your reply to my letter to you asking for a letter of recommendation any sooner as I did not know at that time who to ask you to address it to. I find now that it should be addressed to "To whom it may concern".

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CAL-AERO FLIGHT ACADEMY

ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA

Still a casual, I am acting as
First Sergeant in command
of the entire school. I like it
immensely and believe I am
well qualified to act as an
officer.

Many thanks for the
splendid help you have given
me in this matter.

Very truly yours
Jim Love

Pvt James Love
Parachute School #442
Cal Aero Academy
Ontario, Calif

402. Pot. Gaury
X Commission
ARMY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

August 7, 1942

Private James Love
Flight A, 98th Sq. (S.P.)
1st AF.T.C.
Tuscon, Utah

Dear Jim:

I have your letter of August 3 and would be glad to recommend you for officer's training, however, you do not indicate to whom the letter should be sent. Please send me full particulars as to this and as to how you would like the letter worded.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Loose P.M. Jomo 4085a
- Commission
- Army

COPY

August 3rd, 1942

My dear Bill:

Please pardon the pencil, stationery, etc., but I am writing this letter on the edge of my bed. I am in a new camp which as yet has absolutely no facilities as yet. However it is building very rapidly and will be a great place in a few weeks.

I arrived here Friday and my captain informed me today that he wanted me for permanent party and that he would recommend me for Officers Training Camp. He intimated that he would like to do it immediately if it were possible for him to do so, but he cannot do it in accordance with camp regulations, so I am wondering if you could secure this for me without my going thru this wait.

I am confident I will acquit myself creditably and if you will secure this appointment for me, I will greatly appreciate it and I assure you I will not let you down; if I cannot secure the appointment this way it may be necessary for me to wait many months as I am now applying from Utah which only had 17 vacancies last week and with the large number of men here it surely will have considerable competition.

Colonel Donovan

- 2 -

August 3, 1942

Thanks for all you have done for me, it sure has
been grand of you.

Best regards,

/s/ Jim

Private James Love
Flight A, 358th Sch. Sq. (S.P.)
RTC (T) A.A.F.T.C.
Kearns, Utah

August 3rd / 1942

My dear Bill:-

Please pardon the pencil, stationery etc, but I am writing this letter on the edge of my bed. I am in a new camp which as yet has absolutely no facilities as yet. However it is building very rapidly and will be a great place in a few weeks.

I arrived here Friday and my captain informed me today that he wanted me for permanent party and that he would recommend me for Officers Training Camp. He indicated that he would like to do it immediately if it were possible for him to do so, but he cannot do it in accordance with camp regulations, so I am wondering if you could secure this for me without my going thru this wait.

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Thanks for all you have done for me, it sure has been grand of you.

Best regards

Jim

PRIVATE JAMES LOVE
Flight A, 358th Sch. Sq. (S.P.)
RTE (T) A.F.F.T.C.
Kearns, Utah

4085 James 4085

X Navy

Free X Comm

6331 Hollywood Boulevard
Hollywood, California

July 23rd, 1942.

Col. W. J. Demovan
Director of Strategic Service
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill,

I am in receipt of your very kind letter regarding my securing an appointment as Chief Petty Officer in the Navy.

I became rather tired of combating Navy regulations before receipt of your letter and reapplied to the Army for enlistment. They waived my dental condition and I am now Private James Love, serial No. 19100546. I have a seven-day delay in reporting to Fort McArthur for assignment to duty. As I understand the procedure it is as follows: when I arrive at Fort McArthur, I am interviewed by a Board of Officers and assigned to the branch of service that they feel I am qualified for. I am going to request either Cavalry, as I had previous Cavalry training at Plattsburgh in 1916, and by the way, Secretary of War Stimson was in my troop at that time, -- or air force, as I have considerable flying time.

Bill, frankly, you are the only person that I know in Washington who can be of help to me. I hate like the devil to ask you favors but it seems that sometimes a little influence helps a person and I really am awfully anxious to serve my country in a capacity where I can do my job properly. And I feel that I am better qualified to be an officer than I would to be carrying a pack in the Infantry. Therefore, if it is possible, I would like to be immediately assigned to Officers' Training School. I understand that this is possible in view of my prior naval service and my prior army training camps. However, my previous service is over twenty years old. If you could help me in this, it would be greatly appreciated.

There is also a new camp being opened in Virginia that I would like very much to be able to get into, but you have to be an officer to qualify for this. I understand that this camp is for what will be known as Combat Intelligence Officers who will hold the rank of First Lieutenant or Captain. These men are to serve with front line troops and act as intelligence and morale officers. The

Page 2 --

qualifications as set forth in the bulletin I saw at Santa Ana Field are right down my alley and I know very well I could fill this job perfectly as I have had all the experience that they want. This camp is to be under the command of a Colonel Walsh who is in Military Intelligence. If there is a possibility of your helping me get into this Camp or directly into Officers Training Camp, I will be very grateful to you.

I am to report to Fort McArthur on Tuesday, July 29th. If it is possible, will you contact some friend of yours in the War Department and request that I be assigned immediately to Officers Training Camp.


I called my mother on the telephone last night and told her of what I have done, and she was very much pleased. I also told her of your letter and she asked to be remembered to you.

I might also add that my wife is now at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, training to be an officer in the W.A.A.C.

Thanking you again for anything that you might do to help me, I am,

Sincerely yours,


James Love



(Love 4/25/5)

////////////////////

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 17, 1942

To Whom It May Concern:

Mr. James Love
6331 Hollywood Boulevard, Hollywood,
California

Dear Sir:

I have your letter of the 7th and have discussed the matter with the Navy. I understand that the Navy will not enlist men in higher than their previous rating, unless they have had some specialist training. Unless I am glad to recommend him as a man of good moral character, intelligence, and loyalty, and to endorse his application for service with the Navy in the rating of a Chief Petty Officer. It might be well for you to start out with the best rating you can get. Of course I am glad to give you a letter which you may be able to use when you file your papers.

William J. Donovan
Director

William J. Donovan
Director

Love 4085

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 17, 1942

Mr. James Love
6331 Hollywood Boulevard
Hollywood, California

Dear Jim:

I have your letter of the 7th and have discussed the matter with the Navy. I understand that the Navy will not enlist men in higher than their previous rating unless they have had some specialist training. Unless you have been serving in the Naval Reserve and can qualify for commission by reason of special training, it might be well for you to start out with the best rating you can get. Of course I am glad to give you a letter which you may be able to use when you file your papers.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Love, James 4085

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Silas B. Moore, Commander, U.S.N. DATE July 9, 1942
 TO: Mr. James R. Murphy
 SUBJECT: James Love
 Encl.: Original letter from Mr. James Love addressed to Colonel Donovan.

1. The enclosure is returned herewith. I am not able to offer any very concrete suggestions because I do not know the whole story. For example, how old is Mr. Love? Where did he perform his duty in the last war? To how much trouble is Colonel Donovan willing to go to help Mr. Love out?

2. It might be possible for Mr. Love to be reinstated in a higher rating than Radioman, Second Class, if Colonel Donovan will write a "To Whom it May Concern" letter stating that he has known Mr. Love for so many years and considers him especially qualified for duty in the Navy and requests any special consideration which can be given to Mr. Love with a view to giving him the rating of Chief Petty Officer, etc. It is my understanding that the Navy does not like to enlist men in higher than their previous rating unless they have had some specialist training, and it is my opinion that unless he has been serving in the Naval Reserve and is really qualified as a Second Class Radioman he will be exceedingly fortunate to be reinstated in that particular rating.

S. B. Moore
 S. B. M.

Love, James 4083

6331 Hollywood Boulevard
Hollywood, California

July 7th, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Co-Ordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I have exhausted every means at my command to secure a commission in either the Navy, the Army, or the Marine Corps. I have also tried to enlist in the Navy, but until recently was unable to do so as I was not a specialist in any particular field.

However, within the past few weeks the Navy has relaxed their regulations and I can reenlist in the Navy with the same rating I held during the last war.

When I enlisted last time I had impacted wisdom teeth, and as a result I was compelled to have some of my teeth extracted and bridges made to replace them. Over a period of twenty-five years these bridges naturally deteriorated and it was necessary for me to have all of my teeth removed. Last week I tried to enlist in the Army but was turned down because of the fact that my lower jaw had not healed sufficiently and the denture did not fit properly as a result of this condition. I would not like to be turned down by the Navy, therefore, I did not make application for enlistment until I had an opportunity to write to you. If you can possibly do it, I would appreciate it if you would take up with some officer in the Navy Department the possibility of my securing a waiver for my defective dental condition. My rating was RM20, and I cannot see how this would interfere with the performance of my duty.

In addition if it would be possible for you to help me get a better rating than second class, I would appreciate it as I need all financial aid in supporting my family that I can secure, and I feel that I can hold down a Chief's rating satisfactorily. If you can do this for me, I will appreciate a copy of the letter, so that I can present it when I try to reenlist in the Navy.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

James Love
James Love

Love. ✓

JAMES LOVE AND ASSOCIATES

6331 HOLLYWOOD BOULEVARD
HOLLYWOOD, CALIFORNIA
GRANITE 9488

December 19, 1941.

DEC 24 1941

File

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

I am in receipt of your letter of December 13th, in reply to my letter of December 7th. Several days after I wrote you, I applied for a commission at the Naval Reserve Headquarters here, but I was informed that I could not qualify as I did not have a college diploma, nor was I qualified as a purchasing agent or in some other specialized line of endeavor -- my experience being along executive lines.

Your letter was greatly appreciated, and if conditions change and you are able at a future date to be of assistance to me in securing this commission, I will be grateful for anything you can do for me.

Very best personal regards and wishing you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, I am,

Sincerely yours,


James Love

JL:ME

LOVE, JAMES

December 13, 1941

Mr. James Love
6311 Hollywood Boulevard
Hollywood, California

Dear Jim:

I have your letter and I am very glad of your interest in the Service. I am sorry that our task here involves the use of technicians and scholars that are specialists. We are not in the intelligence branch of the service. It is true that I know Secretary Knox, but I cannot exert any influence in the designation of commissions. That now, in time of war, must be done through the proper channels. I am afraid, therefore, that you must get in touch with that branch of the service. You must deal directly there.

I am glad to hear from you again after all these years, and I certainly wish the best of luck to you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

JAMES LOVE AND ASSOCIATES
 8881 HOLLYWOOD BOULEVARD
 HOLLYWOOD, CALIFORNIA
 90028-1588

December 7, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan,
 Washington, D.C.

My dear Colonel:

I had better preface this letter by recalling to your attention my identity. I am doing this in hopes that it will receive your personal attention.

I am the son of William H. Love, who before his death in 1911 was associated with you in the law business in Buffalo, N.Y. I also worked for you when you were in the law firm of Donovan and Goodyear. If my memory serves me correctly you were also my sponsor when I made my first communion in Buffalo.

I have just heard the reports via radio of the attacks made by Japan on Honolulu and Manila. Naturally this prompts me to want to get back into the Navy if it is possible for me to do so (I was in the Navy during World War #1 as a radio operator). Of course I would be valueless in this capacity as I have not kept up with radio development since my release from service.

I believe however that my general business experience would qualify me to be of value to the Navy in ways as I realize that I could possibly fulfill efficiently the duties of an officer now assigned to some executive task providing for his release to more active duty.

I will herewith give you a brief outline of my abilities and some facts regarding my life. I might say that I have just contacted my doctor and while he did not make a detailed examination of me he assured me, that in his opinion, that I could qualify physically for the service.

I am 42 years of age, I have had a high school education and one year in college. Most of my life has been spent in selling.

JAMES LOVE AND ASSOCIATES

6331 HOLLYWOOD BOULEVARD
HOLLYWOOD, CALIFORNIA
GRANITE 6151

devoted to sales work and I am considered by all who know me to be exceptionally capable in that field. I have also had considerable advertising experience and I am considered a very good public speaker. I have also done a great deal of speaking on the radio. Living in California as I have for over twenty years has given me a wide acquaintance in Mexico and while I do not speak Spanish I have had a foundation in the language thru my study of Latin and French. Therefore I feel that I could pick it up rapidly. I bring out this fact as I might be able to fit into the intelligence branch of the service. I also feel that I would be of value in recruiting, public relations, personnel or propaganda work.

Realizing that you are very close to the Secretary of the Navy and the Department I am writing to you to ask you to help me secure a commission in the Navy as I sincerely believe that I could hold down a position of responsibility in an efficient manner and by doing so release some man for other and possibly more important duty.

I am extremely anxious to be able to get into this fracas and I will be extremely grateful to you if you can help me. If you would care to do this and you would want me to come to Washington I will do so immediately. In any event I will appreciate a telegraphic answer to this letter as I am plenty anxious to get into this thing.

I am typing this letter myself as it is Sunday and my stenographer is out of town for the week end. So please excuse the poor typing.

I visited with mother in San Diego a few days ago. You will be pleased to know that she has remarried and is in splendid health and very happy.

My office number is Granite 6151, the address 6331 Hollywood Blvd, my home phone is Granite 1875, my home address is 1405 Havenhurst Ave, Hollywood, Calif.

Very truly yours,

James Love

JAMES W. WADSWORTH
39th Dist. New York

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

GENESEO, NEW YORK.
August 26th, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Your letter of August 22nd addressed to me at Washington reached me here at Geneseo yesterday.

I have already heard from Mrs. Lee^{te} herself and am sorry to say that I had to answer her to the effect that I am not in a position to help her son in his ambition to secure an appointment to the Naval Academy at Annapolis.

You see, under the law, Congressmen are expected to nominate candidates who are bone fide residents of their respective Congressional Districts. Sometimes this provision of the law is stretched somewhat but only in cases where there are no suitable applicants from the District involved and the Congressman, seeking a good applicant, manages to arrange some "color" of residence for the man he wants. In my case no such condition exists. Something like twenty-five youngsters from the 39th Congressional District have applied for my next vacancies at the Naval

JAMES W. WADSWORTH
30th Dist. New York

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Page 2.

Academy. Among them are some splendid young men, of good background, good education and fine appearance. There is no doubt that from them I shall find the right kind. Consequently, it is my duty to confine my selections to these bone fide residents. For me to go outside would not only violate the spirit of the law but would be exceedingly unfair to the youngsters who live in this neighborhood. I have had to write to Mrs. Leete to that effect. Sorry.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. Wadsworth

JWW/aea

Leete 7359
X Navy Dept

August 22, 1942

Honorable James W. Wadsworth
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

One of the officers under my direction, Lieutenant Commander Joseph Leete, now stationed abroad has a son who has qualified for entrance to the United States Naval Academy.

Unfortunately, though young Neale Leete placed in a tie for second among all applicants in the United States in the entrance examinations, he has been unable to get an appointment.

Commander Leete is a good officer, rendering a fine service in a critical Theatre. His boy is intelligent and good officer material. Believing that you may have a vacancy in your quota for Annapolis appointments, I am writing to ask if you would be willing to sponsor Neale Leete. It would be greatly appreciated if you can help.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Order to AF Office

7/8/42

July 8, 1942

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

Dear Frank:

I don't know whether you can do anything about this matter or not, but if you do I will appreciate it.

Lieutenant Commander Joseph Leste is on foreign service for me. His boy is eligible for appointment to the Naval Academy. His excellent record, enclosed, speaks for itself.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

AB
Bryce

Williamson

Cresswell

U.L. Amos JMM

**BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

AIR STAFF

Handwritten: CC-1, J. L. L. L.
Telephone:
Executive 1940, Rm. 298

*WJD made him
got him in*
8th August 1942.

Dear Colonel Donovan,

I am asked by Air Vice-Marshal H.P. Lloyd
to forward you the enclosed letter.

For your information, Air Vice-Marshal Lloyd,
who is now in New York, will return to Washington on
Monday afternoon and will remain here for a few days. He
can be reached either through this office or at the
Shoreham Hotel.

Very truly yours,

E.W. Russell
E.W. RUSSELL
Squadron Leader.

Stamp: RECEIVED 11 AUG 1942
Colonel William Donovan,
Room 2747,
Munitions Building,
Washington, D.C.

COPY

July 25th, 1942
Office of the Minister of State
10, Sharia Tolubat,
Cairo

Dear Bill:

This is a line to introduce Air
Vice Marshal Lloyd who has been commanding
Malta.

I think that you have already met
him. In any case, I know that you will be
most interested in talking to him as he will
be able to give you an account of Malta.

I returned here just at the worst
moment. The position now has improved. When
are you coming to visit us again?

I was sorry not to see you before
you left for England.

With kind regards,

Yours ever,

/s/ Arthur Forbes

July 25th. 1943

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF STATE
10, SHARIA TOLUBAT,
CAIRO.

Dear Bill,

This is a line to introduce
Aide Vice Marshal Lloyd who has
been commanding Malta.

I think that you have already
met him. In any case I know that
you will be most interested in talking
to him as he will be able to give
you an account of Malta.

I returned here just at the
worst moment. The position now

has improved. When are you
coming to visit us again?

I was sorry not to see you before
you left for England.

With kind regards,

Yours ever,

Arthur Forbs.

Little, Louis 8900

April 23, 1943

Coach Lou Little
Barnstable
Massachusetts

Dear Lou:

Needless to say, I was relieved to hear that you are on the way to recovery. Having been absent for so long, I did not know of the operation, and it was therefore something of a shock to get the news from your secretary.

It was nice of you to agree to give us some help. Incidentally, this includes a little part time work for you if you can undertake it. The General and I will discuss this with you later on.

So far as our requirements with respect to Italian speaking boys are concerned, they are as follows:

a. We are looking for an athletic type of boy who could be made into a combat officer. These officers will be used for small, highly mobile combat units for highly dangerous frontier work.

b. The services of these officers are being sought on a purely voluntary basis. Our principle problem is that these men must all be alert, intelligent, courageous and athletic -- the Governelli type would be ideal providing they can handle the Italian language to some small degree. They should at least be able to ask their way about a given locality, and of course the better they speak the language, the more useful they will be.

Any suggestions you can give us will be gratefully appreciated.

I hope your recovery will be quick and complete, and that you will feel like talking to the General and me upon your return. Will you be sure to let us know when you are back on the job and we will arrange to see you in New York. I will say "hello" to the General and Dave Halliwell as you requested.

Best of luck and many thanks.

Faithfully yours,

CC to General Donovan ✓

Ellery C. Huntington Jr.
Colonel, AUS

Little, Louis 8900

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE February 18th 1943

TO

Mr. Conrad E. Davis Halliwell
430 Fifth Avenue, New York City

FROM

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR INFORMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DONOVAN

CLEAR TEXT

CODE OR CIPHER

ACKNOWLEDGE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

OUTSIDE HEADINGS

UNLESS DESIGNATED OTHERWISE, TRANSMIT THIS DISPATCH AS DEFERRED

TRANSMIT

From Donovan for Halliwell

Had a letter from Little. Wish you would tell him we would like to have him and he could work out anything with us he would want to. Tell him I have talked with Fackenthal and you are there to finish up the deal with him.

W.J.D.

TOD: Sent by courier 2/18/43 10:00 p.m.

OPERATOR'S RECORD

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-50851-1

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

EDWARD S. ELLIOTT, M.D.
DIRECTOR OF ATHLETICS

Little Louis *Ego*

Columbia University
in the City of New York

REYNOLDS BENSON
ATHLETICS MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION

7C to Halliwell 1/17

REPLY TO
DIVISION OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS
JOHN JAY HALL

[Signature]

FEBRUARY 17, 1943

COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR COLONEL DONOVAN:-

SINCE TALKING WITH YOU A WEEK AGO, I HAVE GIVEN ALMOST CONSTANT THOUGHT TO THE SUBJECT OF OUR CONVERSATION. LET ME TELL YOU FIRST OF ALL THAT IT IS A SOURCE OF REAL PRIDE THAT YOU HAVE THOUGHT OF ME AS ONE WHO COULD DO A WORTH-WHILE JOB SERVING UNDER YOUR COMMAND.

I WISH PERVENTLY THAT CONDITIONS WERE SUCH THAT I COULD DROP EVERYTHING WITHOUT FURTHER THOUGHT TO JOIN YOU JUST AS I JOINED THE INFANTRY IN 1917. I AM AFRAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS NOT QUITE AS SIMPLE AS THAT.

IF I WERE TO LEAVE COLUMBIA IT WOULD PRESENT A FINANCIAL PROBLEM THAT I COULD NOT OVERCOME. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, MRS. LITTLE AND I HAVE WORKED OUT INFLEXIBLE PLANS FOR OUR LATER LIFE WHICH ARE ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON MY CURRENT INCOME. THESE PLANS INCLUDE OUR PERMANENT HOME. A CHANGE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE HOME, PROBABLY, ALONG WITH OUR INSURANCE ANNUITIES. AS YOU KNOW, THIS IS A LIFE'S PROBLEM WHICH I MUST FACE MYSELF.

IF, AS YOU SUGGESTED, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO CONTINUE MY WORK AT COLUMBIA AND DO THE JOB FOR YOU AT THE SAME TIME; THAT COULD BE A SOLUTION. DO YOU THINK IT LIKELY THAT I COULD DO THE TWO JOBS WITH JUSTICE TO BOTH? IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT A FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH COLUMBIA WHEREBY I COULD DEDUCT FROM MY COACHING SALARY THE AMOUNT RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNMENT. IT MIGHT BE BEST FOR YOU TO CONTACT PROVOST FACKENTHAL ON THIS POINT RATHER THAN MYSELF.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING MR. HALLIWELL AGAIN ON FRIDAY. THINGS ARE GOING ALONG WELL HERE ON MORNINGSIDE

1/18
Wm J. Halliwell
in this

COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN


-2-

FEBRUARY 17, 1943

HEIGHTS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE INFECTED THROAT WHICH I
TOLD YOU OF AND FOR WHICH I AM STILL BEING TREATED AT THE
MEDICAL CENTER.

KINDEST PERSONAL REGARDS.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,


LOUIS LITTLE

LL/MEH

Little Louis. 8900

P.C. 6
Halliwell

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.


January 24, 1943

Memorandum to Colonel William J. Donovan

From: R. Davis Halliwell

Subject: Lou Little

1. I called Little on the telephone this afternoon and found out that he was home in bed with a bad cold. He did not think it wise to come to Washington at this time but said he would be down in the latter part of the week and would telephone us before coming.
2. My representations to him were: that you would like very much to talk to him and that you believe you have a great tangible need of his services and that he could undoubtedly contribute greatly to our efforts and that we were looking forward to seeing him.
3. He of course betrayed that he knew nothing about OSS.


R. Davis Halliwell

*Answered David M. 10, 504
X 1360118, Jan. 21.*

" THE MARINE MIDLAND TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK

ONE HUNDRED TWENTY BROADWAY

NEW YORK

JAMES S. BLAINE
PRESIDENT

March End, 1948.

Colonel William J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

I have delayed answering your very courteous
letter of February 10th because I have been away.

I find that my brother-in-law does not want to
leave New York, so, as far as I can see, I won't have to
bother you further in this matter, particularly as you have
nothing to do with OWI. Thank you for responding so promptly
and sympathetically. Irina appreciates that too.

With warmest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Jim

Lasaref, David 10.506
X Blaine, James G.

February 18, 1943

Mr. James G. Blaine, President
The Marine Midland Trust Company of New York
120 Broadway
New York City

Dear Jim:

I have your letter about Lasaref and will look into the matter right away to see if we could use him here. Of course I have nothing to do with OWI and could be of no assistance to him there. Could you ask him to send me down a complete biographical statement so that we can look into him for possible employment with us.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

*Lasaref - David 10,506
Blaine James J.*

THE MARINE MIDLAND TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK

ONE HUNDRED TWENTY BROADWAY

NEW YORK

JAMES G. BLAINE
PRESIDENT

February 16th, 1943.

Dear Bill:

Irina's brother, David Mir Lasaref, has applied to the Office of War Information, 224 West 57th Street, New York City, for a position with that organization because of his ability to speak foreign languages. He is an American citizen and his loyalty to this country is without question.

The war has thrown him out of a non-essential job and that is why he is anxious to do this work which he is so well qualified for.

I hate to bother you on a small matter of this kind when you are so busy, but I am just wondering whether you might not feel willing to ask someone to give Mr. Lasaref's case a push so that something will happen. I should be very grateful to you if you would feel so disposed.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Jim

Colonel William J. Donovan,
25th & E Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

To:

Corp. Bernard S. Levine
Co. D, 301st Medical Bn.
APO 76
A.P. Hill
U.S. Military Reservation,
Virginia

(address as of 8-7-43)

Director's Office

(3900)

8-7-43

General Donovan:

Corporal Levine brought the attached letter in shortly after you had left on your trip. He has called several times in the past weeks, and requests an appointment, as that is what he says Mr. Mahoney told him to do.

Levine, Corp. Bernard S. -/2 120
X Mahoney, Dan

(25)

21 August 1943

Mr. Dan Mahoney, Jr.
American Lubricants, Inc.
Buffalo, New York

Dear Mr. Mahoney:

In the General's absence from the city, I wish to acknowledge your recent letter regarding Corporal Bernard S. Levine.

Upon the General's return, your letter will of course be brought to his attention. However, I feel I should tell you that matters of the nature referred to in your letter are within the province of the service man's Commanding Officer and his COB Board. In such a situation, requests by outsiders are usually ineffective if not harmful.

Sincerely yours,

O. C. Doering, Jr.
Major, AUS
Chief, Secretariat

Levine, Corp. Bernard S. - 12,320
 X Mahoney, Dan

AMERICAN LUBRICANTS

INCORPORATED

Manufacturers of Greases

1507-79 CLINTON ST. BUFFALO, N. Y.
 Tel. TRIangle 4410

May 18, 1943

By

Col. William J. Donovan
 Office of War Information
 Washington, D. C.

Strategic Service

Dear Col.:

This is to introduce to you Corp. Bernard S. Levine located at
 Ft. George, S Meade, Maryland as a member of Company D 301 ST,
 Medical BN.

*changed to
 A.P. Nello, Va.*

I have known Corp. Levine for several years as he was a distributor
 for our products in Rochester, New York. Through my acquaintance
 with him, I can safely vouch for his integrity and capabilities.

It seems that Corp. Levine was promised a commission some time ago
 and for some reasons unknown this commission has been held up. However,
 upon his last visit to Buffalo, he advised me that a few words with
 you might clear the way so that he may receive the commission that he
 is working for.

I would sincerely appreciate anything that you can do for him.

Yours very truly

Dan Mahoney Jr.

Dan Mahoney, Jr.

DVN:KAB

P.S. - My dad and I often talk about the old times and as you know, he is
 still a great story teller. I am sure that you will enjoy knowing that
 he still repeats the old stories in the same old way. However, he has been
 rather down in morale since my mother died and I am sure a word from you would
 greatly bolster him up. If you get a minute or so to spare, I am sure he
 would be very glad to hear from you if it's only to say "hello". Thanks
 again and good luck.

Levine, Corp. Bernard S. - 12,320
 X Mahoney, Dan

AMERICAN LUBRICANTS

INCORPORATED

Manufacturers of Greases

1507-75 CLINTON ST. BUFFALO, N. Y.
 Tel. TRIangle 8410

May 10, 1943

By

Col. William J. Donovan
 Office of War Information
 Washington, D. C.

Strategic Service

Dear Col.:

This is to introduce to you Corp. Bernard S. Levine located at
 Ft. George, B Meade, Maryland as a member of Company D 301 ST,
 Medical BN.

*changed to
 A.P. Hill, Va.*

I have known Corp. Levine for several years as he was a distributor
 for our products in Rochester, New York. Through my acquaintance
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I would sincerely appreciate anything that you can do for him.

Yours very truly

Dan Mahoney Jr.

Dan Mahoney, Jr.

DVM:MAN

P.S. - My dad and I often talk about the old times and as you know, he is
 still a great story teller. I am sure that you will enjoy knowing that
 he still repeats the old stories in the same old way. However, he has been
 rather down in morale since my mother died and I am sure a word from you would
 greatly bolster him up. If you get a minute or so to spare, I am sure he
 would be very glad to hear from you if it's only to say "hello". Thanks
 again and good luck.

Donovan, Leisure - 12,378
Jessup, Philip
Wright, Herbert
Angelo, Paul

DONOVAN, LEISURE, NEWTON & LUMBARD

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: August 25, 1943.

To: General Donovan

From: Mr. Leisure

Re:

Dear Colonel:

Some time ago you suggested that I give you the names of international lawyers.

The best one that I can think of is Philip C. Jessup, Professor of International Law, at Columbia University; also Herbert Wright, Professor of International Law at Catholic University.

I am also sending you a memorandum covering another young man who has come to my attention. I do not know whether you are looking for men who are familiar with the Spanish language or not.

As ever,

Henry

le 7

Memorandum re Carlos J. AnguloBirth

Born in New York City June 30, 1919.

Education

Graduated in September, 1942, from the Graduate School of Business Administration of Harvard University with degree of "Industrial Administrator". Subjects covered included an intensive training in industrial management and engineering, business administration, statistics, accounting and industrial mobilization.

Speaks Spanish fluently and is also proficient in Portuguese.

Prior to attending Harvard he attended Yale University from which he was graduated in 1941 with high honors (magna cum laude). At Yale he majored in economics and international relations; was a member of the Political Union and Spanish Club. During his freshman year he was awarded the Yale Club prize (awarded to the highest ten in each freshman class), and at the end of his sophomore year was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. During his senior year he received the Townsend Premium for public speaking.

His preparatory school education was received at Riverdale Country School, New York, where he was President of the Student Council during his senior year and was awarded the Head Boy Cup (the highest possible honor in the School) on his graduation.

Parents

Charles Angulo, member of the firm of Mitchell, Capron, Marsh, Angulo & Cooney, in New York, of which Mr. William D. Mitchell, former Attorney General, is the head; graduated from Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., in 1911 and from Columbia Law School in New York in 1914.

Isabel Piedra Angulo, attended Sacred Heart Convent in New York City.

Although both parents were born in Cuba they have lived here practically all their lives and, of course, are American citizens.

Present address

Corporal Carlos J. Angulo 32635287
Company F
2nd Training Battalion
Camp Ritchie, Maryland

*File**Lauck, Gerald M., 12, 739
X Sully Berger, Arthur H.*

METROPOLITAN CLUB
Fifth Avenue & Sixtieth Street
New York

Oct. 24, '43

Dear General Donovan:

If you should hear of my airplane priority today Monday - I'd appreciate it if you would wire me at 30 Rockefeller Plaza (N.W. Ayer and Son) New York.

I shall not buy my steamship ticket until late afternoon on Monday. The ship, Serpa Pinto (Portugese) sails on Tuesday from Philadelphia,. I intend to go to England, Portugal and Spain. If I go by plane I shall go to England first - Otherwise Portugal and Spain first.

I forgot to tell you that I am seeing Capt. Bolin, Director of Tourism in Spanish gov't. to discuss post war Spanish tourist Adv. in U.S.A. I am only moderately interested in this but it is another reason for my being in Spain if I should be questioned by anyone.

I shall be glad if you and Mr. Shepardson instruct Mr. Thomas of my coming. I intend to pay all my ordinary living expenses in Spain - but should these be extraordinary expenses of extra traveling or other items - I will, as you suggested draw on Thomas for expenses - expend them judiciously and carefully account for them.

Would you please pass this letter on for Mr. Shepardson and Mr. Foster?

With kindest regards and carrying with me a lively stimulation to do my best,

I am, Sincerely, Gerald Lauck.

*done
10/25/43*



METROPOLITAN CLUB
FIFTH AVENUE & SIXTIETH STREET
NEW YORK

BT 24.43

Dear General Donovan:

If you should
hear of my airplane
priority today - Monday -
please abbreviate it if you
would wire me at
30 Rockefeller Plaza (N.W.
Ayer. Son) New York.

I shall not buy my
steamship ticket until
late afternoon on Monday.
The ship - Santa Pinto
(Portuguese) sails on Tuesday



METROPOLITAN CLUB
FIFTH AVENUE & NINETEETH STREET
NEW YORK

in Spain if I should be
questioned by any one.

I shall be glad if
you and Mr. Shepardson
instruct Mr. Thomas of my
coming. I intend to
pay all my ordinary living
expenses in Spain. But
should there be extraordinary
expenses of extra traveling
or other items. I will, as
you suggested draw on Thomas
for expenses. I have them
judiciously and carefully

Lauch Perle 12.739.
x Sulzinger

N. W. AYER & SON
INCORPORATED
ADVERTISING
HEADQUARTERS

Gerald M. Lauck

NEW YORK CITY
October 20, 1943

General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th & E Streets, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

I have been trying to get you today but you have been busy in meetings. As a matter of fact, I still have a call in for you. I gather that you haven't as yet been able to work out a satisfactory method of getting me a priority. I find that there is a Portuguese ship leaving on Tuesday the 26th and whereas I do not relish spending the time on the ocean -- I hope not in it -- I am going to leave on that ship if the airplane thing is not going to work out.

I feel that I should see and talk with you or Mr. Shepardston again - probably the latter -- before I sail and I am intending to be in Washington on Saturday morning of this week and will call your office to see whether it's possible to see either you or Mr. Shepardston. While I am there, I am also going to try and see Colonel Knox but I particularly want to talk with your office before I go to Europe.

With kindest regards and with a very lively
recollection of my meeting with you and Mr. Shepardon,
I am

Sincerely,

Executive Vice-President

Lauch, Gerald M. 12.739
x Sulzberger, Arthur H

The New York Times
Times Square

ARTHUR HAYS SULZBERGER
PUBLISHER

October 16, 1943

Dear Bill:

I appreciate your note of the 12th. I'd like to see you, too, so why not let me know when you are planning to come to New York some time and arrange to have lunch with us here?

Faithfully yours,

Arthur Hays Sulzberger

Brig. General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D.C.

L

Lauck, Gerald H. - 12, 739
X Sulzberger, Arthur H.

12 October 1943

✓
Mr. Arthur Hays Sulzberger,
New York Times,
Times Square,
New York City.

Dear Arthur:

I am glad to tell you we had a satisfactory
talk with Lauck.

Thank you for sending him to us.

I hope to see you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Lauck, Gerald - 12,739-

THE SHERATON HOTEL
15th at L Street, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Oct. 12th 1943

Dear General Donovan,

I greatly enjoyed my meeting with you
and Mr. Shepardson this morning.

If you have any communication to send
me after conference with Col. Knox - I shall be here
until the one o'clock p.m. train tomorrow and at
the Metropolitan Club, 60th and 5th Avenue there-
after. Except on Thursday of this week when I will
be in our Boston Office (N. W. Ayer and Son)
Statler Office Building.

Am ready to leave at the drop of
a hat. Hope I can do a good job.

Sincerely

s/ Gerald Lauck.



The Sheraton Hotel

15TH AT L STREETS N. W. - WASHINGTON, D. C.
THOMAS C. BEVEAU, GENERAL MANAGER

Oct. 12th '43

Dear General Donovan:

I greatly enjoyed my
meeting with you and Mr.

Shepherdson (?) this morning.

If you have any communication

to send me after conference with
Col. Knox - I shall be here until

1 o'clock train tomorrow and at

the Metropolitan Club, 60th + 5th

Ave. thereafter - except on Thursday

of this week when I will be

in our Boston office (N.W. Ayer + Son)

that office building -

Am ready to leave at drop

of a hat. Hope I can do a

good job

Sincerely,
Gerald E. Lauch

THE SHERATON HOTELS: BOSTON - NEW YORK - DETROIT - PROVIDENCE - SPRINGFIELD

Lauck, Gerald M. -12,739
X Sulzberger, Arthur H.

The New York Times
Times Square

ARTHUR HAYS SULZBERGER
MANAGER

October 8th, 1943.

Dear Bill:

Mr. Gerald M. Lauck of
N. W. Ayer & Son has just asked me
for a letter of introduction to you.
Since the request involves service
to the country I am particularly
delighted in complying for I know
you will find him, as I have, a
most agreeable and able citizen.
I am sending him a copy of this
note and suggesting that he get
in touch with your office in the
hope that a mutually agreeable
appointment may be made.

With all good wishes, I am

Faithfully yours,

William J. Donovan

Brig. General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
26th and Constitution Avenue
Washington, D.C.

H

LYSTER

Jill

8-22-41

22. 8. 41.

My dear Colonel

Burgin tells me he is coming straight back to see you. I wish I were to be with him to have another talk in the light of my extended experience as Fifth Sea Lord but this letter will have to take my place and bring you my most cordial greetings.

I also want to ask you if you will please use your influence to speed up the production of Marklet Fighters.

I had hoped to get the first deliveries of the folding aircraft in May but there is August and I haven't got them yet. We do need them very badly and the more they can be speeded up the better and if I can get deliveries at 40 or 50 a month I will remember you all in my prayers.

The engines and guns and gun mounts of the first lot have let us down but I gather the new ones are the genuine article and we are delighted with the aircraft as aircraft.

If I was asked for the two essentials in this war I would say speed and quantity. Double every requirement you think you want and then add the you you were born in!

Do persuade your Naval people to think big. Your reserves must be world wide and ample. Bungin will explain my ideas and even then we shall never have enough.

Best of luck to you and I hope we may meet again one day.

Yours

C. L. S. G. Dyson

Lloyd 3223

December 31, 1941

Mr. Austin Lloyd
304 Gray Street
Thomasville, North Carolina

Dear Austin:

I have your letter, and it was very good of you to write me. I want you to know that your letter is a very great compliment to me, and I am sure you will have a very great future.

The best of luck to you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Lloyd-

3223

Lloyd 3223

302 Gray Street
Thomasville, N. C.
December 19, 1941

Hello Mr. Donovan,

I read your article in the Look Magazine and enjoyed it very much. By your short history in the Look, I have picked you as an Ideal man to make a report on and to represent our school.

It seemd as if you have about every thing about you anybody could possibly have, even to small things which higher up's don't have.

I have fixed our bulletin board up with your picture, your home, and your history. After seeing your picture and your history, they all said you was the one to be picked.

I hope you don't think it is foolish for me to write you and let you know, when I hardly know you, and then not in person. You don't even know me or what I look like. I am hoping you get this letter even if I do feel small writing to such an important person.

I saw an article in the magazine that attracted my attention. It was that your birthday was on New Year's day. Mine is too. I never knew anybody whose birthday was on New Year's day until I read about you. I want to wish you a Merry Christmas, and a happy, happy birthday, with the next years of your life still more pleasant than the last. And I sincerely hope that you will see many more New Years, each making you more happy than ever.

I only hope that in the future years of my life I will be able to help our country, even a small amount of what you have done, and what you are doing. I will always keep in mind you, as an Ideal man and someone to live up to.

I am now a senior in Thomasville High School, seventeen years of age, and I will soon be eighteen, old enough to go into active service for Uncle Sam. I am 5'11½" tall, weighing 160 pounds.

-2-

Thanks for solving a big problem for me, as I
had to pick an Ideal man for me, and our school class.
You was the Ideal man all the way round. I am happy
to say.

Yours truly,

/s/ Austin Lloyd

MERRY CHRISTMAS AND HAPPY NEW YEAR.

Lloyd - 3223

302 Gray Street
Thomasville, N.C.
Dec 19, 1941

Hello Mr. Donovan,
I read your article in the
look magazine and enjoyed it
very much. By your short history
in the book, I have picked you as
an ideal man to make a report on
and to represent our school.
It seems as if you have
about every thing about you, anything
could possible have, even to an all
things which higher ups don't have.
I have fixed our bulletin board
up with your picture, your home,
and your history. After seeing your
picture and your history, they all said
you was the one to be picked.
I hope you don't think it
is foolish for me to write you and
let you know, when I hardly know
you, and then not in person. You don't
even know me or what I look like.
I am hoping you get this letter, even if
I do feel small writing to such an important person.

I saw an article in the magazine that attracted my attention, it was that your birthday was on New Year's day. Mine's too, I never know any body whose birthday was on new years day. untill I read about you. I want to wish you a Merry Christmas, And a Happy, Happy birthday, with the next years of your life still more pleasant than the last. And I sincerely hope that you will see many more New Year's each making you more happier than ever.

I only hope that in the future years of my life. I will be able to help our country, even a small amount of what you have done, and what you are doing. I will always keep in mind you, as an ideal man and someone to live up to.

I am now a senior in J. L. Marville High School, seventeen years of age, and will soon be eighteen, old enough to go into active service for Uncle Sam. I am 5' 11 1/2 in. tall weighing 160 pounds.

Thanks for solving a big
problem for me, as I had to
pick an ideal man for me,
and our school class. You
was the ideal man all the
way round. I am happy
to say.

Yours truly,
Austin Lloyd

Merry Christmas And Happy
New Year.

December 3, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO: DR. BAXTER

THE ACCOMPANYING EXCERPTS
FROM LETTERS WRITTEN BY RAYMOND LOERY BY REQUEST
OF COL. DONOVAN, ARE PASSED ALONG TO YOU FOR WHAT-
EVER THEY MAY BE WORTH.

WILL YOU KINDLY RETURN WHEN

NOTED.

W.A. KIMBREL

HOTEL TZANJUYU

M. ROHRMANN

LAOS DE ATITLAN

PANAJACHEL

GUATEMALA, C. A.

FIRST LETTER

Dear Bill.

When we undertake the designing of an important new product, I like to make - in addition to a thorough regular survey - a quick estimate of the situation as soon quickly and without preconceived ideas. This sort of superficial analysis often proves accurate and most helpful. It is exactly what I have done in the case of the attached notes in regard to Mexico. I hope you take it for what it is and I will be more than delighted if it proves to be of any value to you.

We have some ideas about Guatemala too. Jean is making a terrific hit with her Spanish. I will write you again from Peru.

Kindest regards from both of us.

Raymond

Raymond Lowy

Nov. 18th 41

RAYMOND LOEWEY

Colonel Wm. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington
D.C.

Dear Bill:

I have just left Mexico City and I am sending these notes to my office in New York in an envelope to be re-mailed to you as I am told that many letters addressed to U.S. officials are opened by Mexican authorities. I have met many important business men, mostly American representatives of large corporations I work for. Also many young, aggressive Mexicans, leaders in their fields. These have talked to Joan and myself freely, mostly in French, and as a representative of modern American Design. As I have absolutely no idea whether this is the kind of notes your department is interested in, will you consider this as an experiment. If it is not what you want, please let me know frankly.

- ① Contrary to most Latin American democracies, this is a country where the people dislikes the U.S.A. Of the total population, only 25% have an opinion, but of these, 70% are pro-U.S.
- ② The present government, on the contrary is pro-U.S.
- ③ The good-neighbor policy is most popular. They suspect it of being a "FRIENDLY FIFTH COLUMN" that will eventually mean no good to Mexico.
- ④ The unfriendly attitude of many important Mexicans is often due to the rough treatment they got while studying in U.S. universities of the South-Western states. They were treated "like niggers" and it left a bitter taste in their mouth. One notable example is RAMON BETETA, assistant secretary of treasury. He is violently anti U.S. and ~~is~~ supposed to have an important future, politically.

RAYMOND B. NEWBY (3)

- (I) Everybody places great hopes in Vice President Wallace who made a profound hit with the Mexicans. They hope he does not forget his Mexican friends.
- (F) Finally, and most important. The "BORDER SITUATION" should be remedied. This seems to be urgent. Customs and immigration officials at border stations should treat Mexican subjects who have the proper papers with more courtesy. It is, a constant cause of vexation and they resent the whole thing very much.

I have heard a great deal about the choice - past and future - of the U.S. Ambassadors in Mexico. This is a subject about which I am reluctant to write. But I do wish it were my business to talk about it. In the meantime I am keeping my fingers crossed until I read in the newspapers the name of our new envoy. Jean and I have been wonderfully received ~~here~~ in Mexico. Some of our friends were not in sympathy with some of the U.S. policies, but their hospitality and courtesy certainly did not show it. They've been wonderful.

Jean and I send you our regards.

Yours sincerely,

Raymond Newby

Nov 18th 1941

P.S. I will mail this from the Canal Zone where we will arrive tomorrow as I am told that it is even less safe to write from Guatemala. R.

SECOND LETTER



Line Post

November 21st 1941

Colonel William Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington (D.C.)

Dear Bill:

We have left Guatemala, arrived in Peru. The Guatemalan Fair, pet idea of President Jorge Ubico opened on Nov. 16th. as you know I was in charge of Interior Decorations and planning of the United States government building. We opened right on time and the Guatemalan authorities are delighted.

The picture from and I found in Guatemala is very much different from what I had been led to expect. Here again as in Mexico, our knowledge of French has been a great help, and I had the good luck to meet people who would talk to me very freely. They don't like to speak too openly to British or Americans, as it seems that many of them are only Germans with a good knowledge of English. Then they get in serious trouble with the Guatemalan authorities. Here is what I have been told from sources that looked quite impressive. I will not make any deductions and I had no time to check. But was just the "dupe" for from Guatemala City in the wildest part of the country where coffee planters live.

1) It seems that the country is commercially stable due to the fact that the government of the U.S. is buying coffee and bananas at the right price.

2) Due to the fact that 60% of the coffee planters are Germans, and on the black list, an interesting manipulation is taking place. The Banco central de Guatemala buys the

②



Lima, Peru

coffee from the Germans, sells it to the U.S.A and freezes the funds. The Germans are to get it back later "after the axis has won the war". One large coffee planter, not on the black list, told me he wished he were. He would sell his coffee much more easily, almost automatically and at a good price.

3) The Ulice government is a complete dictatorship. Life in Guatemala City is so restricted and regulated that one left with a certain feeling of relief.

4) The President, and many of his assistants are frankly pro fascist and pro-axis. Their philosophies are similar. They act friendly to the U.S. as a temporary policy.

5) This seems to be substantiated by the important fact that according to regulations, coffee planters are authorized to possess arms. It seems that every German "finca" is a real arsenal. Our informant, a planter born in France, of French descent and established here since 40 years has himself several machine guns of late model, plenty of automatic rifles and ammunition. Due to a little graft, he is going to get a cannon (!) from the local authority. It seems that the government would not tolerate so much armament in German hands if they were not in good terms.

6) The country is overwhelmingly Indian and the Germans work hard on them. Planters line up with them, eat with them and make friends. There are lots of kids with blue eyes and blond hairs in the wildest parts of the country.

7) The white element of Spanish descent is very much pro United States.



Lima, Peru

(3)

8) They are completely fed-up with the present regime and they would like to see as President the present Guatemalan ambassador in Washington.

again, I must repeat that I had no time to start checking on all this. But it was so definite, and so surprising that I feel I had better report it to you.

I will write you from Chile in about two weeks. In the meantime, my New York office will tell you where to reach me in case you have a communication to make.

Jean and I send you our kindest regards.

Raymond Haewy

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
2-11

ELMO ROPER

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA - NEW YORK, N. Y.

November 24, 1941

NOV 24 1941

Colonel William Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Your words of cheer and encouragement were potent and I now feel very much better, although I must say that the idea of looking forward to an increased amount of work in Washington next year with you rather than having the increase elsewhere is still very appealing to me.

The enclosed letter is the one I would propose to send to MacLeish and the more I reflect on it the more I think it is a good idea. If you have any objections, of course, I shan't send it, and I think you ought to decide whether it goes on my own stationery or on Coordinator stationery.

I am planning to be down Wednesday for the entire day and we can discuss the question Wednesday morning if you want to.

Cordially yours,

Elmo

Elmo Roper

ERN

November 24, 1941

Mr. Archibald MacLeish
Office of Facts and Figures
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. MacLeish:

Because of the fear that you might think your "experts" talked in technical terms in our meeting last week, and because of the importance of having a perfectly clear understanding if we are to work together, I should like to set down here my position and my feelings about the set-up you propose to put into effect for the purpose of measuring public opinion.

The net of it boils down to the fact that I don't like the set-up you propose at all, but I am perfectly willing to cooperate with you and work hard in an effort to make it work, and will continue to do so unless I become convinced that it can't work.

To be more specific in my objectives, however, I should like to list the following:

1. In research, as in many other things, it is the actual operator who decides what tools to use and how to use them in order to accomplish a result. Policy-setting committees and advisory committees are all well and good, but the actual operation sets the tone of what is done.
2. The man you have selected as the operating head has an excellent reputation in one branch of public opinion research and I have seen, and have a high regard for, his work in this branch. I admit I was somewhat surprised to hear him say in our meeting that he didn't regard the type of research he was doing as meshing in with and supplementing the type normally done in the FORTUNE survey or the Gallup survey,

and I was disappointed to find that he felt there was no real necessity for going outside of the type of research he has been doing for the Department of Agriculture in an effort to answer the problems which will arise from OPM, SPAB, and other instrumentalities of government. It is my feeling that the type of research he has been doing is a useful corollary to the more extensive research being done elsewhere. But I feel that it is the minority part, not the majority part, of any wide-spread effort at fact-finding. In short, I think we will see a case of the tail wagging the dog, and particularly so in view of Doctor Likert's frank statement that while he is willing to use other types of research if instructed to do so, he frankly doesn't see the need of going beyond the type of operation he has been conducting.

3. To be specific about the shortcomings of the type of Doctor Likert's research which I have seen, I think it will prove to be too slow and too costly for the most efficient use by government and will, at times, provide more detailed information on subjects than is required at the expense of what we might call "breadth" as well as the expense of time and money.

For all of the above reasons my best advice to you is to continue the operation which had been set up by Colonel Denevan in substantially the form in which it was set up. This would certainly not exclude very valuable contributions to be made by Doctor Likert and the form of research he so thoroughly understands and likes. But I gave that advice and you made the other decision.

I have asked Mr. Wilson, Doctor Stanton, and Doctor Gallup to go to Washington to confer further with

center like as to how he would like to operate and to be of whatever help they can in getting the Denver operation straightened out as an integral part of the operation.

There seems to me to be nothing else to do but to reaffirm what I told you at the close of the meeting. I don't like the set-up you have proposed but I don't think it will give the maximum available in public opinion research, but I will work on it if you so desire and will try as hard as I can to contribute whatever knowledge I might have in an effort to make it work.

Sincerely yours,

Elise Reper

Lippmann
x Propaganda

October 10, 1941

Mr. Walter Lippmann
1525 35th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walter:

Thank you for the suggestion contained in your letter of October 7. I don't know whether we can do anything along the lines suggested, but I want you to know that we are going to do something.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

RM/edj

NEW YORK
Herald Tribune

1625 28th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
October 7, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan
1647 28th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Following our conversation last night:

There should be at regular intervals an analytical report on Axis propaganda. I have seen reports of the kind I have in mind in England, where they are being prepared by the Ministry of Information as secret documents for the use of the cabinet. My idea is to issue somewhat similar reports in order to enable the American people to identify Axis propaganda when they meet it. A copy of one of the British reports would provide a first working model.

The general scheme is to list in order of importance (measured by radio time or number of printed words devoted to it) the leading themes of the Axis propaganda for the period covered. Each theme would be labeled so that it is, therefore, easily identified, e.g.

I - German propaganda to the United States

1. Roosevelt a war-monger, 20%
2. Britain is defeated, 25%
3. Roosevelt will suspend elections, 25%
- etc, etc.

II - German propaganda about the United States in Latin-America, Europe and the Far East

1. U.S.A. production bogged down by strikes, 25%
2. U. S. divided politically, 25%
3. U. S. imperialism, plutocracy, aggressiveness, 20%
- etc. etc.

III - Nazi propaganda by Nazi satellites - Italy, Spain, Vichy - in Latin-America

1. etc.
2. etc.
3. etc.

NEW YORK
Herald Tribune

Colonel Donovan

10/1/41

- IV - Chief items of news about U.S.A. reported by
Axis news services and radio
1. Stricker, X
2. Lindbergh, Y
etc. etc.

* * *

I suggest that these reports be issued regularly - perhaps from the White House, with a standing foreword describing the monitoring services and analytical procedure from which the reports issued, together with the statement that the original material (recorded broadcasts, etc.) is open to inspection by authorized persons. Advanced copies should be sent to editors and managing editors. Summaries of the report should be broadcast after publication.

No editorial comment, direct or indirect, should be permitted in the report and it should be written in a cold, dry style. The scheme should be discussed with representative publications and editors before adoption. In inaugurating the scheme there should be a narrative exposition of the measures taken in Axis countries to prevent the people from hearing from the outer world - punishment for listening to radio, confiscation of radio sets, censorship, jamming, etc., etc. It should then be stated that in the United States we prefer to reverse the totalitarian method, and instead of suppressing alien propaganda, we propose to receive it, analyze it, identify it, and make it clearly and regularly known to the public.

Yours,

W. H. Ruggins

Letter 693
LIMBOCKER, T F
File

HEADQUARTERS 61ST CAVALRY DIVISION
ROOM 1802, 80 CHURCH STREET
NEW YORK CITY

NOV 30 1941

November 28, 1941

Col. Wm. J. Donovan, Cav. Res.
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Thank you for your nice letter of November
21 explaining your duty status.

I was much interested in President Roosevelt's
letter of instruction to you and shall file it with your re-
marks. Your work must be very interesting.

I hope that I shall have the pleasure of meet-
ing you some time.

Please let me know if ever I can assist you.

Sincerely yours,

T. F. Limbucker
T. F. LIMBOCKER
Lieut. Col., Cavalry
Instructor

LIMBOCKER, T F

November 21, 1941

Lieut. Colonel T. F. Limbocker
Headquarters 81st Cavalry Division
Room 1802, 90 Church Street
New York, New York

Dear Colonel Limbocker:

I have your letter of the 17th, and I enclose a copy of the order designating me to this office. You will see that this is an order of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. In conformity with the spirit of the order it was the President's wish that I should come into active service, but it seemed to me advisable for the present to do the task by remaining in my present status.

Yours very truly,

William J. Donovan

HEADQUARTERS 61ST CAVALRY DIVISION
ROOM 1302, 90 CHURCH STREET
NEW YORK CITY

NOV 19 1941

November 17, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan
1 Beckman Place
New York, New York

Dear Colonel Donovan:

For peace time purposes you are assigned to this division, and carried on the roster as subject to call for duty, although you are above the present maximum age limit for colonels.

From newspaper accounts I understand that you are now on duty in some capacity and I would appreciate it very much if you would favor me with your advices as to whether you are on duty with the Army or, if not, whether you are in government service that would exempt you from military service.

Very truly yours,

TFL/AL

T. F. Limbucker
T. F. LIMBUCKER
Lt. Col., Cavalry
Group Instructor

LEISURE, GEORGE

DONOVAN, LEISURE, NEWTON & LUMBARD

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: November 10, 1941.

Colonel Donovan
 Mr. Leisure

Dear Colonel:

I received your letters with reference to Mr. William Brown Bell, president of American Cyanamid Co. and Dr. George Curme, vice-president of the Carbide Corporation.

Mr. Bell telephoned me and seemed quite pleased with the opportunity of talking with you about defense. He said he would be very happy to sit down with us any time here in New York that you cared to designate. If you want me to arrange an appointment for you, I will arrange it at any time you say. He did not seem to like the idea of going to Washington if he could avoid it.

Dr. George Curme also called me up and said that he would be very happy to do anything that he could. He said that he has already been called upon by Dr. Busch of your organization, and is considered by Dr. Busch I believe as being one of his men. He said that he would be very happy to see you here any day this week that would be convenient for you, and that he is going to be in Washington on Friday. I would of course come to Washington on Friday also if you think that would be better than meeting him here in New York.

Everything is going fine in the office.

Were you ever able to locate the Burge's memoran-

Sincerely,

George

LEISHRE, GEORGE

x Bell

x American Cyanamid

November 3, 1941

George Leishre, Esq.
200 Wall Street
New York, New York

Dear George:

I am writing you this letter in the utmost confidence.

I am now conducting a study as to the probable economic and military position of the Axis, as well as the allied powers in the spring of 1942. Of course, as you know, the chemical industry in each of the countries concerned, and the research together with anticipated developments in that industry will be a vital question. With that in mind, it occurred to me that perhaps you could talk with Mr. Ball, of American Cyanamid, and explain to him that I am making this study by the use of scholars, technical men, and officers of the Army and Navy, who are in my organization. I wish you would tell him also that we have available for us the Bureau of Scientific Research, under Dr. Vannemar Bush.

-2-

While all of this is of the greatest value, it would be reassuring to me if I could have the advantage of obtaining the opinion of Mr. Bell based upon his broad knowledge and experience.

If convenient, I could talk with you both some time in Washington, or I would be very pleased on my next trip to New York to see if we could meet together there.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

*Personal**2632*
Lee

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
1, GROSVENOR SQUARE, W. 1,
LONDON, ENGLAND

Lee
X am. Embassy London

July 14, 1941.

Dear Major General,

There have been rumors, based chiefly on the authoritative sounding surmises of American columnists, that you were to turn into a super-super intelligence man but the State Department radio confirms it only today.

I'm extremely gratified that something is finally going to be done to consolidate or to collate all the information which reaches Washington by way of a dozen different channels. It is certain that what is reported by the State Department, the Army, the Navy and a number of other agencies would make a definite and fairly accurate picture, if properly fitted together. If this is not done, then prodigious decisions will be taken in the light of only a part of the information which is available in Washington.

This may not be fatal as long as we have enough money, men and material to operate on a wide and wasteful margin, but as that day passes we will be confronted with the responsibility of making only accurate decisions - or else. In that situation we want to weigh and act in the light of every scrap of information we can secure.

The Russians are doing very well. I have never been as pessimistic about them as are the British. Old Joe Stalin has been getting ready for the past two years and I don't think was caught very far off first base. The most cheerful fact, so far, is that at the end of three weeks, the Ukraine, which most people here believed would collapse at the outset, is still standing up. But it must be stiff with Ogpus.


If the Russian Bear can hold his own for the next month, I should say Hitler's goose is cooked, even though it may be some time before it is ready for carving. The big battle ought to come off about the end of this month, and then we will gain some notion as to whether there will be another Battle of Britain. One thing can certainly be said. If this should come off, the British are in much better shape for it than they were a year ago, and the Germans less so.

- 2 -

Our days (and nights) here are not so lively as they used to be. There has been no confetti for a month and we will probably all grow soft. Your late travelling companion, Dykes, is on the Joint Planning Committee and I had a long session with him yesterday. He sent his best wishes.

With my hearty congratulations on your new task and my sincere wishes for its complete success.

Yours sincerely,



Major General W.B. Donovan,
c/o The War Department,
Washington, D.C.

LAZARON, MORRIS S.

X JEWS

October 25, 1941

Rabbi Morris S. Lazon
1914 Madison Avenue
Baltimore, Maryland

My dear Rabbi Lazon:

I have your letter of October 14th,
enclosing the memorandum on remarks to Mr. Anthony
Eden, and I appreciate very much your sending it
to me.

I hope your trip across the continent
is not too burdensome.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Morris S. Luzzaron
1914 Madison Avenue
Baltimore, Maryland

✓ *Luzzaron*
206 F9

October 14, 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I am enclosing the memorandum about
which we spoke.

With warm regards, as always

Faithfully yours,

Morris S. Luzzaron

Colonel William Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM**RE: JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE**

1. The vexing problem of our troubled co-religionists must be approached in the setting of the war and its world-wide implications.
2. We state a/ the right of Jews to live anywhere in the world, to enjoy full civil, political and religious rights as long as they obey the laws of the lands where they live. Similar rights guaranteed by similar duties.
 b/ the reconstruction of Jewish life in Palestine and anywhere else where permanent homes for the persecuted may be found.
3. In reference to Palestine, there are among Jews many differing and conflicting programs and methods.
4. Unfortunately the position of a powerful group of Jews in England and America has been misrepresented. The impression has been conveyed in England that the entire Jewish community of America is behind the political philosophy and program of the Zionists. This is not true.
5. Behind all the differences, however, is the desire to utilize Palestine as an outlet for Jewish immigration to the fullest possible extent. The problem, therefore, is to find a basis on which the largest number of Jews will cooperate.
6. Practically all Jews will unite on a program for the economic development of Palestine.
7. The Jewish Agency was originally designed as the instrument through which the British Government would act jointly with the Jews of the world to fulfill the Balfour Declaration. It was to include both Zionists and non-Zionists. The Zionists have, however, secured control of the Agency and it is therefore no longer representative except of one group.
8. The good faith of the British Government is acknowledged but the situation has become more complicated and difficult. For many and obvious reasons there were Jews' Committees and Papers issued on Palestine, the last being the White Paper, the object of much discussion. No one is satisfied; neither the Arabs and the Jews nor the British Government.
9. It is suggested that a new start be made:
 - a/ A re-affirmation of the Balfour Declaration. Interpretive sentences emphasizing the sincerity of the British Government in its desire to promote not a State but a Homeland; emphasizing also the clauses safeguarding the rights of Jews who live outside Palestine and the rights of the existing Arab population in Palestine.
 - b/ The Agency should be reconstructed as an ECONOMIC AGENCY working on a definite though flexible economic and immigration program over a period of years.
 - c/ Immigration of Jews to Palestine on the general principle already enunciated - the economic absorptive capacity of the land, this to be extended as generously as conditions permit.

Memorandum (S) - Secret

- 4/ The future political status of the Jewish community in Palestine to be determined by the Jewish community there and the Mandatory Power and in consultation with the Arabs. Cultural autonomy to be guaranteed.
- 5/ It is further suggested that the British Government keep in touch informally and unofficially with the group of British Jews who are approaching the problem from this point of view. There shall be consultation between the British and American Jewish groups in order to reach a concept of program as an economic program for Palestine reconstruction which will be sound and practical and will do the fullest justice to all parties concerned within the limits of the situation.

SUMMARY

While we wish to do everything in our power to help our stricken brethren find homes in Palestine, we are resolved not to be drawn into an international political program which might subject us to the charge of dual allegiance and thereby endanger the security of the great British and American Jewish communities and their power to help their brethren in other parts of the world. Palestine cannot take more than several millions of Jews even over an extended period of years. The vast majority, thirteen to fourteen millions, will continue to find their homes throughout the world. To preserve the smaller community, even in Palestine, we do not believe it wise to jeopardize these larger communities.

We accept with profound pride the legacy of our great tradition. We desire to stand in that religious-cultural tradition, to maintain and promote it. We wish to help our brethren in distress but we also cherish our present citizenship and reject any other political loyalty or obligation for ourselves and our children.

The above approach to a complex problem seems to us in the circumstances to be the most practical, the wisest and the best designed in the long run to serve the larger welfare of Jews both in Palestine and in the world.

Lambright, E. L. 13 555
X McAfee, W. L.

13 March 1944

Miss Elizabeth Lambright
3800 Farmall Road
Shaker Heights, Ohio

My dear Miss Lambright:

General Donovan has asked me to acknowledge your letter of 8 March 1944 and say that he will be very glad to see you when you come to Washington. If you will call me when you arrive, I will be glad to make an appointment at a mutually convenient hour.

Very sincerely yours,

O. C. Deering, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Executive Officer

*Airmail
Spec Del.*

*Intermined by OCB and
turned over to Kriders for processing
23 March 1944
O.C.D.*



**OHIO STATE
COUNCIL OF DEFENSE**
101 NORTH HIGH STREET
COLUMBUS 15, OHIO

GOVERNOR JOHN W. BRICKER
CHAIRMAN
RALPH D. HENDERSON
VICE CHAIRMAN
RALPH H. STONE
DIRECTOR

March 8, 1944

General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Information and Services
War Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Donovan;

On February 18th, Mr. William A. McAfee of Cleveland wrote to you asking that you give me an interview when next I came to Washington.

My present schedule calls for a trip to Washington on March 21st, 22nd, and 23rd, and, incidentally, New York City from the 16th to the 21st in case you should be there. If you are going to be in Washington at this time, I would appreciate your giving me an appointment and writing me at the address given below.

Sincerely yours,

Elizabeth Lambright
Elizabeth Lambright
Director, Program Services
OHIO STATE COUNCIL OF DEFENSE

21925 Parnell Road
Shaker Heights, Ohio

1044 MAR 10 AM 11 52

*Lambright, Elz. 15,555-
x McAfee, W.A.*

*→ ACED
Please call her
& come and either
you or I will see
her -*

SK

CA3

Lambright, Miss Elizabeth
13, 513
X McAfee, W.A.

29 February 1944

Mr. William A. McAfee
McAfee, Crossman, Hanning and Newcomer
Midland Building
Cleveland 15, Ohio

Dear Bill:

I have your note about Miss Lambright.
Of course we would be glad to talk with her. I
have just returned for a short time, and if she
really wants to talk with me, it should be done
within the next three weeks.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

*Miss Elisabeth Lambright, 13, 55th St.
X Mr. Ryan, W. D. C.*

McAfee, Grossman, Hamming & Newcomer
Law Offices
Radland Building
Cleveland 15

(2 T)

IRVING WISSEMAN
WILLIAM A. MYER
GEORGE B. WANNING
W. C. NEWCOMER
GEORGE W. HALL
DAN J. HALL
DAVID A. GILBERT
GUSTAV L. GORDON
ARTHUR E. JACOB
EDWARD B. BIRNBAUM
WALTER M. CARROLL
JAMES E. MITCHELL
VINCENT C. MITCHELL

February 18, 1944.

General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Information and Services,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Personal

Dear Bill:

I am writing you to request that you be good enough to take a few minutes from your busy day and grant a short interview to a young Cleveland woman, a friend of ours, who is anxious to talk over with you the possibility of getting placed in your Department.

Her name is Miss Elisabeth Lambright. She is about 27 years old, is a graduate of Northwestern University, and has held responsible positions in one of the large Department stores in Cleveland and in the Ohio State Office of Civilian Defense. Both of her positions were administrative in character and not secretarial or stenographic.

She is a girl of exceptional intelligence, ability and charm of personality, and I am sure would be excellent in any job which involved the handling of or dealing with people as well as one requiring intellectual capacity and judgment.

Miss Lambright will either write to you from Cleveland or call at your office within the near future with a view to obtaining a short interview with you if possible, and I should appreciate it as a great favor if you would accord her one.

A great deal of water has gone over the dam since our days together in Madison. I am occasionally reminded of them, however, by seeing some of our fellow-convicts such as Raleigh Warner and Henry Dawes.

Kindest regards to you.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. McAfee

Sam. A. L. David Knox 14, 077

DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & LUMBARD
TWO WALL STREET
NEW YORK 5

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
COUNSEL
GEORGE B. LEISURE
CARL ELMROSE NEWTON
J. EDWARD LUMBARD, JR.
RALSTONE R. IRVINE
THOMAS J. MADDEN
OTTO C. DOERING, JR.
DAVID TEITELBAUM
FRANCIS A. BRICK, JR.
GRANVILLE WHITTAKER, JR.
GARDNER O'SHEA
DAVID F. RAMSON
JAMES R. WYTHROW, JR.
MALCOLM FOOSHEE
BRECK P. MALLISTER
JAMES V. HAYES
LEAVE OF ABSENCE

HENRY H. HILLMAN HOND
COUNSEL
RAYMOND J. RUWEN
HOWEN BUILDING
WASHINGTON 5 D C

March 22, 1944

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

You were good enough to ask me to write you about my son, Pvt. David Knox Langstaff, now in Headquarters Battery (Intelligence Section), 47th AAA Group, Camp Edwards, Mass.

He is over 19 years of age, a graduate of the Choate School at Wallingford, Connecticut, and a member of last July's freshman class at Harvard. He is a fine physical specimen (over six feet), in first rate condition; and mentally he is unusually keen and alert.

At school he stroked the crew, captained the fencing team and ran cross-country. He was president of the Glee Club and Editor-in-Chief of the Choate Literary Magazine which won the annual Princeton award. He writes and reads French well and has a good working vocabulary (200-300 characters) in Chinese. He has started Russian but because of the uncertainty of his movements he has delayed commencing the Army correspondence course. He was one of three men ordered to ASTP - languages

-2-

and area division - on the day before ASTP was discontinued.

Finally, he is keenly observant; expresses himself in his writing in a succinct and mature style; fond of the study of history and of the people and events with which he happens to be surrounded; has the zeal and receptivity of youth coupled with a maturity of judgment.

If you can use him I hope you will. His older brothers are in the infantry and field artillery. At the moment he is not alerted for movement to any other post so that a timely gesture from your elevated position might easily disengage him from his present job.

Faithfully yours,

R. M. L. Layloff

P.S. Under separate cover I forward a photograph.
Please return this picture which I have lifted temporarily from its frame.

RMk.

100-100000-100000



Publication:
10/10/44 (197)

Laird
14-684
COMBINED OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS,
1A RICHMOND TERRACE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1

26 June, 1944

My dear General,

I want to take this opportunity of writing to thank you not only for the invitation which O.S.S. was good enough to extend in suggesting that a small Mission of my officers should visit you, but also for the immense help and kindness which all the officers in your organisation showed them during their tour.

My officers have now returned with a very full and interesting report, and tell me that in your absence they were introduced to Colonel Huxton who very kindly arranged a tour of the various training bases, also that he was good enough to arrange a Dinner where my Officers had the advantage of meeting those members of your staff who are mutually interested in our type of operation.

I am convinced that such interchange of ideas and the opportunity of examining each others equipment cannot fail to be of mutual benefit, and I hope that you will feel that the Mission's visit will have been of assistance to the American Units which they visited.

I would once again like to convey to you my very sincere thanks. Perhaps you would be good enough to thank Colonel Huxton for the very considerable help which he gave, and which I sincerely appreciate.

Yours ever

Bob Laird

P.S. Please let me know when you come to London.
Brigadier General W. Donovan,
O.S.S. Detachment,
WASHINGTON.

*be with you hold of
Bill Rolfe & have a
meal together.*

1944

15,650
SECRET

17 November 1944

For Mr. William L.
X ROVER
X P. L. J.
X H. J. L.
X ST. L. D. P.
X L. H. L. M. L.

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please see that the attached memo-
randum for the President with inclosure is placed on
his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

SECRET

17 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a memorandum to me from Dr. Langer asking for access to certain documents pertaining to the French problem.

If you feel that you can grant him permission, you can be assured of his discretion.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

SECRET**S S R I**

DATE: 15 November 1944

TO: General Donovan

FROM: William L. Langer

As you know, I have prepared at the special request of Secretary Hull, a history of the United States policy toward France, and the French problem from the time of the collapse of France to the assassination of Darlan in December 1942. It was Secretary Hull's idea, and one with which I concurred enthusiastically, that the story of this policy should be written while memories are still fresh and while those who were involved in it could still be freely consulted. In order to make the history as complete as possible, the State Department made available to me all of its materials without exception. Admiral Leahy permitted me to consult and use the diary which he kept during his embassy to Vichy. The War Department made available a great deal of material dealing with the political aspects of the invasion of North Africa. You, yourself, permitted me the freest use of the records of the OSS, which were rich in materials bearing on the North African situation. In addition, I have been able to discuss the whole problem at length with men like Robert Murphy, Wallace Murray, Freeman Matthews and Ray Atherton. As a result, I think I have been able to write a full and accurate account of this interesting chapter in the history of our policy during the war. The first draft of this study has been very enthusiastically received in the Department of State, and I have been given every possible assistance to make it complete.

The one category of material which has remained inaccessible to me and which is probably of crucial importance, is the material which is in the White House archives. Since the President took a very active interest in this whole problem and apparently made a number of important decisions in consultation with Prime Minister Churchill or other non-State Department officials, it is of the utmost importance that the records of the White House be consulted in order to achieve completeness and accuracy.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

I should be deeply indebted if, on some occasion, you could mention this to the President and point out to him that it would be in his own interests to contribute to the success of this enterprise. To my knowledge, this is the first time that the attempt has been made to set down the development and conduct of an important policy while the information is still fresh in the minds of those who participated. It is also the first time, I believe, that a professional historian, not connected with the Department of State and therefore completely disinterested excepting as an American citizen, has been called upon to do a study of this character. It would be a pity if some of the most crucial data were not included in this history, and it could hardly serve the President's interests to have the study exist in this incomplete form. I need hardly state that the history is classified as secret and that it is not intended for present publication unless it should be in a highly expurgated form.

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

SECRET

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan
 FROM: William L. Langer
 SUBJECT:

DATE: 18 November 1944

As you know, I have prepared at the special request of Secretary Hull, a history of the United States policy toward France, and the French problem from the time of the collapse of France to the assassination of Darlan in December 1942. It was Secretary Hull's idea, and one with which I concurred enthusiastically, that the story of this policy should be written while memories are still fresh and while those who were involved in it could still be freely consulted. In order to make the history as complete as possible, the State Department made available to me all of its materials without exception. Admiral Leahy permitted me to consult and use the diary which he kept during his embassy to Vichy. The War Department made available a great deal of material dealing with the political aspects of the invasion of North Africa. You, yourself, permitted me the freest use of the records of the OSS, which were rich in materials bearing on the North African situation. In addition, I have been able to discuss the whole problem at length with men like Robert Murphy, Wallace Murray, Freeman Mathews and Ray Atherton. As a result, I think I have been able to write a full and accurate account of this interesting chapter in the history of our policy during the war. The first draft of this study has been very enthusiastically received in the Department of State, and I have been given every possible assistance to make it complete.

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
SECRET

General Donovan

- 2 -

15 November 1944

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William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

SECRET

NE - copy

Tehran, July 24, 1941.

AFGHAN SERIES

No. 9

Subject: Internal Affairs of Afghanistan; Frontiers;
Tribes and Internal Security; Government;
Important Personalities; Orientation;
Stability of Regime.

291400/1210

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor, in continuation of the Legation's series of despatches on the Mission to Afghanistan, to submit the following discussion of matters touching on the internal life of that country.

This despatch has for its purpose the presentation of a picture of the internal political life of Afghanistan. Matters relating to foreign affairs, trade, economics, justice, education, public health, et cetera, will

be

be left for later despatches. The subject of American-Afghan relations was discussed in despatch No. 6 dated June 29, 1941. The despatch will not be burdened with a repetition of Afghan history, which has been adequately covered by more competent writers, except in so far as there are new facts to be related or where incidents in relatively recent history throw light on present day policy.

THE COUNTRY

It is often said that Afghanistan is an artificially created country, founded and nourished by the British to serve as a buffer state to protect India. While it is true that the British have permitted and encouraged the establishment and development of the existing political entity, this does not tell the entire story. It must not be assumed that the British created a buffer state where nothing existed before or that the country has no history or tradition of its own to justify its independent existence. One must in fairness recall to mind the extensive Ghaznavid empire founded by Mahmud of Ghazni circa 1000 A.D., which included not only Afghanistan but also parts of India and Persia; the great Mogul empire founded from Kabul by Babur; the reign in the mid-16th century of the pretent of the Lodowai rulers, Ahmad Shah, who established an empire stretching from Lahore to Meshed and the Oxus to the Persian Gulf; and the reign of Dost Mohammad, first of the present reigning Mohammadzai family, who created a strong state before his death in 1863 and consolidated it under his competent rule.

In spite of the diversity of tribes and the many forces of dissunity in the country, two factors, it seems

to

- 3 -

to me, tend to draw the people together into some degree of harmony - first, a common and fanatical religious faith, which has made Afghanistan the last redoubt of the Sunni Mohammedan faith, and, secondly, a warlike spirit and general tradition of bravery as exemplified by the three bitter, and in their eyes fully successful, wars against the British. I do not intend to infer by the above remarks that a homogeneous race exists in Afghanistan or that there is any degree of national consciousness but wish merely to record that the tribes have in times past been welded by strong leaders into something resembling national unity and that there are certain forces which tend to bind them together, particularly where foreigners are concerned. One has only to travel through the country and see the stalwart, tough, bearded types with their bold, independent bearing to realize that here is a distinct type almost unrelated to Iranian or Indian neighbors. Afghanistan exists, if not as a natural political entity, at least as a group of tribes with customs, language and traditions which differentiate them from their foreign neighbors. Until such time as these tribes can be molded into a national unit, the life of even the best governments must necessarily be precarious. It is not impossible that this can be accomplished slowly through improvements being made in communications, education, settlement of nomadic tribes, and the industrialization of the country, but the way will be tedious.

Even assuming that political Afghanistan is a creation of the British and that its continued existence must necessarily depend on British policy in India, it is noticeable that

that the country is gradually escaping British tutelage by pursuing an independent foreign policy and by turning to other foreign powers for assistance, as witness its policy of strict neutrality in the European war, its economic ties with Germany and its present desire to draw closer in every way to the United States. The ultimate destiny of the country will, of course, be decided by the present war. If, as we hope to expect, the Allies are successful and a better world eventuates in which the rights of small nations are respected, Afghanistan will undoubtedly continue to live and prosper as an independent state, much less dependent on British aid than heretofore. In the meantime, it would be well for us to endeavor to understand and respect the Afghans, who are generously offering us their friendship and a pre-eminent role in their national life. In this end in view, I have recommended the immediate opening of a Legation at Kabul.

Turning now to Afghanistan as a physical entity, its frontiers are well established and recognized. First with Iran, for many years vague and disputed, was established in 1934 by a boundary commission headed by General Edmund Allenby, a British General. The Commission's findings were accepted by both countries and part of the boundary has already been marked. There are no outstanding boundary disputes between Iran and Afghanistan although the Helmand water dispute, which has to do with distribution of the waters of the Helmand river, is still outstanding in

in spite of efforts to solve it. This controversy, in which the Iranians want a fixed amount of water for the Afghans and an equal distribution, may well be resolved when the Afghans complete the construction of a large irrigation dam near Girsak.

The border with Baluchistan and India, known as the Durand Line, was agreed upon on November 12, 1883, as a result of negotiations conducted between Amir Abdurrahman and the British representative, Mortimer Durand. As a result of this delineation, Afghanistan lost Chitral, Gilgit, Swat, Pishan, Waziristan and Shab, which from the political and geographical viewpoints form integral parts of the country. The Afghan and Indian administrative frontiers do not meet but are separated by a semi-independent zone inhabited by Afghan tribes and administered by British political agents. This curious situation which the British have created a "buffer to a buffer", will be discussed more fully in a later despatch on Afghan-Indian relations. The Afghans, while not happy with this border, which is unscientific and which excludes numerous purely Afghan tribes, at least accept it as a fact.

The frontier with the Soviet Union is generally speaking established although there are a few outstanding issues. The Russians claim the Afghan bank of the Oxus as the boundary while the Afghans recognize the Hindu Kush as the proper boundary. There are also several unsettled

but

not certain whether the general of Soviet influence in the Caucasus dispute is that of "black" or "white", the Soviet Union has to live up to its obligations, both to the Soviet Union and to the disposition of the Caucasus. The Afghans agreed that, after a period of no action during which time they saw neither money nor plots etc., finally wanted to withdraw their claims. The Russians have been unwilling to permit the closing of this and other disputes, evidently wanting to keep them as a source of friction for possible future use. Should the Russians decide, as the Afghans have long feared, to push their southern border to the Hindu Kush to establish a stronger frontier, Afghanistan would lose such a large proportion of her wealth and gain, so that she could scarcely exist as an economic unit.

ETHNIC AND TRIBAL COMPOSITION

The population of Afghanistan is far from homogeneous, being composed of numerous tribes of different appearance, stature, and customs. For example, the Hazaras and some of the Turkmen tribes are of medium stature, dark and Mongolian type, and in some cases of Shiah faith, while the Afghans and some of the southern tribes are of striking Semitic type and of strict Sunni faith. These tribes, brought to other no doubt for self preservation, common interests, and because of lack of communications in this mountainous country, are usually divided into smaller

- 7 -

smaller units of clan and family. Tribal organization, and in fact society generally in Afghanistan, is democratic and heredity is not an unalterable rule. A custom established by Nadir Shah requires the King to sit down at table frequently with workers and tribesmen, who are permitted to speak to him as friends and equals. It is noticeable in travelling in the country that nothing can be accomplished unless the tribesmen are approached in a friendly and democratic manner. The principal of the numerous tribes in the composition of Afghanistan's estimated population of 10,000,000, are the Durrani and Ghilzai, true Afghan types, in the south, the Hazaras, of Mongolian type, in the center, and the Tajiks and Uzbeks, Turkomen tribes, in the north. There are other smaller tribes as well as numerous divisions of those mentioned and in addition a number of Afghan tribes, principally the Mohmands, Mahsuds, Afridis and Waziris, live in the independent zone between Afghanistan and India. There is little relationship or movement between tribes, with the exception of the nomads. These are of two kinds, those who move about the country working for example in Jelalabad in the winter and Kabul in the summer. They do many kinds of work in India, even acting as agents for money lenders or lending on their own account, their stature and warlike mien rendering it easy for them to exact repayment from the docile Indians. The trek which took place to Russian Turkestan before the first world war has been abandoned and it is estimated that some 40,000 Turkomen from Russia have instead taken refuge

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refuge in Afghan Turkestan.

It seems clear from the above discussion that the most important single task of the Government is that of trying to unify the diverse tribes and to settle at least part of the nomads on the soil. Numerous measures to accomplish this end have been taken such as improvement in communication by road, there now being a possible motor road making a circle of the country, from Herat to Kabul via Kandahar and return to Herat via Lashan-i-Jang. Telephone communication exists along this motor road, which enables the Government to keep in touch with local officials as to the activities of the tribes. The Government is fortifying and even consolidating the line of frontiers, the line of the border of the south, and the idea of bringing the Government of Kabul closer to the tribes closer in touch with the tribesmen. As to settling the nomads on the soil, this is not only a question of altering their mode of life but one of water supply, and herein lies another of the tribal problems. Most of the rivers of the country flow from their waters into foreign rivers or oceans, or even into the Kabul river emptying into the Indus, the Helmand empties into Iranian waters, and the northern rivers into the Oxus. The Government has a plan of harnessing these rivers for power and irrigation, and has already set into motion by the construction of a number of dams. The first of these projects is that of the Helmand River and at present, which, with a flow of 100,000 cfs, is said to be capable of developing 10,000 hp.

JOHN C. OR

over the last few years, 100,000 hectares. The work, and the building of roads on these, will require several years but it has actually been made. The government hopes, with this and five other dams under construction, to irrigate sufficient land to settle at least part of the nomads. The industrial developments have helped also in the settling of the tribes, the best example being the paper factory at Kandahar, which has started operating, giving employment to several hundreds. In addition to the textile mills already operating and those under construction, such as the large one at Pul-i-Khumri, a number of hand looms for the use of nomadic tribesmen around Kandahar are being purchased.

It is axiomatic in the history of Afghanistan that a government can exist only so long as it maintains control over the leading tribes. Means toward this end usually include placating the tribal leaders, payment of money and distribution of favors. It is not the custom of the government to pay outright bribes to the tribes but certain payments are made to those which took part in the war of independence and judicious distribution of money or favors is sometimes made when they become too restless. British legation officials at Kabul take the stand that any government in Afghanistan could be put out of power by a foreign nation or even an individual who had sufficient money to distribute among the tribes, beginning in the independent zone with the Arghis and other tribes which are potentially on the warpath.

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added that tribesmen are almost without exception armed, largely with muskets and obsolete rifles.

Since the Aziri incursion of 1933, tribal disturbances, while fairly frequent, have been of no great importance. These include uprisings of the Khatwan and Minwaris in 1938, the Alisal clan of the Turanians in 1939 and the Wamanda in 1941. Causes of these disturbances are religious fanaticism, retaliation for government action in connection with conscription, or simply personal grievances. Although it is commonly held that Germany and Italy are back of revolts, the British have obtained no concrete evidence of this allegation. It is known, however, that they are working from the tribes to some extent. The British Military Attaché informed me that airplanes have been most effective in putting down these disturbances, having worked so well against the Wahabids in 1941 that it was not necessary to drop bombs.

At the present moment, the tribes in Afghanistan proper are quiet. In the independent zone, the Aziris and Khatwans are somewhat stirred up, while the others are momentarily at rest. The most numerous leader at present at Isma'ilia is Amir Ismail, an Aziri mullah who holds great influence but is said to be anti-British rather than anti-Afghan. Another, who has been more prominent in the past than Amir Ismail, is Amir Ismail, an Aziri mullah, said to be anti-British rather than anti-Afghan.

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allah and to work for his return to Afghanistan. He is said not to be very active for the moment but is considered a potential danger. To show how easy it is to stir up trouble among these tribes, one Shami Pir, a Syrian from Baghdad who came to Afghanistan in 1938 without funds or influence, was able to stir up serious disturbances there. He escaped to Syria, some state with a handsome present from the Indian Government, was interned by the French but is said to be now at large.

In summary, it may be said that the Afghan Government seems competent to deal with tribal disturbances and are doing so effectively; however, it is doubtful if they could do so if a foreign power were to furnish money and organizers to work against them. This is no reflection on the Government for such a threat comes from foreign machinations and not from internal weakness.

GOVERNMENT

The Government of Afghanistan has evolved during the past two decades from that of absolute monarchy with full powers vested in the Amir to that of rule by family oligarchy. While in theory Afghanistan is a constitutional monarchy, in practice it is the most absolute of monarchies, but with power concentrated in the ruling Mohammedi family and not as heretofore in the hands of the sovereign. A Senate and National Assembly exist but they are the bidding of the ruling family so unquestioningly that consideration of their functions and perspectives is hardly worth while.

(a) History

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(a) History since Aburrahman

Although strong governments which exerted control over the entire country existed under Ahmad Shah and Dost Mohammad, it was Aburrahman (1880-1901) who created a proper central government in Afghanistan. This cruel but extremely competent ruler consolidated his rule over the country, weakened the influence of the mollahs, reduced and humiliated the higher classes and created a class of young protégés to learn the business of government administration and to rule the court. It was these young protégés who were primarily responsible for the killing of his son, King Habibullah, in 1919. The actual tool in the murder is said to have been the King's own son Amanullah and the cause a beautiful Hazara girl whom the King was endeavoring to take from his son, apparently not being contented with the 300 wives he already had. Amanullah, when he assumed power in 1919 after the assassination of his father, in order to strengthen his position at home since it was generally thought he had killed his father, altered Habibullah's policy of non intervention and declared war on Great Britain. His war was successful only because Great Britain was absorbed with World War problems at home and in India and did not care to be drawn into the kind of campaign which would have been necessary to overcome resistance in mountainous Afghanistan. However, certain Afghan successes along the Khyber River at the time armistice negotiations were being

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being conducted and the reluctance of the British to carry on the dispute gave the Afghans the impression that they had won a great victory over the British. Thus the Afghans, who do not generally suffer from an inferiority complex, like to refer to their three successful wars against the British, particularly the 1919 War of Independence, and indulge in hero worship of the first General Khabib Khan, who became King in 1926.

Amrullah continued to use the government officials who had been trained by his grandfather but, through his strong qualities and lack of balance, often to the detriment of the state until at last he stood entirely alone. He was a free thinker, visionary, and very much but unfortunately, rash, bold, and impulsive. He failed to foresee the results of the things he did in Europe. His call and flight to Italy in 1929 was a popular reaction of the people to his too rapidly developed system of modernization, which they considered impractical. The regime of terror following Amrullah's fall, during which the British were expelled, is a relief to the people of Afghanistan. I have examined the records of the government of Amrullah and find that he was a very able and energetic man. I can testify that they are a very capable people.

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The present government and that of Nadir Shah have
 been of great help to the people, have been
 able to turn the country into a modern one, and at last they
 have been able to build a modern foundation for the country
 and to the extent of financing the
 country.

Development of Present Country

It is not a surprise as he is sometimes
 called the "Great King" of the
 country, although not from the same branch as
 the one entitled to succeed to the throne on con-
 vention. His reign is not a strict rule
 of law. There is no question that he was a most
 able ruler as well as a splendid indivi-
 dual. His reforms the following are worthy
 of note - he rehabilitated the country financially, hav-
 ing been nearly ruined by Asanullah and his mad
 policy, created a banking system, banned private banks,
 created a reserve fund which has grown constantly;
 introduced the monopoly system which has brought in
 a great deal of money, constructed dams, provide power
 plants, and started the industrialization of the
 country; continued the policy, started by Abdurrah-
 man, of training young Afghans
 to work through a preparation of work and edu-
 cation; and gave the country its first sound
 and efficient administration. Most important of all, he
 expanded and obtained from government officials, by his

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great influence and by personal precept, frugality, simplicity and freedom from ostentation in their official and personal lives. This rule continues to this day, especially by the equally frugal and simple Prime Minister, a reputation which impresses one most favorably in his contacts with the Afghans. One hears the accusations leveled especially at the Afghans that they "feather their own nests", and that bribery and corruption are rampant. This is perhaps true to some extent; in fact, it would be surprising if it were not true in a young country like Afghanistan, particularly considering the lack of literacy existing in more advanced nations. The condition can be corrected and it seems to me most probable that the personal standards of Afghan officials are so high.

It must be noted that the regime and rule of the King continues, although he has been dead for about 10 years. Although his was by necessity a dictatorship in view of the needs and conditions of the country, he made possible the present rule of family continuity of this system is that it insures continuity of rule and prevents the chaos which has recently been caused by constant change of Amir and ruler over the throne. Today, for the first time in the history of Afghanistan, the country is ruled not by a single person, but by older and competent members of the royal family. In the system works, and in actual practice it is not to be tested, the government should continue without serious upheaval on the death of the King or

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highly in the order of their import and.

Prime Minister, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan

The Prime Minister, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan

The Prime Minister, half brother of the late Nadir Shah, is the power behind the throne in Afghanistan. A man of some 60 years, he is simple in his personal life, simple, frank, competent and intelligent. He speaks English only fairly well. The British, admitting his ability, accuse him of being so drunk with power that, like the Shah of Iran, he is impatient of criticism and is losing contact with what is going on in the country. Some accuse him of being pro-German because of his admitted admiration for what he saw in Germany several years ago but even the British have no proof of such leanings on his part. Reputation of such an accusation is his balanced neutral policy as regards the war. He presides at the family meetings and has the confidence of both the King and his mother. He is grooming as his successor Muhammad Naim Khan, who is now Assistant Prime Minister and Minister of Education. This personable and cultured young man, son of a full brother to the Prime Minister, Muhammad Aziz Khan, is competent but it is doubtful if he could fill at present more than an ordinary role in the family councils. The Prime Minister seems now to be somewhat improved in health.

Minister of War, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan

The Minister of War, full brother of the great Nadir Shah and half-brother of the Prime Minister, is perhaps

the

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the second most important member of this family government. A man of perhaps 50, he is handsome, poised, and intelligent. His English is fairly good but halting. His voice has an unpleasant throaty quality but is understood to be much better than before his operation in Germany in 1936. He, like his half-brother, was most impressed by his reception in Germany on his visit there and has a respect amounting almost to awe of the German war machine. He does not always see eye to eye with the Prime Minister or his most important subordinate, Daud Khan, Chief of the Army Corps at Kabul, and is said not to be too fond of work. It is admitted that he has done a good job of building up and organizing the Afghan army with the small amount of money at his disposal. He, as do most Afghans, seems friendly towards Americans.

3. Minister to France, Sardar Shah Wali Khan.

The Minister to France, full brother of the Prime Minister and half-brother of the Prime Minister, is an important member of the ruling family, particularly in matters connected with foreign policy. I doubt if his influence in internal matters at present is as great as that of the King or the Prime Minister, due to his continued absence from the country.

4. His Majesty's son, Amir Shah, King of Afghanistan.

The King of Afghanistan, son of the late King, is now 7 years old, is gradually becoming more mature and personable. He is a pleasant and cultured young man, speaks good French which he learned while residing in France.

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He goes with his father, but gives the impression of being
 independent. The Turkish Ambassador, who is a
 long personal friend and adviser to the Prime Minister,
 believes that the Ambassador has a positive character, knows
 his own mind, is much more decided than is commonly
 thought, and that he takes an increasingly important place
 in the family councils. He has a good following among
 the high officials of his simple manner and his demo-
 cratic spirit. He has followed the custom established
 by his father of sitting down at table with his subjects
 and eating with them on grounds of equality. In fine, he
 is very capable, is more than a young
 man, and will probably play a more important role in
 the government after the death of his uncle the Prime
 Minister. It must be remembered, in this regard, that
 of fifteen members of a family council in which the
 Minister plays the dominant part.

His mother

The mother of the Prime Minister has a more important posi-
 tion in the government than is commonly known, because
 of her position of confidence, because she is the
 one who is covered with the name of her per-
 sonal devotion. The Turkish Ambassador, who through
 his contact with the Prime Minister is intimately
 acquainted with her position in the family
 council, the Prime Minister listening to
 her will consent. It is not, for example, that the
 Prime Minister does not make in her presence. She is at the
 moment

Minister of Education

This man, son of the late Prime Minister, is being groomed for the position of Prime Minister. He is tall, handsome, well dressed, cultured, and speaks French with some fluency. There is no doubt that he is an outstanding young man but it is doubtful, in view of his youth and inexperience, whether he could fill his uncle's shoes. The British believe definitely he would not because of his conceit and laziness but he should at least give him time to mature for he is undoubtedly not expected to take over tomorrow. He is well disposed toward Americans and expresses great satisfaction with the students trained in America. He was instrumental in employing our two American teachers at the school in Kabul and is now arranging for five more for the same school. Whatever his future, it is a credit to Afghanistan to have young administrators of this type.

Abdul Ghaffar, Minister of Economy

This man, Minister of Commerce and former president of the Afghan National Bank, is the economic dictator of the country and something of a financial wizard. Rising from the position of a simple but successful merchant in the north, he made the Afghan National Bank pay dividends of over 7 percent, and has been the driving force behind

the

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an industrial magnate, a strong Germanophile and married
 to a German woman, he is largely responsible for
 the accumulation of German capital, equipment, and tech-
 nical information. He is said to have made a
 considerable fortune out of his government work and to
 have spent it abroad, largely in Germany.

When American authorities refused him a visa
 to the United States for treatment, he proceeded to
 Germany. It is understood that his operation
 was successful. It is unlikely to be
 repeated in the future, although he inclined widely, to the
 effect that he is fleeing the country and will not return.
 The British Government officials take it for
 granted that he will still in the government's good graces
 and that he will return after he has recovered from his
 operation. It is of the opinion, in spite of such assur-
 ances, that there is something odd about the whole matter
 and that it will be followed.

General A. G. M. Allen, Inspector General of the Army.

General Allen, in his 50s, is the only hold-
 over from the old regime. He is a soldier, is influ-
 ential and is the confidant of the Prime Minister. He,
 like all the others, is young, handsome, well dressed, speaks
 English fluently and is altogether charming. It is
 said that he is a very capable and able politician who
 has failed to find a place in the new government. He
 is said to be a man who will be watching
 in the

that the young of the species are not all out, or out
completely, and consistent. The influence of the
interior is considerable but it is not to be
taken solely with air out, the interior of the

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Abul Kalam Khan, Chief of Protocol

Abul Kalam Khan is a member of the royal family, of pleasing personality, but in a position of little importance but his views will be heard in the future. Like Asadullah Khan, he is a keen politician and is a good official. He is intelligent, something of a student and speaks French fluently.

Abul Kalam Khan, Minister of State

A member of the royal family, formerly Ambassador to Iran and now Minister without portfolio, this man is ambitious, tricky, and dangerous. He is competent, amusing, and speaks English passably well. His influence for good is not negligible but his ability to do harm is great. It is said he would like to be the first Afghan Minister to the United States.

Abul Kalam Khan, Director of Afghan National Bank

Abul Kalam's position is of considerable importance since he, together with Abdul Rejid Khan, has to do with the carrying out of the industrial program. He is of great ability and is energetic beyond anything I have seen outside the United States. He lived many years in Germany, speaks German fluently and is beyond question progressive. He is well connected, being married to a sister of the King, and is said to have sold a great deal personally out of the government projects.

Abul Kalam is one of the officials who wield great influence in the government and is said to have decided

possibilities

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abilities for the future. A list of other officials follows with, in some cases, brief notes concerning them:

President of the Senate, Mir Asa Mohammad Khan, a fanatical Islamicist, little influence.

President of National Assembly, Abdul Anad Khan, important figure of influence with a name, he himself having been taken from the tribe to be trained by Abdurrahman. He is the Assembly with an iron hand but is now 70 years old.

Minister of the Court, Sardar Ahmad Shah Khan, father of the Queen, he is a charming man but of little importance.

Minister of the Pina, Mir Mohammad Nader Khan, son of President of Senate, not important.

Minister of Public Works, Rahimullah Khan, energetic, formerly Minister of Posts, has charge of important road and public works construction. Although said to be of the German office, he seems friendly towards the United States and is anxious to obtain American equipment and technicians. He is competent but his actual influence is not great.

Minister of Finance, Mir Mohammad Khan, a dealer, another of the German office, trained by Abdurrahman, unpopular generally but has some influence as he has some influence in the office.

Minister of Health and Police, Abdul Hussain Khan, said to be lazy and completely unimportant.

Minister of Hygiene, Gulam Yahya Khan, another member of the German office, comes from a distinguished family which established the first newspaper in the country, is somewhat under suspicion as he is a friend of Amrullah, is not of importance.

Minister of Affairs, Salimuddin Khan, formerly Consul in Istanbul, of Turkish descent, said to be the most tricky and least trusted official in Kabul, of no importance.

Minister of Agriculture, Mir Mohammad Ghous Khan, of no importance.

Minister of Justice, Mirza Ali Khan, comes from Herat, is a member of the House of the influential Mirza Ali Khan, who is said to exist on this side of the border and is said to be a Minister of Justice.

Minister of Interior, Mirza Ali Khan, a new man recently appointed, of little importance.

Governor

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Governors of Provinces

There follows, for the record, a list of the gov-
ernors of the various provinces of the Republic of
Vietnam, as of the date of the signing of the
Paris Agreement, 1973. The names of the gov-
ernors are given in the French language, and
in the Vietnamese language, where available.
The names of the provinces are given in the
French language, and in the Vietnamese language,
where available.

Province of Hanoi, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Vinh, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Thanh Hoa, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Haiphong, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Nam Dinh, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Bac Ninh, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Phu Tho, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Son Tay, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Lai Chau, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Dien Bien Phu, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Ha Son, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Cao Bang, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Tuyen Quang, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Phu Quoc, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Province of Ho Chi Minh City, Governor: General
Pham Hung Nam.

Although separate secret agreements have been
concluded between the Government of the Republic of
Vietnam and the United States of America, and other
countries, it will be noted that in this
document the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
has not signed any such agreements.

(c) Foreign Affairs.

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam, and
the United States of America, and other countries,
have agreed to the following terms of the Paris
Agreement, 1973. The terms of the Paris Agreement,
1973, are as follows: The Government of the Republic
of Vietnam, and the United States of America, and
other countries, have agreed to the following terms
of the Paris Agreement, 1973. The terms of the
Paris Agreement, 1973, are as follows: The Govern-
ment of the Republic of Vietnam, and the United
States of America, and other countries, have agreed
to the following terms of the Paris Agreement, 1973.

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that the other, on the contrary to seek new friends to offset this influence. The friend has recently been named the Soviet Union. It is very much to have the United States, this necessary third power friend to assist in the plan. As to the war, a policy of strict non-interference has been successfully followed to date.

(1) Finance

The financial policy is based on a balanced budget, which is never made public, the accumulation of a gold reserve and foreign currency deposits, control of exchange, and government monopoly of business to give profits to be used in the program of modernization and industrialization. The government, it may be said, has been successful in this policy and in spite of the heavy costs of their program, a substantial reserve fund has been created where none existed in 1959 and the country has no debt internal or external, other than certain five year credits granted by the Germans.

(2) Industry

Economic policy centers around the program of industrialization and modernization. This comprises building of textile mills, heat engine factories, power plants, dams, to mention of several modernization and town planning. Most of the program is under way; some, such as the heat engine factory at Kandahar, are finished and others, for example, the power plant and textile mill at Kabul, are nearing completion. To pay for this program which is carried out for the government by the

Afghan

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Afghan National Bank with certain participation by private investors, strict control is maintained of caravan exports to the United States, which furnish the principal foreign exchange, and of profit making monopolies. The road program is most important, since the country is entirely dependent on motor transport, outside of caravan transportation. Much has been done and a passable road now exists between all important towns in the country.

(d) Social.

In a social sense, the most important plan is to settle part at least of the nomads on the soil. This problem is closely bound up with the all important one of water, and both hinge on the construction of dams for irrigation purposes. In education, a most difficult task due to the tribal suspicion and dislike of compulsory education, something is being accomplished, especially in the cities. To assist in creating a national consciousness, the government is requiring the learning of Pashtu by all officials.

STABILITY OF REGIME

The stability of any government in Afghanistan is a question qui generis and it is unfair in considering it to use a foreign yardstick. In relation to previous governments and considering the youth and inexperience of the country, the present government is, in my opinion, sound, well conducted and stable. One is surprised to encounter, in such a small and unimportant country, administrators of the intelligence, balance and good tastes of the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister or with the

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the energy of Attiq Rafiq. The balance of the government is shown by the caution with which it is proceeding in its industrial program, not making the mistake of Amanullah who, in his impatience to accomplish his ends overnight, lost completely the support of the people. Nor is the government playing with the dangerous fire, which cost Amanullah his throne, of proceeding rashly with unveiling of women or other measures which are against the religious precepts of this fanatical people. Their plan is to modernize, industrialize slowly, educate, and develop communications, knowing that if this program is carried out westernization will come naturally as it has come in Iran. Any attempt to unveil women or proceed too fast even with education would certainly spell the ruin of the government.

The tribes are relatively quiet and the government is quite able to cope with any ordinary internal uprising. The army has been strengthened to something like 80,000 men, is loyal, and is sufficiently well armed for internal purposes. The airplane, of which they have some 35 serviceable ones, has been recently a powerful weapon in putting down disturbances. Internal security is good, perfect safety prevailing on the highways and in the towns. Afghanistan is the only oriental country I have seen where beggars are seldom or almost never encountered. The above remarks have to do

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exclusively with internal security and the ability of the government to handle local situations and to not take into consideration foreign obligations or instigation of revolt from without. It is probable that any foreign power could render the life of the government precarious or impossible by free use of money in stirring up the tribes, particularly in the independent zone.

It is often stated by critical observers that discontent among all except the governing class is widespread and violent. While it is true that discontent exists, this point should not be overstressed to give the impression that revolt is imminent. Discontent with the government is not an uncommon condition in any country, and more especially in one like Afghanistan where loss are apt to be stepped on as a result of the rapid changes being made. I have been unable to detect discontent or restlessness among the masses of such serious nature as to warrant the assumption that the danger point has been reached.

As to the immediate future of the regime, this will depend much on the continued existence of the Prime Minister and the success of the new rule by family oligarchy. The government is in the best hands it would be possible to find in Afghanistan and I see no reason to fear for its stability or immediate future. Obviously, however, the destiny of the country for the moment will depend on the action of the warring nations rather

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rather than on the country itself.

It will be well, in closing, to lay at rest the recurrent rumors of the return of Amanullah to the throne. While there are elements working for his return, such is out of the realm of possibility if one take into consideration only internal Afghan conditions. It is possible of course, that he might be reinstalled on the throne as a puppet by any great power who desired to do so, but per se his cause has almost no strength.

CONCLUSION

Great change has been wrought and much accomplished in Afghanistan in the last two decades. These accomplishments must be viewed in the peculiar light of Afghan history, the former reputation of this "forlorn land", the relative poverty of the country, the diversity of tribes, and the lack of communications. With these limitations in mind, one is surprised not that progress is so slow but that so much has indeed been accomplished. Afghanistan asks for American help and understanding; we should not at least be rude to the latter.

Respectfully yours,

Paul G. Prayton Jr.

enclosure

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the above is

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July 24, 1961 on

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INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA, NEW YORK, N. Y.

TEL. CUNY 5-1071
CABLE GRANTRADE

December 9, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Ulius L. Gross

A young citizen of Colombia arrived in the United States from Europe in July 1940. A few months later, he wrote to an acquaintance of his in Colombia, Baron Christian de Rivaux, head of a large textile firm, knowing that he had several connections in New York, and asked him to put him (Rubiano) in touch with some firm here which might help him in securing his American citizenship papers.

About March of this year, he received from the Baron two or three letters of introduction to firms in New York, one of which was addressed to Meck & Company, 82 Wall Street. On presenting this letter, he was told by one of the heads of the firm that, because of the International situation and because they were German, they could do nothing for him if it had to do with the State Department. They implied that it would even be harmful to his (Rubiano's) interests to have their firm recommend him, because of these conditions. They said that, although they didn't expect to be forced to close the business, at least their business would be decreased.

Baron de Rivaux wrote to Rubiano about September of this year, saying that the trip he expected to make to New York had to be postponed, since he had been placed on the United States blacklist, and could not secure a visa.

Meck and Company are buyers here for Baron Christian de Rivaux who is of French origin.

Yours very truly,

R. L. Escobar

Manager Latin-American Division

RAF/n

COPY

Gramtrade

TEL CHARGE 5-15H
CABLE GRAMTRADE

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA, NEW YORK, N.Y.

MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

June 27th, 1941.

With reference to the POTASH CHLORATE I confirm our following cable communications:

On cable of the 27th: VIEW SEVERAL COMPETITION VILLA OFFERS FIRM FOUR TONS CHLORATE 99-1/2% WHITE 43-1/8 CENTS CIF SIGHT DRAFT TERMS TWO SHIPMENTS, INTERVAL 30 DAYS TELEGRAPH ACCEPTANCE.

On cable of the 28th: REQUIRE IMMEDIATE REPLY RADIOGRAM TWENTYFIRST

On cable of the 29th: IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT CASH NEW YORK ACCEPT

On cable of the 30th: ON TERMS STIPULATED VILLA ACCEPTS TWO-TONS TELEGRAPH CONFIRMATION

On cable of the 31st: ACCEPT CHLORATE

I am aware of Don Vicente's commercial standing; the whole competition is against his business, offering him special terms which no other importer would. Fortunately I am on very intimate terms with Don Vicente and have been able to persuade him to prefer me, whenever he can possibly manage to do so. In this particular case he gave me the order for CASH in New York without obtaining documents, although he had better terms offered to him, and he stated he compensated me for my cable expenses in which I had incurred. This special concession does not mean to say, that he is disposed to give the same to other foreign transactions, as far as other materials are concerned. He can get draft terms from 60 to 120 days, some competitors even longer than him mean account.

In confirmation of above I have great pleasure to enclose now my official order for 2 tons of CHLORATE, furthermore the respective import license No. 64691, and he trusts that you will be able to attend to prompt shipment, as the material is most urgently required.

August 6th, 1941.

SIR: I note what you say about the CHLORATE and trust that you will continue your special efforts in order to obtain the export license, because Don Vicente counts upon the two tons contracted, and has also sent already about the irrevocable letter of credit. Therefore please do not leave anything undone in this respect.

COPY

VICTOR VILLAS, BOGOTA

August 15th, 1941.

VICTOR VILLAS G.: Client is very anxious to know the result of your efforts regarding the export license for the CLORATO DE POTASA, in view of the very urgent need of the product. He asked me today to write you the effect, that in case you encounter difficulties, to communicate with the Colombian Embassy in Washington, to assist you in the matter. Don Vicente is well known in the Embassy, also a personal friend of Dr. Turbay, the Ambassador, at present in Bogota.

September 24th, 1941

VICTOR VILLAS G.: What about the export license for the 2 tons of CHLORATE? Client is in dire need of this product, as the stocks in his factory have practically run out and he will have to close if he cannot get the material soon. Please do everything in your power, in conjunction with the Colombian Embassy, to obtain export license without delay.

October 4th, 1941

VICTOR VILLAS G.: What about the export license for the 2 tons of POTASH CHLORATE? Client is in very urgent need of this material for his Match factory. Please do not leave anything undone in order to obtain this license at an early date.

October 11th, 1941

VICTOR VILLAS G.: The delay in obtaining the export license for the CLORATO DE POTASA is creating a very serious problem for client. He counts upon your ability to pull him through successfully and also wishes to know whether it will be convenient to take further steps on this side. Please do your best.

October 18th, 1941

VICTOR VILLAS G.: Thanks very much for the trouble you are taking regarding the CLORATO DE POTASA. As already stated in my last letter of the 11th inst., if you think it advisable to continue the pressure on this side, please let us know, and how to proceed.

October 22nd, 1941

VICTOR VILLAS G.: The two copies of your letters addressed to client I handed over immediately. With reference to the matter of the CLORATO DE POTASA, unfortunately there has been a severe lack of foresight on your part. You committed two grave mistakes, first by returning the documents instead of holding onto them in your possession and to ask first for final instructions. Second, to return these important documents by ordinary mail, instead of airmail. You know that ordinary post mail does not reach its destination here in Bogota before a week, therefore a most valuable time is lost, and in the meantime client cannot take any further effective step from here. It goes without saying that Don Vicente is greatly annoyed about your procedure. I understand by this same letter that he is writing you direct on the subject. Immediately upon receipt of your letter copy client took the matter up with the Government. The latter hereby requests the Government is directly interested that client's factory does not close down for want of raw materials, as it collects from Don Vicente annually about \$10,000 for stamp duties on Matches.

COPY

WALTER SHINSCHER, BOGOTA

October 29th, 1941

VICENTE VILLA G.: Your observations in letter of the 24th inst. I showed to client. in order to convince him that you had not left any-
thing regarding the CLORATO DE POTASA and that you were still working
on the matter. He expressed his willingness to accept the two tons if after
all you were able to obtain the export license, although after your last letter,
in view of the devolution of all documents, he had placed an order for 10 (ten)
tons with Mecke, the Colombian Government sending at the same time a cable to
the Colombian Embassy in Washington to see that the export license for these 10
tons get through.

In the way, what about the two pending matters of the MATCH WICK and the MATCH
WICK, about which I wrote you some time ago? If you keep me waiting too long,
I am very much afraid that clients opinion about your efficiency will suffer a
great deal.

November 18th, 1941

VICENTE VILLA G.: Lately you have not mentioned anything further on the subject
of the CLORATO DE POTASA. Have you not been able to get any further in the
matter? You will remember that in my letter of October 29th I wrote you, that
client had placed 10 tons with Mecke & Co. and that the Colombian Embassy was
assisting in the matter of the export license. Today I was informed by Don
Vicente, that the export license for these 10 tons had been obtained. What
do you say to that? I must confess this news did upset me considerably.

Walter Scinsche

Bogota

REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA

CODIGOS EN USO
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
COMMERCIAL TELEGRAPHIC & CABLE CODE
SENTENCES & WORDS
QUICKLY MADE INTO A SUMMARY
RECEIVED 11/11/1961

Bogota, August 11, 1961

X VENTURA 11/16 p.1. Went to park, looking to see if result of
certain regarding the report. In the park, the
atmosphere is in very pleasant mood. The weather is very
pleasant.

Walter Seinsche

Bogotá

REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA

CODIGOS EN USO

A. B. C. WITH Y. Z. ADDED
LISSEN'S FIVE LETTERS
COMMERCIAL TELEGRAPH & CABLE CODE
BENTLEY'S - ACME
RUDOLF MORSE CODE & SUPPL.
SCHOFIELD'S LETTER CODE

AIRMAIL

Trade International Corporation Bogotá, September 24th 1941
Latin-American Division
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York

Attention Mr. Rafael Escobar

Dear Sirs,

I have great pleasure to acknowledge receipt of your airmail letter dated the 19th inst.

DIYCA-DROGUERIA Y FARMACIA COLOMBO-ANDINA S.A.S. Prefer to send the complete three items. Therefore please let me know as soon as you have obtained the export license for the ALUMBRE EN POLVO.

PROGUERIA REAL - GOMEZ ECHEVERRI & CIA In accordance with your specification I have great pleasure to enclose herewith import license No 7 3629, covering those items which can be shipped immediately. As you will notice, the ACIDO ACETICO has been increased to 3 barrels, in accordance with your indication. Now as far as shipment is concerned, I have been able to induce clients not to insist upon their original instructions as to handing over to Young & Glenn, in view of your explanations in previous correspondence. You are herewith authorized to attend to direct shipment yourselves, to the consignees indicated in Buena Ventura.

Make one single shipment of all the lines indicated in the enclosed import license, and do not overlook to forward the original shipping documents direct to consignees address, in order to avoid customs fine for late arrival. This is important in all cases.

As soon as you have obtained export license for the remaining four items, please let me know at once, in order to send you the import license from here.

JORGE GARCES R.E. NIJOS, CALI I sincerely trust you will obtain export license for the NAPHTALINE soon. I am looking forward for your corresponding advise.

VICENTE VILLA G.S. What about the export license for the 2 tons of CHLORATE? Client is in dire need of this product, as the stocks in his factory have practically run out and he will have to close if he cannot get the material soon. Please do everything in your power, in conjunction with the Colombian Embassy, to obtain export license without delay.

I note that you will go ahead in making application for the other three tons, as soon as you have received approval for the first shipment. Do you not think it advisable to make application for the three tons right now?

With reference to your quotation for GUM COPAL, I could induce Don Vicente to accept your offer at 18-1/4 ¢ CIF, and I refrained from telling you, as you told me that there was no need for it, having placed the order firm with the suppliers. In consequence I have great pleasure

Walter Seinsche

Bogota

REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA

CONDICIONES EN USO:

A B C LETTER WITH 20
LETTERS FIVE LETTERS
COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE & CABLE CODE
SPENTLEY'S - ACME
RUDOLF MORSE CODE & SUPPLY
SCHWABER'S LETTER CODE

TELEFONO 4434
CALLE 13 No. 13 Rep.

AIRMAIL

Bogota, October 4th 1941

Transtrade International Corporation
Latin American Division
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York

Attention Mr. R. C. Kasper

Dear Sirs,

I beg to confirm my last airmail letter of the 1st inst. and did not have the pleasure of hearing from you in the meantime.

X VICENTE VILLA G. & Co. What about the export license for the 2 tons of POTASH material for his Match factory. Client is in very urgent need of this material to obtain this license at an early date. **X**
MATCH GLUE (COLA) Can you find out who are the suppliers to Necke of this material? They are offering two certain brands to Don Vicente, one called "Atlas" and the other one "No 9011". These two brands client has received on various occasions and he says they are very satisfactory. He is disposed to order two tons of each, if you can get hold of the right article and at convenient prices. Please try your very best to find out, and if you are successful, send a small sample of 50 grams each. But these samples have to be forwarded by airmail, as he cannot wait for ordinary postmail which is on the road too long. And with less than 50 grams he cannot experiment, 50 grams is the minimum required. We would very much appreciate your giving this important matter your most serious and immediate attention.

DROGUERIA NUEVA YORK S.A. May I remind you once more that your price-list must reach me here the very latest on the 10th of this month, viz. Friday next. Please do not leave me in the lurch. I am most anxious to get you in with this first rate concern.

Without anything further for to day, I remain, Dear Sirs,

Yours very truly

Walter Seinsche

PAGINA N. 11

es. Inmate International Corporation

Thanks very much for the trouble you are taking regarding the CLORATO DE POTASA. As already stated in letter of the 11th inst., if you think it advisable to continue the procedure on this side, please let me know, and how to proceed. I am working on the two lists sent with your letter of the 11th inst. and trust to be able to let you know something next mail.

Enclosed please find "Certificate" from the Ministerio de Economia Nacional with reference to the CLORATO DE POTASA. I went round to the United States Commercial Consulate in Bogota to obtain a visto bueno, but I was told that there was no chance for it and that I should send the Certificate as it was. I will be successful in getting the export license through. I have a provisional order #41 of Dept. 23rd from this same office. I am very desirous of getting the products specified.

I sincerely trust that the day after tomorrow I receive your quotations for the ALCOHOL METILICO and PIRIDINA as per letter of the 11th inst. Hoping that business will result this time. I offer you the following new inquiry from the Caja:

1. 20 toneladas de 1.000 Kilos c/u.
2. 20 toneladas de 1.000 Kilos c/u.
3. 20 toneladas de 1.000 Kilos c/u.
4. 20 toneladas de 1.000 Kilos c/u.
5. 20 toneladas de 1.000 Kilos c/u.
6. 20 toneladas de 1.000 Kilos c/u.
7. 20 toneladas de 1.000 Kilos c/u.
8. 20 toneladas de 1.000 Kilos c/u.
9. 20 toneladas de 1.000 Kilos c/u.
10. 20 toneladas de 1.000 Kilos c/u.

These items are required both CIP Buenaventura and FAS United States port. I have the very latest in October 20th next. The necessary export license, the Colombian Government will issue once the contract has been placed. I am sure that like to get this contract, therefore may I ask you to submit competitive quotations. I will remember that the last two contracts in this same line were placed in May at \$34.00 FAS per 100 lbs. against the time of \$34.00 FAS. I am sure that you are an usual wire letter of credit in New York against the quotation not to include consular fees.

Your invoice for \$31,850.00 has been paid, therefore you should have received the money in due course. The delay has not come through yet. Another delay has been caused on account of the War Minister having designated next week. The name of "Haviland" had gone through all the stages. The latter was accomplished, and also the new one made place. Hence the new delay.

Yours very truly
Walter J. Smith
Import Licenses #34060 & 25061
Certificate

SEINSCHE
BOSTON

PAGINA No. II

Sres Grantrade International Corporation

URGENT MATTER: The two copies of your letters addressed to client I handed over immediately. With reference to the matter of the **CLORATO DE POTASA**, unfortunately there has been a severe lack of foresight on your part. You committed two grave mistakes, first by returning the documents instead of holding same in your possession and secondly, by ordinary mail, instead of airmail. You know that ordinary mail does not reach its destination here in Bogotá before 3 to 4 weeks, therefore a most valuable time is lost, and in the meantime client cannot take any further effective step from here. It goes without saying that Don Vicente is greatly annoyed about your procedure; I understand this same airmail he is writing you direct on the subject. Immediately upon receipt of your letter copy client took the matter up with the Government. The latter is going to intervene direct, as soon as the documents returned by you, arrive here. Because the Government is directly interested that clients factory does not close down for want of raw materials, as it collects from Don Vicente annually about \$250,000 for stamp duties on matches.

Covering my order #47, please find enclosed import license #76137, for the **SESQUILS** (LPHIDE and the **BLANCO DE ZINC**, to be shipped together.

With your offer of 1 (one) ton **STEARIC ACID** client cannot do anything. He requires a minimum of 5 tons, and up to 10 tons if price is convenient.

In your quotation for the **FULLY REFINED PARAFFINE WAX** you are quite out. As I told you in my letter of the 11th inst. he received an offer at \$27.10 CIF. As to your suggestion for client to place an open order, this he terminantly refuses, as he wishes to know what he is doing. On this subject Don Vicente remarked furthermore, that other United States concerns, do not find any inconvenience to send cable quotations on **PARAFFINE**, therefore he suggests, that when you believe to have a competitive quotation on hand, to cable same likewise. His orders in **PARAFFINE FULLY REFINED** are always for a minimum of 10 tons.

SEER TURBINA-GENERADOR: This offer I took up immediately with the manager of the "Empresas Unidas de Energia Electrica" here in Bogotá, and was told by the Gentleman, whom by the way I know very well, that this offer is not suitable for Bogotá, but that he would be pleased to assist me in case he could find any interested party outside Bogotá. In the course of to day I have an appointment with the manager of the "Compañia de Cementos Portland Diamante", who have their plants outside Bogotá. I also intend writing to Medellín on the subject.

INTEREST-FINLAND-GOVERNT MATERIAL: The "Consejo Administrativo de Ferrocarriles Nacionales" might be interested in the **BALL BEARINGS**, but they told me that they require complete details. As no doubt you know, they are operating a great number of trucks on the Ibaqué-Armenia road. Furthermore I found interest in the **BALL BEARINGS** and the **COPPER WIRE** at the "Talleres Guqueta", the most important work-shops in Electricidad. These people also asked for complete specifications, also for sample of the Ball Bearings and the Copper Wire, furthermore for quotations on the basis FAS New York as well as CIF Buenaventura. However they told that they would only consider any business proposition on the basis of cash terms, but authorizing you to charge interests. In the **COPPER WIRE** I have another client on hand, a certain firm "Radio", they also wish to see sample and know quotations. Regarding the other lines, I am still working on same.

5000 net your two airmail letters as per copies sent to me.
 In fact only with the exception of your quotation for the
 net your other prices were found satisfactory. On the same
 day, 11-11-41, he was offered the YODERO DE POTASIO in 1 lb
 net. He said you can accept the same price, he is willing to
 have the items together with 1 x 240 lb barrel of KATALINE
 net. Please let me know per return airmail if alright.
 The day's out in the car. I was told that your
 could not get him to let me know
 about also.

the different lines covered by the import licenses sent.

In your observations in letter of the 24th inst. I showed
 that I am not sufficient, in order to convince him that you had not lost
 the matter, he expressed his willingness to accept the two tons
 after all you were able to obtain the export license although after
 the letter, informing of the devolution of all documents, he had placed
 the two tons in the hands of the Colombian Government pending at
 the moment of license for these 10 tons gets through. ~~Washington~~
 the way, throughout the two pending matters of the MATCH RICK and
 the 24th inst. about which I wrote you some time ago. If you keep me
 informed all along I request.

Although I have much doubt that on the basis of your experience and business will come about, it also looks to me that your offer for the FAR is exceptionally high, although of course I cannot judge on a bare basis how the dips market conditions are. Furthermore, I do not state with CIE quotation, as asked for it before.

[illegible]

PLEASE REPLY BY TELEPHONE OR MAIL. Please let me know per return
mail whether you wish to know definitely. You remember I sent you my complete
list of names in my letter of September 5th last.

201. Import License #76860

Yours very truly

Blackburne

SECRET

J.P.W.C. 40th Meeting

COPY NO. 1

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 100-A,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on Monday, December 7, 1942, at 1430.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Col. C. C. Blakeney
(for Gen. G. V. Strong)

Rear Adm. H. C. Train, USN

Lt. Col. J. K. Woolnough
(for Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer)

Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Capt. A. V. S. Pickhardt, USN

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

SECRET

1. SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN AREA
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 27/3d Dr.; 53; 53/1/2d Dr.)

COLONEL DONOVAN reported that the survey group authorized for Algiers, is being organized now. As to materiel required for the plan, the S.O.S. has indicated that most of the items will be available except "Thompson Machine Guns" which must be delivered over a period of months, or other types of submachine guns substituted. The requirements for high speed boats and the use of a submarine had been discussed with Admiral Horne who indicated that these needs would be given consideration as they arose.

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF reported that the Office of Procurement and Material, Navy Department, had approved all items on the list for this operation.

After further discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Approved the plan as presented, subject to approval of S.O.S.
- (b) Directed the Secretary to forward this proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners, recommending approval.

2. SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 55)

COLONEL DONOVAN objected to a limitation of five persons in the advance party since there might be need to include code clerks and other experts.

LT. COL. WOOLNOUGH reported that General Andrews had approved the plan in principle but had made the following conditions:

(a) That directives for the operations of the mission be issued by General Andrews, based on requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the theater.

(b) That absolute control of the activities of the mission in the Middle East Theater be vested in General Andrews.

(c) That no operatives be permitted to function until they are thoroughly trained and cognizant of conditions in the area.

(d) That information gathered in that theater be disseminated by General Andrews.

(e) That no radio interception work be attempted by the mission until its personnel has become familiar with British technique in that theater.

SECRET

LT. COL. WOOLNOUGH also suggested that the subject directive should include the same conditions as laid down for the "Hoskins Mission", and proposed two substitute paragraphs.

COLONEL DONOVAN recommended that a provision be included that all other O.S.S. missions in the area should be under control of the head of this mission to the Middle East.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Agreed to the various changes in the directive as suggested above.
- (b) Directed the Secretary to forward the plan, as amended, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval, through the Joint Staff Planners.

3. PROCUREMENT OF S.O. EQUIPMENT
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 54/1)

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF stated that Admiral Cooke had suggested this revised procedure because it had been his belief that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff Planners should not be obliged to pass on individual items of O.S.S. supply needs. Since the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee is advisory to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for O.S.S. administrative matters, it would be preferable for the Committee to pass finally on matters of procurement of S. O. equipment.

ADMIRAL TRAIN agreed that this revised procedure would be more logical and quicker.

Changes were suggested (a) in the verbiage of paragraphs two and three, and (b) in the addition of a new paragraph which would revoke the pertinent parts of the present directive (J.C.S. 67/4) fixing the procedure for approval of O.S.S. requirements for materiel.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Approved the revised procedure, including the changes suggested.
- (b) Directed the Secretary to forward the revised procedure to the Joint Staff Planners with the request that it be substituted for the procedure which previously had been transmitted.

4. O.S.S. 1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 42/1/2d Draft; 42/4; 42/5)

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF stated that the letter from the Office of Procurement and Material, Navy Department covered (1) this Catalogue, (2) the list of British requirements contained in J.P.W.C. 42/5, (3) the list of material submitted for use in the Western Mediterranean area.

SECRET

LT. COL. WOOLNOUGH stated that the approval of the Services of Supply, War Department had not yet been received and that it would be unwise to give final approval prior to receipt of those comments.

After discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Approved the Catalogue as requirements of O.S.S., subject to:
 - (1) Comments and concurrence of the Services of Supply, War Department.
 - (2) The reservation of the Office of Procurement and Material, Navy Department as to the radio equipment listed on page 9 of the Catalogue.
- (b) Directed the Secretary to forward the Catalogue, when the approvals had been received from S.O.S., to the Joint Staff Planners recommending approval.

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

J.P.W.C. 39th Meeting

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 100-A,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on Monday, November 30, 1942, at 1430.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong

Rear Adm. H. C. Train, USN

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Col. C. C. Blakeney

Capt. A. V. S. Pickhardt, USN

Lt Col. J. K. Woolnough

A. H. ONTHANK,

Secretary.

SECRET

GENERAL WEDEMEYER said that the Joint Staff Planners are ready to give strategical plans to the J.P.W.C. as soon as the O.S.S. has presented its psychological warfare plans, and urged that they be submitted without delay.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the plan for special operations from Algeria to the Continent will be laid before the Subcommittee in the near future in conjunction with other plans for the Mediterranean Theater.

3. PROPOSED CONVENTION FOR EXTRADITION OF AXIS WAR CRIMINALS

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 46)

ADMIRAL TRAIN pointed out that the Political Committee of the State Department is considering somewhat similar possibilities, and suggested that this proposal should be cleared with the State Department before further action. GENERAL STRONG agreed with that opinion and stated that the State Department may be loath to approach neutrals on a proposal which they may consider will jeopardize their position of neutrality.

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that the primary purpose of the proposal is to drive a wedge between German high authorities who are guilty of criminal acts and the German people, as a measure of psychological warfare. He pointed out that a representative of the State Department is on the Advisory Committee and suggested that this proposal be laid before that Committee.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed that this proposal be referred to the Advisory Committee for comment and recommendations.

4. PROCUREMENT OF S. O. EQUIPMENT

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 54)

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that the O.S.S. has been engaged in conversations with procurement officers of the S.O.S. to develop a procedure for the procurement of this equipment. He explained the difficulties involved in the procurement of certain of these items, which are small in number and amount of material involved, but which are developed through close cooperation of O.S.S. officials with specially chosen manufacturers. This is essential in order that control be retained in the O.S.S. for security reasons. One result has been that the manufacturers have often suggested substitute materials for those which have a high critical priority. GENERAL WEDEMEYER emphasized that on such critical materials it would be better for O.S.S. to be working through the S.O.S., since its needs would be given greater consideration if S.O.S. officials were familiar with the situation.

SECRET

GENERAL STRONG suggested that the difficulty might be met if the O.S.S. were permitted to place liaison officers in the S.O.S. GENERAL WEDEMAYER suggested the addition of a new paragraph to cover this point:

f. To represent properly the O.S.S. interests in the procurement of these munitions, that organization shall be authorized to provide not less than two liaison officers with the S.O.S.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER agreed to lay this proposal before General Somervell for his approval. COLONEL DONOVAN stated that this would be acceptable.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Approved the proposal of General Wedemeyer, subject to inclusion of the proposed new paragraph f.

5. IMPLEMENTATION AND SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PLANS
 (Ref. - J.P.W.C. 52)

GENERAL STRONG explained that this paper was an effort of the Joint Security Control to notify this Committee of what had happened in the North African situation, especially as to the necessity of the last minute action which had been required. He pointed out that after psychological warfare plans had been approved, it became necessary for some one agency to coordinate action among the various agencies which are implementing those plans. It had been done in this case by the Joint Security Control.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER expressed the belief that such a coordination function might be too much for the Joint Security Control to carry in view of its other important duties, to which ADMIRAL TRAIN agreed. COLONEL DONOVAN pointed out that coordination of psychological warfare plans, which might involve operating functions, might cause difficulty when linked to the normal operations of Joint Security Control, which is primarily a directing force.

ADMIRAL TRAIN stated that it would seem better to provide a separate agency for coordinating the execution of psychological warfare plans. To this COLONEL DONOVAN agreed on the basis that the Joint Security Control was not geared to perform such operations and it would be desirable to have such functions executed by such agencies which have operational organizations, and which could meet the necessary improvisations.

After further discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Directed that this subject be removed from the Agenda.

SECRET

6. COORDINATION OF U. S. AND BRAZILIAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
 (Ref. - J.P.W.C. 38)

love
 GENERAL STRONG stated that one factor had been overlooked in this proposal, viz., the close religious connection between Brazil and Portugal, which could possibly be used to advantage.

ADMIRAL TRAIN explained the new organization which has been set up in Brazil by the Navy Department, whereby all personnel are made responsible to Vice Admiral Ingram. He pointed out that Admiral Ingram should be consulted before action is taken on this proposal.

GENERAL STRONG said that the State Department also should be approached in advance of any formal action, as it might tend to place the proposed functions with the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. COLONEL DONOVAN suggested that this paper might be approved in principle and the details worked out with the State Department prior to any final decision. He pointed out that there is a good precedent for such collaboration with the State Department in the consideration of the Plan for Portugal which has been before the Advisory Committee.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that Colonel Donovan will:

- (a) Refer this proposal to the Advisory Committee for discussion of details of operation;
- (b) Report to this Committee at its next meeting on the attitude of the State Department.

SECRETCOPY NO. 1November 14, 1942JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEMEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION No. 2.ITEMS PENDING

1. PROPOSED NEW DIRECTIVES OF THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS
OF STAFF TO THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 50; 50/1. J.P.W.C. 49)
Under consideration by J.P.W.C.
2. MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR O.S.S.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 37)
MILITARIZATION OF O.S.S.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 37/2/D)
Consideration deferred for action on J.P.W.C. 50.
3. FUNCTIONS OF O.S.S.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 45/D; 45/1)
Consideration deferred for action on J.P.W.C. 50.
4. FUNCTIONS OF O.S.S. - ORGANIZED SABOTAGE AND
GUERRILLA UNITS
(Ref. - J.C.S. 63/1. J.P.W.C. 21/2/3d Draft)
To be considered in connection with Item #3.
5. IMPLICATIONS OF SPEECHES OF STATE DEPARTMENT
OFFICIALS
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. Mtg., Oct. 12)
Awaiting report from Military Intelligence Division.
6. PROPOSED CONVENTION FOR EXTRADITION OF AXIS
WAR CRIMINALS
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 43)
Final consideration deferred in J.P.W.C. meeting
November 2.

SECRET7. O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS -
1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 42/1
J.P.W.C. 42/4)

Catalogue returned by Joint Staff Planners for further information.

8. PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL DEVICES
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. Mtg., November 2)

O.S.S. to submit revised plan for procurement by U. S. Government and foreign agencies.

9. JOINT AMERICAN-BRITISH PLANS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE FOR ITALY

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 51; 51/1)

Awaiting consideration of report of Subcommittee.

10. IMPLEMENTATION AND SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PLANS

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 52)

Awaiting action.

11. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FROM ALGERIA TO THE CONTINENT

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 53) .

Awaiting action.

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

COPY NO. 1

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J.P.W.C. 34th Meeting

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 100-A,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on Monday, November 9, 1942, at 1430.

PRESENT:

Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong

Rear Adm. H. C. Train

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN

Col. E. G. Buxton
(for W. J. Donovan)

ALSO PRESENT:

Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Lt. Col. J. K. Woolnough

Gen. J. Magruder, O.S.S.

Maj. D. K. E. Bruce, O.S.S.

Dr. J. G. Rogers, O.S.S.

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

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1. JOINT AMERICAN-BRITISH PLAN OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE FOR ITALY
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 51; 51/1)

GENERAL STRONG summarized the proposals made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their action. He pointed out that the present function of this Committee, under the action taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be that stated in J.C.S. 68, (Paragraph 2 - c.), "to designate the executive agencies for implementing approved psychological warfare plans". He indicated that the plan would need to be implemented under two heads, (a) the first part in the theater of operations under the direction of the theater commander; (b) the second part outside the theater of operations under existing directives. Insofar as the Western Hemisphere is concerned, it will need to be implemented by the Office of War Information and the C.I.A.A., with the O.W.I. acting as coordinating agency between its activities in Europe and those in the Western Hemisphere. He suggested that the proposal be referred to the Subcommittee for its recommendations as to division of the work involved (a) in the implementation of the plan and (b) in the supervision of its execution.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER asked if Paragraph I - (d) would require continued British approval in the implementation of the plan. GENERAL STRONG expressed his belief to the contrary, except as the European Theater Commander may desire to make any supplemental agreement with the British.

Regarding the comments of the Office of Strategic Services and its approval of the plan, contained in J.P.W.C. 51/1, GENERAL STRONG inquired as to the procedure involved in circulating this document without reference to other Committee members, and indicated that because of that procedure it would be impossible to consider the subject matter of the paper at this meeting.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Referred the plan to the J.P.W. Subcommittee for its study and recommendations as to the necessary implementation of the plan and for the supervision of its execution, in accordance with the provisions of J.C.S. 68.

2. DISSEMINATION OF COMMUNICATION - INTERCEPT
INTELLIGENCE
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 47)

GENERAL STRONG reviewed the proposal with its attachments and made the following comments pertaining to the sections indicated.

(a) Enclosure B; paragraph 2. The basic principles of the dissemination of information resulting from intercepts are stated herein, as well as an indication of the material which can be furnished to agencies with direct interests in it.

(b) Enclosure E.

(1) Paragraph 2; the statement that the O.S.S. is eliminated from any participating in the proceeds resulting from cryptographic work is erroneous, since paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (c) of Enclosure B provide for furnishing O.S.S. with such material as it will need.

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(2) Paragraph 3; the statement that O.S.S. will be excluded from any source of information for S.I. and S.O. activities, is based on a premise that the material gathered would aid O.S.S. in these missions; that assumption is not warranted in a large majority of cases.

(3) Paragraph 4 is incorrect inasmuch as it applies only to certain messages of a particular character.

(4) Paragraph 5; pertaining to economic and political information, is based on an erroneous assumption that the cryptographic processed material covers information of that nature.

(5) Paragraph 6; there is no reason to assume that the material processed deals with such items.

(6) Paragraph 8; the matter treated therein is considered to be outside the province of this Committee.

ADMIRAL TRAIN stated that the O.N.I. has no intention of excluding any agency from obtaining intercept information which is pertinent to its mission.

The determination of the dissemination categories for intercept intelligence is made, GENERAL STRONG said, by the O.N.I. for Navy, by G-2 for the Army and by F.B.I. for criminal information. ADMIRAL TRAIN added that this function is watched very carefully and that every effort is made to distribute information of this type to all persons who have proper interest. He agreed with General Strong that the information distributed should not be labeled as "intercept" because there is every reason why persons receiving the information should not know the source.

COLONEL BUXTON stated that the main question involved is whether the persons who determine what intercept intelligence is to be disseminated will have a complete knowledge of the needs of the O.S.S., and therefore whether they may fail to designate certain information for its purposes. He suggested that one or two thoroughly trusted persons from O.S.S. should examine the incoming material to find those items which would be of value to O.S.S. He pointed out that the persons who use this information in their work would have no idea of its source.

GENERAL STRONG said that he had heard that same argument three years ago and that after the request had been granted there had occurred instances to both the Army and the Navy which had done almost irreparable harm to the Government. ADMIRAL TRAIN agreed with this statement and stated that he believed that it would be impossible to open up the dissemination of this intelligence any further than the recommendation to the President indicated.

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THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Approved the draft of a memorandum for the President (Enclosure 3) recommended by the Joint U. S. Intelligence Committee.
- (b) Directed the Secretary to return this paper to the Joint Staff Planners with the Committee's recommendation that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sign and dispatch the draft memorandum to the President.

3. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES COMMUNICATION
SERVICES

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 48)

GENERAL STRONG summarized the points of the paper, pointing out Admiral King's disagreement with the initial report. ADMIRAL TRAIN stated his agreement with the report of the Joint U. S. Communications Board.

COLONEL BUXTON explained the necessity of having a communications system between undercover agents and field stations. For the agents there would be needed about 200 small receiving-transmitting sets, weighing about 15 pounds, which could be easily produced by commercial companies in the U. S., with very little demand on critical materials. The field stations, of which there would be from three to six, would utilize sets of about 500 watts capacity. As to personnel requirements, the total would run to about 294, of which under 100 would be of any interest to the Army or the Navy. Beyond the field stations, the O.S.S. would be perfectly willing to utilize Army, Navy or commercial systems.

GENERAL STRONG pointed out that all of the O.S.S. needs are covered in recommendation 1. (b) of the report of the Joint U. S. Communications Board.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER stated that the Signal Corps expert who had appeared before the Joint Staff Planners had stated that the needs of O.S.S. as expressed in paragraph 1. (b) could be met. MAJOR BRUCE indicated that from the standpoint of S.I. this arrangement would be perfectly satisfactory.

COLONEL BUXTON brought out that it would be possible for O.S.S. to have its own separate code system, to which General Strong agreed. It was also noted that paragraph 1 (e) would change the previous agreement that O.S.S. would operate the radio stations at Baltimore, Long Island and North Hollywood, California for a three month trial period.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Agreed with the recommendations of the Joint U. S. Communications Board in its report of October 23, 1942.
- (b) Directed the Secretary to return this paper to the Joint Staff Planners with information of the Committee's agreement as above.

4. PROPOSED NEW DIRECTIVES OF THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS
OF STAFF TO THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 49; 50)

GENERAL STRONG submitted a memorandum from the Joint Security Control pertaining to its actions in coordinating and executing certain psychological warfare activities in connection with operations TORCH; this memorandum will be circulated as J.P.W.C. 52. He explained the circumstances which required the Joint Security Control to operate in that manner, and his resulting report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This occurrence had demonstrated that there is now no agency which is in position to assume the executive job of coordination of last minute directives for any special operation, and neither J.C.S. 68 or J.P.W.C. 49 and 50 appear to provide for such an agency. The Joint Security Control, in the continuation of its operations beyond TORCH, will function in a much more inclusive field than for psychological warfare activities; security requirements are distinct from the implementation of any particular plan. GENERAL WEDEMAYER questioned whether J.C.S. 68 did not charge the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee with being the body to designate the agencies to execute psychological warfare plans. GENERAL STRONG pointed out that there is a difference between an executive agency designated to implement decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on psychological warfare and the functions of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, because some plans have not passed through the J.P.W.C.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER suggested that an attempt be made to foresee what strategical plans can be proposed and to have psychological warfare and deception plans made concurrently. In this way agencies to execute these plans can be organized and can function, if proper coordination is provided. He pointed out that the Joint Staff Planners will consider a number of strategic plans in the future but that corollary psychological warfare plans or deception plans have not been provided.

GENERAL STRONG stated that he believed it to be a function of the Joint Staff Planners to send directives to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee to produce psychological warfare plans to supplement strategic plans. Even though many of these plans may never see the light of day, and may be merely outlines, they will furnish the basis for action at the time the final plan is put into effect. It may be necessary to have a permanent Subcommittee sitting continuously to produce the number of such plans which will be necessary.

GENERAL MACGRUDER pointed out that all the ideas in the above discussion had been taken into account in the proposed O.S.S. plan, which would provide a mechanism for planning, coordination and operations.

GENERAL STRONG inquired about the functions of the Foreign Nationality Branch of the O.S.S., and the necessity for its operations as against similar activities of F.B.I., both from an intelligence and a counter-intelligence standpoint. DR. ROGERS explained the purpose of that group as an intelligence function. It obtained information from loyal citizens and groups who have kept in touch with their relatives and other persons in foreign countries and who thoroughly obtain much valuable information about conditions in Axis countries. The State Department, he said, both can not and

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will not perform this function. It is now headed in O.S.S. by Mr. John Wylie, Minister to Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, who has been loaned by the State Department. It may be possible that F.B.I. has agents among these groups, but for other reasons. It is not considered that the small O.S.S. group of twenty persons duplicates the work of any other agency. GENERAL MAGRUDER referred also to the several hundred correspondents in universities who contribute material which they glean from reading current literature from foreign countries; they produce much valuable information on events and trends.

GENERAL MAGRUDER, MAJOR BRUCE and DR. ROGERS left the meeting at this point.

GENERAL STRONG requested information on the reasons for the O.S.S. recommendation to abolish the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, and was told by COLONEL BUXTON that the main reasons were to avoid delay in dealing with three or more committees, especially in O.S.S. administrative matters.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER pointed out that if psychological warfare matters came directly to the Joint Staff Planners, without having been filtered by a subsidiary group, it would make the work of the Planners much more difficult.

ADMIRAL TRAIN stated that the organization proposed by the O.S.S. appeared to constitute an intelligence center which would make the Army and Navy intelligence agencies merely an adjunct of the O.S.S. COLONEL BUXTON pointed out that paragraph 2 of the proposed directive requires that no change be made in the operations or activities of Army and Navy Intelligence agencies. ADMIRAL TRAIN indicated that paragraph 13 runs counter to paragraph 2 and reverses the functions of O.S.S. as against O.N.I. and M.I.S.

GENERAL STRONG added that it would result in the Joint Chiefs of Staff depending upon information furnished by civilians, and that this condition would not be corrected by militarization of the O.S.S.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Took note that General Wedemeyer will request the Joint Staff Planners to send directives to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee which will outline possible strategic plans and will request the formulation of supplementary psychological warfare plans.
- (b) Agreed to continue discussion of the proposed directives for O.S.S. in a meeting on Tuesday, November 10, at 1400 or 1500;
- (c) Agreed that Dr. Rogers might accompany Colonel Buxton to discuss further those proposed directives.

W.J.D.

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J.P.W.C. 33d Meeting

COPY NO. 1

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held in Room 100-A,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on MONDAY, November 2, 1942, at 1430.

PRESENT:

Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong	Rear Adm. H. C. Train
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer	Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN
Col. E. G. Buxton (for W. J. Donovan)	

ALSO PRESENT:

General J. Magruder, O.S.S.	Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN
Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney	
Lt. Col. J. K. Woolnough	
Lt. Col. C. C. Dusenbury	
Dr. J. G. Rogers, O.S.S.	
Mr. F. Hamilton, B.E.W.	

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

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GENERAL STRONG read a letter from Colonel Donovan which stated that in view of the desirability of objective discussion of the proposals in J.P.W.C. 50, he would absent himself from this meeting.

1. O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - PROCUREMENT
AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL DEVICES
 (Ref. - J.P.W.C. 42; J.P.W.C. 42/3)

After GENERAL STRONG had read the Subcommittee's recommendations, COLONEL BUXTON said that it was the desire of O.S.S. to withdraw this proposal.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER stated that even though this particular proposal for arrangements for foreign governments to procure O.S.S. special devices is withdrawn, there must be established some principle and procedure for procurement of those devices by foreign governments. He suggested that O.S.S. submit another proposal which will satisfy the requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. COLONEL BUXTON accepted this suggestion for the O.S.S.

GENERAL STRONG pointed out that the withdrawal of the proposal removes any authority for O.S.S. to act as procurement agency for any agency but itself until the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorize some other arrangement. He noted that the Engineers will probably want O.S.S. demolition material but that no authority will exist for O.S.S. to furnish it.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Directed the Secretary to remove from the Agenda J.P.W.C. 42 and its attendant papers.
- (b) Requested the Office of Strategic Services to raise the subject de novo at an early date.

2. O.S.S. 1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL
 (Ref. - J.P.W.C. 42/1 (2d Draft); J.P.W.C. 42/2;
 J.P.S. 35/15)

GENERAL STRONG noted that the Catalogue cannot include any materiel for other services under the action taken in Item #1 above.

ADMIRAL TRAIN stated that the Navy will have strong objections to making available radio equipment for the purposes listed by O.S.S. in the catalogue, but that since approval is being recommended on the basis of "requirements," and since later review of priorities will be afforded in the Army and Navy Munitions Board, he is willing to approve the catalogue on that basis.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Took note that the Catalogue, without the inclusion of any items for foreign governments or for other U. S. agencies, had been approved in its 21st Meeting on October 19, 1942.
- (b) Confirmed the transmittal of the Catalogue, including materiel for O.S.S. only, to the Joint Staff Planners.

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3. CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING
 (Ref. - J.P.W.C. 43; 43/1; 43/2)

GENERAL STRONG reviewed the substance of the three pertinent documents. He noted that a requisition for six 50 kw sets had been received from the Allied Forces Commander, London, and that great difficulty was being met in obtaining them. It was pointed out, however, that these were standard wave broadcasting sets.

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF stated that a number of standard wave domestic stations in the U. S. may be closed because of lack of revenue and that it was desirable for the Federal Communications Commission to survey this situation to provide equipment which can be converted to international broadcasting shortwave sets for O.W.I. GENERAL STRONG suggested that paragraph 1 (c) be changed to provide that the F.C.C. "maintain a continued scrutiny of existing broadcasting facilities" for the purpose outlined by Captain Grosskopf. GENERAL WEDEMAYER objected to paragraph 1 (d) as not being in the province of the Subcommittee, but upon reference to the memorandum from the Army and Navy Munitions Board which requested the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for a "determination of the relative military necessity, so preference ratings can be assigned," he withdrew his objection.

GENERAL STRONG pointed out the desirability of so limiting paragraph 1 (d) that future changes in conditions will be reflected in changes in the suggested priorities, and recommended verbiage to that effect.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Approved the recommendations of the J.P.W. Subcommittee on this subject, with certain changes as specified.
- (b) Directed the Secretary to transmit this report, as amended, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners, with recommendation that it be accepted.

4. PROPOSED CONVENTION FOR EXTRADITION OF AXIS WAR CRIMINALS

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 46)

GENERAL STRONG stated that this proposal raised questions which cut across the activities of other agencies, especially the State Department and the Foreign Policy Association, which are considering somewhat similar action.

DR. ROGERS explained that these facts were known to the Office of Strategic Services when it made the subject recommendation but that nevertheless this proposal appeared to be desirable as an action in psychological warfare as apart from diplomacy. Its main objective is to drive a wedge between the German ruling class and the mass of the German people in their attitude towards any punishment which may be expected from the United Nations at the end of the War. It is believed that favorable action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this proposal would encourage the State Department to go ahead, and that the State Department would welcome the suggestion.

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GENERAL WEDEMEYER pointed out that there might be danger of Axis retaliation on U. S. prisoners, and that the proposal is fraught with danger at this time. DR. ROGERS stated that the proposed convention does not provide for the punishment of the Axis war criminals but only for their extradition from any country to which they might flee at the close of the war. GENERAL STRONG pointed out that the Germans would go only to neutral countries and that it would be essential that the convention include all neutrals. He agreed with Admiral Train that in its present form it might result in a boomerang.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER stated that the only effect on the Japanese would be to make them more bitter. He felt that it would have little effect on the Italians. CAPTAIN PICKHARDT stated that the German feeling goes very deep and that it might be difficult to differentiate between leaders and the mass of the people.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer action on this proposal until its next meeting.

5. FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 45/D; 45/1)

At the request of COLONEL BUXTON,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Deferred discussion of this subject until a decision had been reached on the proposed new directives of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff to the O.S.S.

6. PROPOSED NEW DIRECTIVES OF THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 49; 50)

(Note by the Secretary - The following is a briefed minute of this discussion. A more complete record of the discussion of this item is attached as Appendix "A.")

COLONEL BUXTON requested that reference to the Joint Intelligence Committee be eliminated in the memorandum of October 31, 1942, from the Director of Strategic Services, but GENERAL STRONG suggested that it remain for the purposes of this discussion.

GENERAL STRONG alluded to the military order of June 15, 1942, which established the Office of Strategic Services, and suggested that it form the basis for the following discussion. COLONEL BUXTON reviewed the history of the formation of the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and DR. ROGERS elaborated on that subject. He pointed out that the conception of a center of information and intelligence for military purposes, into which would flow all kinds of information, was an outgrowth of the last war, and was being used by the Germans at this time.

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As to psychological warfare, DR. ROGERS indicated the extent to which the field had been split among various agencies and indicated the need for a stronger collaboration among them than is now provided by the J.P.W. Advisory Committee. In addition to such cooperation, he said, there are needed (a) an over-all planning organization to formulate the broad principles and plans for psychological warfare and (b) an operating agency which will from day to day implement the directives of the planning group.

DR. ROGERS dwelt on the necessity of implementing the O.S.S. to the point where it is free to operate under its directives, or, alternatively, to take drastic action. He described further the objectives of the organization which had been proposed by the O.S.S. in J.P.W.C. 50.

GENERAL MAGRUDER expressed his agreement with the necessity for a central planning group and indicated that the O.S.S. is not being used by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff to fullest advantage.

After questions by General Strong and Admiral Train,

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Agreed to consider further the proposals of O.S.S. at its next meeting.
- (b) Set the time for its next meeting as Friday, November 6, 1942, at 1430.

SECRETAPPENDIX "A"

6. PROPOSED NEW DIRECTIVES OF THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS
OF STAFF TO THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 49; 50)

MR. HAMILTON of the Board of Economic Warfare left the meeting because the subject for discussion did not pertain to the activities of B.E.W. He requested permission to attend such a discussion if it affected the B.E.W., and was assured that he would be given that opportunity.

COLONEL BUXTON requested that reference to the Joint Intelligence Committee be eliminated in the memorandum of October 31, 1942, from the Director of Strategic Services to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff, since it was not intended to include reference to that Committee. GENERAL STRONG suggested that it be allowed to remain for the purposes of the present discussion and be removed later, if necessary.

The Military Order of June 13, 1942, establishing the Office of Strategic Services was read by GENERAL STRONG, who pointed out that the O.S.S. was given two functions:

(a) "to collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff."

(b) "to plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff."

He suggested that the ensuing discussion be based on those two criteria.

In stating the purpose and objectives of the O.S.S. proposal, COLONEL BUXTON pointed out that the Military Order had been implemented by J.C.S. directives to the O.S.S. He reviewed the history of the formation of the Office of the Coordinator of Information in the Summer of 1941, including the basic idea, which had been approved by the President, of the formation of a pool of scholars who would assemble, analyze, and present all available information necessary for the High Command to formulate its decisions. Pursuant to the Executive Order establishing the C.O.I., it had gathered about 250 of the country's most eminent scholars, who read and spoke thirty-nine languages, and whose knowledge of world conditions is outstanding.

Later an agreement was made with the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, General Miles, and Admiral Kirk, and approved by the President, for the C.O.I. to take over foreign secret intelligence work. The "S.O." activities and psychological warfare functions were a development of Colonel Donovan's own knowledge of military developments and his sense of the needs of modern total war.

DR. ROGERS reviewed in greater detail the original conception of the need for such services as the C.O.I. had inaugurated. He indicated the trend of progress as negligible since that organization was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff as the Office of Strategic Services. He pointed out that the O.S.S. is now almost stopped in its tracks; that there are signs of dissolution of the organization; that dissatisfaction prevails generally; and that it has become entangled in two or three committees and the rivalries of several government agencies.

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The conception of a center of information and intelligence for military purposes, he explained, had been growing since the last war. The Germans have employed this method very successfully, and it was the basis of the formation of the Office of the Coordinator of Information by the President. Its Services were to be fed by a constant flow of all kinds of information, political, economic, geographic, as well as military, and that provided by the system of undercover agents. It was regarded as essential that these functions be performed for the U. S. by a separate civilian agency. The information gathered was deemed as necessary also in the psychological warfare field which would operate as auxiliary to military activities.

[It has developed that the field of psychological warfare has been split. O.W.I. has been given the duty of "giving information." The B.E.W. has been given the important functions of economic warfare, which are growing in importance in this war as against political factors; it has set up its own intelligence service. The C.I.A.A. has taken over the implementation of the "good will" policies in the Western Hemisphere. The State Department is likewise involved and has a vast field of activities in its collection of information. The O.S.S. is operating "Echo Intelligence" for the benefit of other agencies. It is obvious that there is no centralization of control over any of these agencies for psychological warfare.

Through its Advisory Committee, the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee does have liaison with these other agencies in the field of psychological warfare, but it has been very fragile. The Advisory Committee, however, has started its meetings with enthusiastic cooperation from the State Department, and cooperation from B.E.W., C.I.A.A., and O.W.I. only in lesser degrees. It is practically acknowledged by some of these agencies that psychological warfare planning and activities must be controlled through the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

Not only is an opportunity for collaboration among agencies needed, but also there must be an operating agency which from day to day will implement the directives and needs of psychological warfare in response to the underground information and other intelligence gathered. In addition, there is needed an overall planning organization, which will be in close contact with military operations, to formulate the broad principles and plans upon which the operating agency will act. These are the objectives of the proposals made by the O.S.S.

Since the O.S.S. is not now serving the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff to the extent of its possibilities, and because it has not gone forward as it had been doing before transfer to the jurisdiction of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff, it appears that the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff have four alternatives:

- (a) To implement the O.S.S. to the point where it is free to operate under its directives;
- (b) To split up the O.S.S. by assigning its information services to O.W.I. or to G-2, in which case it is probable that the brain power collected will be scattered;
- (c) To close out the O.S.S. and pick up the odds and ends for inclusion in other activities;
- (d) To alter the top management.

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In any event it is essential that something must be done soon if O.S.S. is to continue. It should be freed from the entanglements of Committee operations and from the rivalries of other organizations which take so much effort and time. So far as the non-military agencies are concerned, it is probable that cooperation with them can be worked out gradually, since the weight of the State Department influence seems to be thrown towards the O.S.S.

Because of the conditions in the field of intelligence and psychological warfare, it seemed necessary that some action be taken at once. That action is provided in the proposed directives from the J.C.S. to the O.S.S., and involves:

(a) The abolishment of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee. This is recommended in order that J.C.S. command may be simplified by having the O.S.S. report directly to it through the Joint U.S. Staff Planners. It would further provide for a more direct approval of the psychological warfare plans, with the details of operation left to the O.S.S., which would be militarized, and therefore amenable to such direct commands. It would release the O.S.S. from its present entanglement in numerous committees and in organization rivalry.

(b) The division of O.S.S. into two major operating functions:

(1) The organization in O.S.S. of a Planning Group for psychological warfare programs, these to be submitted to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff through the Joint U. S. Staff Planners and, when approved, to be returned to the O.S.S. for implementation and operation. There would be no disturbance of the Joint Intelligence Committee except as O.S.S. would report directly to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The Planning Group would operate much as the present O.S.S. Planning Board functions, except that military and naval officers would be added to it. An advisory committee would be set up to represent other Governmental agencies interested in this field, which would eventually produce cooperative and coordinative action without the necessity of changing President directives.

(2) Organization of a central information and intelligence agency, in accordance with the original conception of the President. The material available in the Research and Analysis Division of O.S.S. would form the basis for the operations of this agency, to which would be added the appropriate material from O.W.I. and G-2, and intelligence gathered from the O.S.S. undercover organization. The information gathered in this country by the Foreign Nationalities Division of O.S.S. would also be included. Thus would be formed a pool for processing all intelligence needed by military forces or the High Command. It is recognized that security would be a major problem, but this could be controlled by militarization of the O.S.S., which is a basic assumption of the plan, and by care in dissemination of important knowledge.

SECRET

There are three basic problems which must be considered in the decision on this proposal:

(a) The O.S.S. organization. This has been thoroughly reorganized, largely on General Magruder's suggestions, and is now in such order as to accept its responsibilities under these directives. ✓

(b) Colonel Donovan's imagination. Control of all projects will be vested in the Planning Group.

(c) Constitution of the Planning Group. Although it appears that O.S.S., with six members on the planning group as against four military and naval officers, will be in control, it should be realized that two of the six O.S.S. members will be Army or Navy officers assigned to O.S.S., of the others, three will be veteran diplomats with long experience in the State Department.

GENERAL MAGRUDER pointed out that nobody is content with the status of intelligence and psychological warfare as conditions now are, and that his interest had developed in centralizing functions which would put together all information which became available. In working on an internal reorganization of the O.S.S. he had been impressed by the outstanding abilities of the men there and with the fact that there had been lack of means for harnessing their best efforts. He had concluded that the O.S.S. is not serving its fullest purpose as servant of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because advantage was not being taken of the fullest facilities of O.S.S.

GENERAL STRONG questioned whether the theory that the utilization of scholars to evaluate military intelligence is tenable unless the same logic could be applied to other professional fields. He believed that the tools used by soldiers must be made by them. COLONEL BUXTON replied that intelligence today is not simply a matter of military knowledge and evaluation but, involves the collection of all applicable knowledge of the political situation, the economic fabric, the social structure or the finances and even religion.)

GENERAL STRONG inquired why it appeared necessary to abolish the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, and Dr. ROGERS answered that the change would put a full time organization in charge of psychological warfare planning in the O.S.S. instead of having a part time committee of persons who are very busy on other duties as a major function.

GENERAL STRONG asked if this Planning Group would not need to have access to plans and reports of actions on several levels, and specifically what arrangements would be made for coordination with the approved plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the operational details with which O.P.D. and the theater commander are involved. He also requested information on how security measures here and abroad would be handled. Dr. ROGERS answered that no psychological warfare plan would be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff until it had included consideration of all the factors mentioned by General Strong. He thought that no serious security problem would be involved that is not now successfully met in the O.S.S.

SECRET

ADMIRAL TRAIN asked whether it was proposed to operate a counter intelligence system apart from an intelligence system. DR. ROGERS explained that in the operation of undercover agents it is almost automatic that they become involved in counter-intelligence measures, certainly for their own protection, in addition to intelligence procurement. It is not intended to abolish any present counter-intelligence activities in O.W.I. or in G-2. COLONEL BUXTON pointed out that the O.S.S. agents would not be operating in the Western Hemisphere anyway.

ADMIRAL TRAIN also asked for an explanation of the proposed functions of the O.S.S. planning group in "preparing and recommending plans for the coordination of the activities of intelligence agencies of the several parts of the government for the adoption of the J.C.S." DR. ROGERS replied that the planning group would merely suggest and recommend such coordination and would have no power beyond those two duties.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER stated that he regarded this proposal as merely a beginning in the centralizing of the whole warfare effort. The Operations Division is primarily interested in obtaining information that has been exhaustively evaluated by experts, but that procedures for that purpose must be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF said that he had been struck by the total absence of coordination in the fields of psychological warfare planning as well as in the production of complete intelligence. He believed that in the interests of improving both, some steps should be taken towards adequate cooperation, although he was not sure that the present proposal was the final answer. He believed that the directive from General Marshall opened up the whole question and that it should be thoroughly pursued towards a satisfactory solution.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Agreed to consider further the proposals of O.S.S. in its next meeting.
- (b) Set the time for its next meeting as Friday November 6, 1942, at 1430.

SECRET

J.P.W.C. 32d Meeting

COPY NO. 1

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 100-A,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
On Monday, October 26, 1942, at 1430.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong

Rear Adm. H. C. Train

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Lt. Col. R. E. Looker

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Maj. J. K. Woolnough

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

S E C R E T

1. FUNCTIONS OF OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 45/D)

GENERAL STRONG pointed out that in connection with paragraph 5 of the directive it would appear that the study required will involve some investigation of the propaganda activities of the Office of War Information. COLONEL DONOVAN agreed that the Committee could probably make recommendations on the basis of its findings; he was supported in this view by Admiral Train.

COLONEL DONOVAN suggested that instead of referring this directive to the Subcommittee, it would be highly desirable for two representatives of this Committee to visit the Office of Strategic Services and examine in person its personnel and operations. After discussion, GENERAL STRONG and ADMIRAL TRAIN agreed to visit the O.S.S., on condition that General Wedemeyer, Captain Pickhardt and Captain Grosskopf would prepare the Committee's recommendations.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER requested guidance on certain parts of the directive, especially paragraph 3 pertaining to intelligence functions. GENERAL STRONG stated that a great many of the intelligence functions performed by the O.S.S. are direct duplications of similar functions performed by O.N.I. and M.I.S., but that there are certain fields in which the latter are limited. COLONEL DONOVAN stated that there was no desire in O.S.S. to duplicate activities of O.N.I. and M.I.S., and outlined the history of conversations with General Miles, Admiral Kirk and representatives of the F.B.I. which resulted in the O.S.S. taking over certain intelligence activities. This agreement on those functions was later approved by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, and the President.

After discussion it was agreed that the O.S.S. should retain its underground intelligence activities outside the Western Hemisphere.

The proper channels for evaluating information were also discussed at length, particularly as to the place of evaluation by military agencies. COLONEL DONOVAN stated his belief that the primary information must be compared with all possible mobilized facts for evaluation by experts, including experienced Army and Navy officers. Such intelligence would then be suitable for use by the Army and the Navy as a basis of planning. He pointed out that this would avoid duplication of sources and uses of information and would produce intelligence which is less distorted than at present.

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF supported this view and outlined cases from his own experience where a central analysis group would have been very helpful. ADMIRAL TRAIN also agreed in part with the idea of a central intelligence agency but felt that material should go to military organizations for final evaluation. The latter step would be avoided, COLONEL DONOVAN pointed out, if experienced military men were added to the group which made the central evaluation.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed that General Strong and Admiral Train would make an initial investigation of the organization and facilities of the O.S.S., and that General Wedemeyer, Captain Pickhardt and Captain Grosskopf would supplement this investigation and would prepare an initial draft of the report required.

SECRET

2. PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 44)

After discussion and some corrections,

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Approved the recommendations of the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee.
- (b) Directed that the Secretary request the Office of Strategic Services to make the study involved.

3. O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - PROCUREMENT
AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL ITEMS
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 42)

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF reviewed the previous action of this Committee and the recommendation of the Joint Staff Planners that the proposal be disapproved. He outlined the effect of this disapproval in foregoing any control over procurement by foreign Governments of the special devices developed by O.S.S. In consequence, he had discussed this situation with Admiral Cooke and Captain Connolly and they had agreed that the paper should be resubmitted to this Committee for reconsideration on the basis of eliminating certain objectionable features.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER stated that he was in agreement with Admiral Cooke and recommended that a Subcommittee to consist of Captain Grosskopf, Commander Vanderbilt, of O.S.S., Lt. Col. F. S. Bosson, C.E., and a representative of S.O.S. be appointed to examine the situation and clarify it in a report to this Committee.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to appoint a subcommittee for this purpose as suggested by General Wedemeyer.

4. O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - 1942
CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 42/1/2d Draft; J.P.W.C. 42/2;
J.P.S. 35/15)

Without discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Deferred action on this proposal as being contingent on the action pertaining to procurement of O.S.S. special devices.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF SPEECHES OF STATE DEPARTMENT
OFFICIALS
(Ref. J.P.W.C. Mtg., of Oct. 12, 1942, Item #5)

THE COMMITTEE:-

Deferred discussion until General Strong were present to present his report.

SECRET

6. PROPAGANDA RE UNITED NATIONS VICTORY

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF read a suggestion of Colonel Wolfinbarger to the effect that propaganda should emphasize that the United Nations will win this war.

After discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that this idea could well be incorporated into the overall strategic plan to be submitted by O.S.S.

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

J.P.W.C. 31st Meeting

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 100-A,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
On Monday, October 19, 1942, at 1000.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Rear Adm. K. C. Train

Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney

Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Maj. J. K. Woolnough

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

SECRET

1. DIRECTIVE TO EUROPEAN THEATER COMMANDER
RE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

(Ref. - O.S.S. Memo. 10-8-42; Message from
 General Eisenhower, 10-16-42)

COLONEL DONOVAN read a paraphrase of the message from General Eisenhower in reply to the message framed by this Committee at its last meeting.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed that the steps taken by General Eisenhower were sufficient to meet the situation at the present time.

2. O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - 1942
CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 42/1/2d Draft; J.P.W.C. 42/2)

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that the recommendation of the Subcommittee was agreeable to the O.S.S., inasmuch as it desires only the right to present its case in comparison with other demands, on the basis of the strategical situation and needs. He felt it unnecessary to include the stipulation that the O.S.S. allocation of priorities be on an equal footing with the Army and the Navy.

There was general discussion on the request of the British for supplies of special devices which are being procured by the O.S.S.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(a) Agreed to accept the recommendations of the Subcommittee with the following changes:

(1) To omit the statement that the allocation of the priorities of the O.S.S. be on an equal footing with the Army and Navy.

(2) The approval of the Supply Division, War Department General Staff and the Office of Procurement and Material of the Navy Department be obtained on the increased amounts of supplies and materials involved in the British request.

3. IMPLICATIONS OF SPEECHES OF STATE DEPARTMENT
OFFICIALS

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. Mtg., Oct. 12, 1942, Item #5)

LT. COL. BLAKENEY reported that General Strong had no report to make on this subject at this time.

General discussion took place on the need for a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject, in view of the fact that the situation with Chile had bettered.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer further consideration of the subject until General Strong can present his views in person.

SECRET4. CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 43)

GENERAL WEDEMEYER explained that this paper had been referred to this Committee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because they desired advice on the effect of such a broadcasting program from the point of view of psychological warfare. COLONEL DONOVAN pointed out that the international broadcasting program might well effect the whole basis of this Committee's work.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the proposal is under study by the Subcommittee.

5. ARMY AND NAVY PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES

COLONEL DONOVAN drew attention to various activities of the Public Relations Offices of both the War Department and the Navy Department which had been receiving criticism recently. He recommended that each Department appoint a person to make a thorough investigation of the activities of its Public Relations Office and the functions of the individuals assigned thereto.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER expressed the belief that it would be preferable if releases and communiques used the term "our forces" instead of referring to the Army, the Navy, or the Marines.

After general discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of Colonel Donovan's recommendation.

6. MONTHLY STATUS REPORT OF O.S.S.

COLONEL DONOVAN presented to the Committee a copy of the first monthly status report of the Office of Strategic Services and explained the procedure for future reports. GENERAL WEDEMEYER suggested that it would be desirable to include the following:

- (a) The activity or project.
- (b) The date authorized and the source of authority.
- (c) Description of activity and what it involves.
- (d) Report of current status of the project or activity.

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF said that it would be preferable to have the projects listed in chronological order of authorization with a cross index by areas.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Requested Colonel Donovan to make the changes suggested in the monthly report of the O.S.S.

SECRET

COPY NO. 17

J.P.W.C. 30th Meeting

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 234,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
On Tuesday, October 13, 1942, at 1000.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong

Rear Adm. H. C. Train

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Brig. Gen. J. E. Hull, OPD

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney

Maj. J. K. Woolnough

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

S E C R E T

1. DIRECTIVE TO EUROPEAN THEATER COMMANDER
RE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

(Ref. - Memorandum from O.S.S., 10/8/42)

COLONEL DONOVAN presented to the Committee a draft of a proposed recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including a suggested directive to the European Theater Commander.

GENERAL STRONG pointed out that because that theater of command is a "combined" instead of a "joint" theater, it would be necessary for this proposal to be laid before the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He also referred to a letter from General Eisenhower dated September 26, 1942 which indicated that Mr. W. H. B. Mack, with the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff, was giving consideration to, and making recommendations on, matters which pertain to economic considerations subsequent to the proposed operations.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER inquired the particulars of the organization for political and psychological warfare on the Staff of the European Theater Commander and these were explained in detail by GENERAL HULL. In this connection the directive given to Mr. Richard Murphy by the President was also noted.

From consideration of the three messages sent by General Eisenhower on this subject it became apparent that complete information was not available here on the exact organization which is presently functioning for the European Theater Commander, for both political and psychological warfare; nor is the relationship clear of that organization's future activities in the designated theater of operations, especially as to what individual is to coordinate these matters in the name of the Theater Commander.

After discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Requested the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, to send a message to the European Theater Commander making the following points:
 - (1) Outlining the Committee's understanding of what the arrangement should be for control and coordination of political and psychological warfare activities, in accordance with the directive of the President.
 - (2) The organization for these purposes as it appears from the messages received from the European Theater Commander.
 - (3) A request for clarification of the organization, functions and personalities involved.
- (b) Agreed to consider the reply from the European Theater Commander before taking further action on the proposal to bring this matter before the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

S E C R E T2. CRITICAL MATERIELS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTS
(Ref. - J.C.S. 125)

GENERAL WEDEMAYER brought to the attention of the Committee a proposal of the Joint Communications Board which involved a program for providing radio stations to combat Axis propaganda to allied and neutral countries. It appeared that a negative recommendation had been made by the Board because of a shortage of critical materiel needed for such stations. He suggested that this matter involved subjects in which the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee is interested and upon which its recommendations are needed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that General Wedemeyer would request that this subject be referred by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for study and recommendations.

SECRETCOPY NO. 17J.P.W.C. 29th MeetingJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEMinutes of Meeting held in Room 100-A,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on Monday, October 12, 1942, at 1430.PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan
Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong
Rear Adm. H. C. Train
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer
Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney
Maj. J. K. Woolnough
Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRET

1. MILITARIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.
(Ref. - J.F.W.C. 37/2/D)

COLONEL DONOVAN brought this directive to the attention of the Committee and suggested that it be referred to the Subcommittee for preparation of the study required.

GENERAL STRONG suggested several points which he believed would need clarification:

(a) Close study of what constitutes "the heads of all divisions and subdivisions of the organization," which could best be shown by a schematic organization chart.

(b) Specific provisions for the executive staff, in distinction to operative divisions.

(c) The status of O.S.S. as a militarized organization in comparison with the authority of Army and Navy organizations.

COLONEL DONOVAN explained that the O.S.S. had been working out a new organization which is planned to be closer to that of the Army and Navy. As to General Strong's third point, he explained that the legal status of the O.S.S. appears to differ from the Army and Navy in authority, inasmuch as the Army and the Navy were organized pursuant to Acts of Congress, whereas the O.S.S. was set up by a Military Order of the President, and thereby became part of the Armed Forces of the United States. He cited precedents for including groups in the armed forces of the United States.

GENERAL STRONG requested that the Subcommittee clarify the command organization of the O.S.S. relative to the Army and the Navy and to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER suggested that an equitable proportion be worked out between commissioned officers of the Army and of the Navy to be assigned to O.S.S.

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that approximately 88 Navy officers and 30 Marine officers had been agreed upon by Admiral Jacobs as a fair proportion. In this connection ADMIRAL TRAIN indicated that it would be satisfactory to commission specialists as Navy officers.

GENERAL STRONG said that O.S.S. should have some care in commissioning officers in the Army Specialists Corps for S.O. and S.I. operations, and COLONEL DONOVAN agreed that most of the Specialists Corps commissions would be used for members of the Research and Analysis Division, and other non-military positions.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Directed that this paper be referred to the Subcommittee for study and report.
- (b) Agreed to have a special meeting for consideration of that report when it is ready.

S E C R E T

2. O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - 1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL;
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 42/1; O.S.S. 1942 Catalogue)

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF withdrew the Navy approval of this Catalogue subject to further consideration by the Procurement Bureau of the Navy Department.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER questioned the need for radio stations in New York and California. COLONEL DONOVAN explained that these stations had been purchased by the C.O.I. for three main uses:

(a) For monitoring short-wave broadcasts as supplementary to similar Army and Navy operations.

(b) For use later as transmission stations in connection with S.O. and S.I. activities.

(c) For intercept stations on a small scale.

The stations would be administered by the O.S.S. but would be used also by the Army and the Navy. This project had received the approval of the Joint Intelligence Committee but has not yet been approved by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

COLONEL DONOVAN further stated that he realized that there is great shortage of some types of equipment which are included in this Catalogue. He pointed out, however, that the Catalogue is merely general authorization for priorities and that it must be followed by actual requisitions for the equipment needed.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(a) Deferred action until the Navy Department has indicated its opinions.

(b) Directed that the paper supporting the Catalogue be revised to indicate that it is only an authorization and is not an approved requisition.

3. O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL ITEMS.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 42)

In connection with procurement by foreign governments of O.S.S. special items which have been developed by it, COLONEL DONOVAN stated that this procedure had been suggested by the Lend-Lease organization, and that the Bureau of the Budget had agreed to work out reimbursement to O.S.S. on the basis of individual cases. In effect, this would constitute the moneys appropriated to O.S.S. for such supplies as a revolving fund for procurement of these devices for both United States and foreign government agencies.

SECRET

GENERAL WEDEMEYER questioned whether there would be adequate coordination in the war effort if equipment were procured for the Army and Navy by several agencies. He pointed out that it is essential to establish the precedent of the best possible integrated procurement procedure for the Army and Navy. COLONEL DONOVAN replied that the policy being recommended is in accordance with that principle since one procurement source is being used to provide these devices for the Army, the Navy, O.S.S. and foreign governments; also, since no Army and Navy agencies now produce these items, there is no duplication of procurement and no competition among procuring agencies. GENERAL WEDEMEYER indicated that his objections were removed provided that coordinated procurement, which is integrated with Army and Navy requirements, is actually obtained by this procedure.

After directing certain changes in the recommendations,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to recommend approval of this proposal to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff through the Joint U. S. Staff Planners.

2. DIRECTIVE TO EUROPEAN THEATER COMMANDER RE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.
 (Ref. - Memorandum from O.S.S., 10/8/42)

COLONEL DONOVAN explained that as soon as he had learned of the appointment of Mr. W. H. B. Mack, of the British Foreign Office, as Chief of the Political Section of the staff of the European Theater Commander, he had pointed out the possible dangers to both Admiral Leahy and General W. B. Smith. Later, in London, he had discussed those possibilities with General Eisenhower and General Smith. He pointed out that there is special difficulty for any theater commander whose headquarters is situated in the capital city of an Allied country, because the problems facing him are not only military but political, economic, fiscal, etc.

COLONEL DONOVAN recommended the following program to remedy the present situation as it pertains to proposed operations in the European Theater:-

- (a) A closer tie between the work of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and the theater commanders.
- (b) Indication to General Eisenhower that the effect of the appointment of a British Foreign Office representative on his Political Warfare Staff would be bad in the proposed theater and on American public opinion;
- (c) Appointment of men to the Theater Commander's staff who are expert in the whole field of psychological warfare and not solely in propaganda;
- (d) Propaganda activities in the forthcoming operations to be carried out by Frenchmen and not by British or United States representatives.

SECRET

GENERAL STRONG led a detailed discussion of these proposals, which made the following points:

- (a) It is unwise to change horses in the middle of the stream.
- (b) The embarrassment to the Theater Commander may be regrettable.
- (c) The Theater Commander has been given his mission and should not be told how to accomplish it.
- (d) The Theater Commander, through his staff, should be fully competent to handle other than military problems.
- (e) The Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff have not abdicated their authority over the Theater Commander because they have given him a mission which is delimited by certain boundaries.

The discussion also concerned itself largely with the effect on the French and on the American public of the appointment of a British Foreign Office representative on the Theater Commander's staff for these particular operations, and the failure to designate Mr. Richard Murphy as being in charge of psychological warfare operations for the proposed theater in advance of action.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(a) Agreed:-

- (1) That only the case of the European Theater Commander would be considered at this time.
- (2) That a directive for all theater commanders which will insure coordination of psychological warfare activities will be framed at a later date.

(b) Directed that a memorandum be framed for presentation to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff in accordance with specifically stated items and including a proposed directive to the European Theater Commander incorporating the sense of the discussion.

(c) Agreed to consider this revised proposal at a meeting on October 13, at 1000.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF SPEECHES OF STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.

GENERAL STRONG brought to the attention of the Committee the implications of the speech made by the Under Secretary of State last week in which Argentina and Chile were criticized as providing sources for activities of Axis agents. He noted that this address had been the cause of one diplomatic protest from Chile, had caused widespread unfavorable newspaper comment in South America and had seriously jeopardized relations of the United States with certain Latin American countries. He pointed out that inasmuch as this Committee is charged with psychological warfare matters, it might well take cognizance of that speech and point out to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff the effect of such actions by State Department officials through the repercussions on military and naval operations.

SECRET

After discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed that it would be desirable to inform the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff of the implications of the speech of the Under Secretary of State on October 8, and to suggest to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff that they take whatever action may be deemed appropriate in the premises.

SECRETCOPY NO. 1J.P.W.C. 2nd MeetingJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 100-A,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on Monday, October 12, 1942, at 1430.

1. J.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - PROCUREMENT
AUTHORITY FOR J.S.S. SPECIAL ITEMS.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 42)
Consideration of report of Subcommittee.
2. J.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - 1942
CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 42/1)
Consideration of report of Subcommittee.
3. CONSIDERATION OF SPECIAL ITEM.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETCOPY NO. 1J.P.W.C. 15th MeetingJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held in Room 234
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on MONDAY, October 5, 1942, at 1430.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Rear Adm. H. C. Train

Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney

Capt. B. J. Rodgers, USN

ALSO PRESENT:The Hon. D. Bowes Lyon, Brit-
ish P.W.E.

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Mr. R. E. S. Crossman, British
P.W.E.

Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN

Mr. J. Wheeler-Bennett, Brit-
ish P. W. E.

Colonel E. J. Rogers, Jr.

Lt. Col. E. C. Huntington

Mr. Walter Adams

Maj. J. K. Woolnough

LT. COL. A. H. ONTHANK,

Secretary.

SECRET1. EVALUATION OF HITLER'S SPEECH OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1942.

COLONEL DONOVAN introduced Mr. R. H. S. Crossman, Regional Director of the German Section of the British Political Warfare Executive. Mr. Crossman gave an evaluation of Hitler's speech of September 30, 1942. He pointed out that Hitler had evidently been sensitive to criticism for being away from home. The main indication of his remarks, however, was that Hitler feared that there might be some infection of the Army with defeatism from the home front. The whole speech evidenced an awareness of the possibility of civilian weakness.

It is probable that there will be a recurrence of the defeatism of last winter among the working classes at home during the coming winter, he added.

Any hope of propaganda from RUSSIA corroding the German Army is futile, he said, because the Germans regard the Russian war as defensive and as a crusade. On the other hand, there is evidence that the Germans feel that the Western war was a mistake.

2. O.S.S. ACTIVITIES IN UNITED KINGDOM.

LT. COL. HUNTINGTON reported on his discussions with General Eisenhower concerning O.S.S. activities in the U. K. He stressed the fact that the foreign nationality groups (Free French, Poles, Czechs) desire to obtain more bombers in order that they and their supplies may be sent to their destinations more readily. He pointed out that the British have urged the O.S.S. to create a duplicate organization to the S.O.E. Operations Department, in order that O.S.S. may gradually build up its own operations on an independent basis.

LT. COL. HUNTINGTON stated that General Eisenhower had made clear his intention to take steps to coordinate the services of O.S.S. with his military plans. He had also promised support for obtaining planes for the foreign groups, if the project were approved and initiated in the U. S.

3. COORDINATION OF U. S. AND BRAZILIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

(Reference: J.P.W.C. 38)

LT. COL. BLAKENEY reported that General Strong had requested that this proposal be suspended pending certain decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer consideration of this proposal until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had indicated U. S. policies in BRAZIL.

4. ORGANIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN PORTUGAL.
(Reference: J.P.W.C. 40)

ADMIRAL TRAIN pointed out the desirability of removing any open contacts of psychological warfare agents with the Military and Naval Attaches in PORTUGAL, and General Wedemeyer expressed his agreement.

SECRET

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that great care will be taken on this matter.

Answering a question, LT. COL. BLAKENEY stated that G-2 did not see any need for a clarification of the Brazilian situation before implementing these proposals regarding PORTUGAL. He added that General Strong suggested that the reaction of O.W.I. to the parts of the plan pertaining to that organization should be obtained before the final details of this proposal are determined. COLONEL DONOVAN stated that he would discuss those matters with Mr. Elmer Davis.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Agreed to accept the proposals of this paper in principle.
- (b) Requested the Office of Strategic Services to prepare and submit detailed plans to this Committee, for later referral to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. REGULATION OF PUBLICITY REGARDING GERMAN REPORTS OF SHIP SINKINGS.

(Reference: J.P.W.C. 41)

After discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Agreed to recommend approval of this proposal.
- (b) Directed that it be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR O.3.3. - EMERGENCY ALLOTMENT.
(Reference: J.P.W.C. 37/1)

COLONEL DONOVAN noted that a proposal for approval of allotment of one Major and one Captain had been omitted. He explained that it had been intended to send those officers to supplement a mission which had previously been approved and was now operating in British West Africa, where they would serve as observers for liaison with the British in obtaining agreed upon information.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER suggested it would be desirable to obtain allocation of some Naval officers in lieu of Army officers, if this were possible. COLONEL DONOVAN indicated that permission has been obtained from Admiral Jacobs for the allocation of about 20 Naval officers and that these will be used in places for which they are particularly appropriate.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Agreed to recommend approval of the present request for allotment of twelve Army officers for the purposes stated.
- (b) Took note that COLONEL DONOVAN will submit a memorandum justifying the addition of one Major and one Captain for the present mission in British West Africa.

SECRET7. COORDINATION OF INSTRUCTIONS TO O.S.S. FIELD REPRESENTATIVES.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER instanced a recent action by O.S.S. personnel in French North Africa as necessitating measures to prevent recurrence without the approval of projects by this Committee or by theater commanders.

COLONEL DONOVAN agreed to the desirability of such measures but pointed out that it was equally desirable for instructions to O.S.S. field representatives from theater commanders to be reported to him, in order that he might assume whatever responsibility were necessary.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the O.S.S. will arrange with its field representatives to report to it any instructions proceeding directly from theater or other commanders which are outside the previously agreed upon plan of operations.

8. SUPPLIES FOR FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER reported that the Board of Economic Warfare had notified him that a million pounds of green tea are available for shipment, and stated his understanding that the Arabs are fond of this tea.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the O.S.S. will discuss with the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare the possibility of including this green tea among the commodities which are being sent to French North Africa in accordance with the present economic trade agreement.

SECRETJ.P.W.C. 28th MeetingCOPY NO. 1JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 234,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
On Monday, October 5, 1942 at 1430.

1. EVALUATION OF HITLER'S RECENT SPEECH
 By MR. R. H. S. CROSSMAN, Regional Director of
 German Section, British Political Warfare
 Executive.
2. COORDINATION OF U. S. AND BRAZILIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
 WARFARE
 (Ref. - J.P.W.C. 38)
 Further consideration of proposal, and report by
 GENERAL STRONG.
3. ORGANIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN PORTUGAL
 (Ref. - J.P.W.C. 40)
 Consideration of Subcommittee's recommendations.
4. REGULATION OF PUBLICITY RE GERMAN REPORTS OF
 SHIP SINKINGS
 (Ref. - J.P.W.C. 41)
 Consideration of Subcommittee's recommendations.
5. MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR O.S.S. - EMERGENCY ALLOTMENT
 (Ref. - J.P.W.C. 37/1)
 Consideration of C.S.S. request.

LT. Col. A. H. Onthank
 Secretary

SECRETJ.P.W.C. 27th MeetingCOPY NO. 1JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held in Room 213,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1942, at 1430.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Brig. Gen. E. Kroner
(For Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong)

Rear Adm. H. C. Train

Capt. B. J. Rodgers, USN

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney

Maj. J. K. Woolnough

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

SECRET1. COORDINATION OF U. S. AND BRAZILIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

(Ref. - J.P.M.C. 38)

ADMIRAL TRAIN stated that ADMIRAL BEAUREGARD, who had recently returned to BRAZIL, had talked to COLONEL DONOVAN about this project and that he had indicated his opinion that Brazilians would not look favorably upon psychological warfare activities, since they would be likely to favor more direct methods. ADMIRAL TRAIN also suggested that if this project were approved the liaison representative in BRAZIL should work under the direction of ADMIRAL BEAUREGARD. COLONEL DONOVAN agreed with the latter idea.

GENERAL INCHER stated that GENERAL STODOL re-quested that no action be taken on this subject until certain pending questions have been decided.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer action on this proposal until its next meeting.

2. SMITH MACHINE GUNS FOR SUPPLY OF O.S.S.

(Ref. - J.P.M.C. 39)

COLONEL DONOVAN explained that MAJOR CARL EIFFER, who is representing O.S.S. with GENERAL STILWELL, has requested 2,500 guns for use of the Chinese in special operations. Presumably the project has the approval of GENERAL STILWELL since MAJOR EIFFER was chosen by GENERAL STILWELL for this work and was sent to CHINA by O.S.S. with ten or twelve other men to act as instructors of the Chinese in special operations. Another 2,500 guns will be needed for similar activities in BURMA and CHINA. It will be desirable to hold the balance of the 14,200 Dutch guns in stock for various other projects now under consideration.

There was discussion of the need for Sten 9-mm guns and GENERAL EIFFER indicated that it was undesirable to make any agreement with the British to request production of these guns for the U. S. There was general agreement that, in the absence of copper, no commitments should be made which involve diversion of the supply of ammunition.

THE COMMITTEE:-

2. Directed that a message be sent to GENERAL STILWELL to ascertain if he approved the project being conducted by MAJOR EIFFER.
1. Agreed that O.S.S. should be authorized to acquire the 5,000 Marlin guns being manufactured for the Dutch, or such other number as are now completed, on the condition that there is no implication that the part of the 14,200 guns still in process of manufacture will be acquired; and that steps be taken to acquire the ammunition needed for the approximately 5,000 guns to be bought.

SECRET

3. DIRECTIVE FOR O.S.S. RE PHOTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL.
(Ref. - Memorandum)

Without discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that this directive is to be issued to the Office of Strategic Services.

4. MILITARY STATUS OF O.S.S.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER requested information as to whether it would be desirable to "militarize" the O.S.S. by commissioning the key personnel in the Army or the Navy.

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that phases of this question had already been considered in the O.S.S., which had been making a study to determine the organization's exact status. It now appeared that the O.S.S. is a part of "the armed forces of the United States". It would, therefore, be logical to commission the major personnel of the O.S.S. A request for total allotment of commissioned personnel is now being drawn up and will be checked with G-1 and G-3.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that O.S.S. intends to submit a proposal on this subject for the next meeting.

5. PLAN FOR SYRIA.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 31)

COLONEL DONOVAN reported that the Under Secretary of State intends to discuss with GENERAL MARSHALL the letter which was sent to the State Department by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the message sent to MR. WINANT on this subject. From his own discussion with the British in London COLONEL DONOVAN believed that the British Chiefs of Staff consider this project to be desirable.

COLONEL DONOVAN suggested that the project may need to be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order that GENERAL MAXWELL may have some guidance in the matter.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to discuss the matter further upon the receipt of GENERAL MAXWELL'S recommendations.

SECRETCOPY NO. 1J.P.W.C. 27th MeetingSeptember 28, 1942JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEAGENDA

2/3

For the Meeting to be held in Room 284-
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
On Monday, September 28, 1942, at 1430.

1. COORDINATION OF U. S. AND BRAZILIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 38)
Consideration of Subcommittee's recommendations.
2. SUBMACHINE GUNS FOR SUPPLY OF O.S.S.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 39)
Consideration of Subcommittee's recommendations.
3. DIRECTIVE FOR O.S.S. RE PHOTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL
(Ref. - Memorandum)
Item for information of the Committee.

A. H. Onthank
Secretary

SECRETCOPY NO. 1J.P.W.C. 26th MeetingJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 234,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on Monday, September 7, 1942, at 1430.

1. BASIC ESTIMATE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 36)
Consideration of Recommendations.
2. FRICITION BETWEEN U. S. AND BRITISH ARMED FORCES.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 35/2d Draft)
For consideration of revised draft.
3. PRODUCTION OF STEEL SUBMACHINE GUNS.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 20)

Lt. Cdr. Chas. Moran

Acting Secretary

SECRETCOPY NO. 1C.F.S.C. 25th MeetingJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held in Room 234,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
On MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1942, at 1430.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong

Rear Adm. K. C. Train

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Capt. B. J. Rodgers, USN

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney

Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN *

Maj. J. K. Woolnough

PRESENT FROM C.S.S. FOR ITEM #3

Lt. Col. H. P. Goodfellow

* Present for Items #3 and #4.

Lt. Col. A. F. Onthank,

Secretary.

SECRET1. FRICITION BETWEEN U. S. AND BRITISH ARMED FORCES.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 35/2d Draft; J.P.W.C. 35/3d Draft)

The recommendations of this paper were reconsidered and several changes made.

ADMIRAL IRWIN suggested that there might be need of a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on relations among the armed forces of all the Allied Nations.

GENERAL STRONG stated that it might soon be necessary to recommend legislation to prosecute American citizens who, under the protection of constitutional privileges, are sabotaging the war effort. COLONEL DONOVAN expressed the belief that present legislation is sufficiently broad for this purpose but that the real difficulties are found in actuating prosecuting officers and in the policies which govern them. He suggested that a study of this situation be made by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee under whatever directive GENERAL STRONG desired to submit.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- a. Took note that GENERAL STRONG will submit a memorandum to the J.P.W.S.C. outlining a study to be made of desired action to affect prosecution of citizens and elements who are sabotaging the war effort.
- b. Approved the basic paper with certain amendments.
- c. Directed the Secretary to transmit this paper, as amended, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners.

2. PRODUCTION OF STEN SUBMACHINE GUNS.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 28)

GENERAL WEDEMAYER stated that no report as to the number of sten guns allocated to secret operations has yet been received from the British and that in consequence action is still deferred in the Combined Staff Planners.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer action until the requested report from the British has been received by the Joint Staff Planners.

3. MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR U. S.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 37)

COLONEL DONOVAN introduced COLONEL M. F. GOODFELLOW, Deputy Director of the O.S.S. who explained the reasons for the desired increase in allocations of military personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, to the O.S.S. He pointed out that about 20 per cent of the officers will be directly procured instead of transferring them from their present duties in the Army or Navy. He also indicated that of the total number, 20 are to be assigned to subversive operations and 68 to secret intelligence.

Friday, January 26

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JANUARY

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GENERAL WEDEMAYER pointed out that G-1 and the procurement officers will need more information than is given in the basic paper, especially the exact duties and responsibilities of each officer or enlisted man requested, with supporting data. ADMIRAL TRAIN stated that the Navy will need similar information and suggested that tables of organization be drafted to show these facts. GENERAL STRONG recommended that the amended request include the 48 officers who have heretofore been allocated to the O.S.S. to assist in training activities so that there will be shown an overall total of officers required, whether they have been previously furnished or not.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Deferred action on the basic paper until further information has been furnished by the O.S.S.]

4. BASIC ESTIMATE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 36)

GENERAL STRONG suggested a number of changes in the recommendations, in particular;

- a. A further definition of "the integrated use of all means" (par. 1).
- b. Clarification of the basis for the planning of J.P.W.C. (par. 3 - c.)
- c. The necessity for O.W.I. being informed of the wishes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (par. 4).

GENERAL WEDEMAYER discussed the new definition of psychological warfare recommended in comparison with the definition which had already been accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in J.C.S. 12. COLONEL DONOVAN explained that the change had been made in order to supplement the earlier definition. It should be made clear, he said, that while the President had set up in the O.W.I. a separate agency for propaganda, nevertheless the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not relieved of the responsibility for coordinating all psychological warfare agencies to the end of general military success. He pointed out that MR. ELMER DAVIS, Director of O.W.I., had accepted the proposal to submit propaganda plans to this Committee and that in addition, he had accepted the definition and the statement of means which are in the basic paper.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- a. Accepted the basic paper with amendments as directed.
- b. Deferred further action in transmitting the paper to the Joint Chiefs of Staff until such time as a propaganda plan is ready for submittal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

J.P.W.C. 25th Meeting.

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held in Room 234,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
On MONDAY, August 31, 1942, at 1430.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong

Rear Adm. H. C. Train

Lt. Col. G. C. Blakeney

Capt. B. J. Rodgers, USN

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Colonel E. J. Rogers, Jr.

Maj. J. K. Woolnough

ACTING SECRETARY:

Lt. Cdr. Chas. Moran

SECRET1. REVISED PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN
PACIFIC SOUTHWEST THEATER.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer consideration of this Basic Estimate until the next meeting.

2. PROPOSED ESTIMATES SUBMITTED BY C.S.S. FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1943.

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that the Subcommittee was considering these proposed estimates and inquired whether the Senior Committee desired to pass on them.

GENERAL STRONG suggested that these estimates need not come before the Committee.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed that there was no need of considering same.

3. FRICTION BETWEEN U. S. AND BRITISH ARMED FORCES.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 35; 35/2d Draft - To be circulated)

COLONEL DONOVAN read to the Committee the draft of J.P.W.C. 35 as prepared by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee.

GENERAL STRONG pointed out that the approach to this problem would vary according to the locality in which American forces might find themselves, and suggested that troops going to Ireland be required to read, or be lectured on, the hand book prepared by the War Department entitled "A Short Guide to Great Britain", that forces of the U. S. going to Australia or remaining in the U. S. had best be approached along different lines, emphasis being made on tolerance and discretion.

COLONEL DONOVAN suggested that he take the matter up informally with Mr. Elmer Davis insofar as it affected the civilian population.

After discussion of the report of the Subcommittee
and the draft:

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed upon certain amendments and directed the Secretary to prepare a revised draft.

SECRETJ.P.W.C. 24th MeetingCOPY NO. 1JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting Held in Room 234,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
On MONDAY, August 24, 1942, at 1430.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong

Capt. H. C. Train, USN

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Capt. B. J. Rodgers, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Maj. J. A. Woolnough

ALSO PRESENT FOR ITEM #10:

Lt. Col. W. Eddy, U.S.M.C.R.

SECRETARY:

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank

SECRET1. PLAN FOR SYRIA
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 31)

COLONEL DONOVAN presented the recommendation of the Subcommittee that this proposal be approved. He pointed out that present conditions indicate the need of representatives in SYRIA immediately, and that if action is deferred until the State Department and the British Foreign Office reach an agreement on the proposed political statement regarding SYRIA, there might be considerable delay.

GENERAL STRONG suggested that since SYRIA is in a British theater of operations the authorization to send O.S.S. representatives should be subject to concurrence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER pointed out that paragraph 2 (c) should refer to a directive to the O.S.S. representatives which would state their mission exactly, and would also comply with J.C.S. 67/3 and J.C.S. 83/1 as regards direction and control by the Theater Commander.

He suggested that recommendations (e) and (f) be omitted since these matters are outside the sphere of control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

a. Agreed,

- (1) That the authority to send O.S.S. representatives to SYRIA be predicated upon the concurrence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- (2) That the recommendations should provide that a directive be given to the O.S.S. representatives to be sent to SYRIA, which will clearly indicate their exact mission, and will be in conformity with J.C.S. 67/3 and J.C.S. 83/1 as pertains to control by the Theater Commander; this directive to be approved by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.
- (3) That reference to the O.W.I. and State Department, including the Appendix A, be omitted.

b. Directed the Secretary to transmit this paper, with the amendments as suggested above, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for action at their meeting on August 25.

2. PRODUCTION OF STEN SUBMACHINE GUNS.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 29)

COLONEL DONOVAN read the recommendation of the Subcommittee and referred also to the production of an American 9-mm. submachine gun.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER reported that British members of the Combined Staff Planners have requested from London further information as to the uses to be made of Sten guns, especially in subversive operations, and that it would be desirable for this information to be before this Committee when action is taken on this subject.

SECRETTHE COMMITTEE:-

Deferred action on this subject until its next meeting.

3. PRODUCTION OF 9-MM. SUBMACHINE GUN BY THE U.S.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 29)

Because of the connection of this subject with the production of Sten submachine guns,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Deferred action until its next meeting.

4. MISSION OF THAI NATIONALS FOR FAR EAST.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 30)

GENERAL STRONG suggested that all such groups going to various theaters of operations should be given directives detailing their specific missions, including the coordination necessary with military plans and the manner in which they would be subject to the orders of Theater Commanders. COLONEL DONOVAN agreed and stated that the Subcommittee would submit a standard form of directive to be used for these groups.

There was general discussion concerning the desirability of obtaining GENERAL STILWELL'S APPROVAL of this mission prior to submittal of the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- a. Approved this proposal, subject to obtaining the approval of GENERAL STILWELL.
- b. Directed the Secretary to forward the proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending approval on the above condition.
- c. Recommended that in the future the approval of the Theater Commander be obtained for the activities of such missions, prior to submitting recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. CAMPAIGN FOR COLLECTION OF PICTURES BY O.S.S.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 32)

COLONEL DONOVAN explained the history of this organization and referred to similar activities which had been successfully executed by the British. In considering the methods used in this campaign he recommended that any plans therefor be submitted first for approval of this Committee.

CAPTAIN TRAIN referred to a report from the Navy Department which stated that few pictures had been received until recently and which indicated possible difficulty in dealing with this organization through a New York office. COLONEL DONOVAN explained that although the laboratory and executive organization would be in New York because of better facilities there, a complete library of photographic prints will be maintained in Washington available for consultation by the Armed Services.

CAPTAIN RODGERS queried the necessity of sending out researchers to the homes of individuals who had reported lists of available pictures. It was explained that such action is necessary in order that the researcher may talk with the owner and obtain other information regarding the locality shown in the picture.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Approved this proposal and directed that it be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. JEDBURGHES.

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 33)

GENERAL WEDEMAYER pointed out that the operations of the JEDBURGHES should be subject to control of the Theater Commander concerned.

GENERAL STRONG suggested that since joint action and joint training with the British are involved, the project should go to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.

THE COMMITTEE:-

a. Approved this project amended to indicate that the Jedburghs should be employed subject to control of the Theater Commander concerned.

b. Directed the Secretary to transmit the amended proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending approval.

7. CONFLICTS BETWEEN BRITISH AND U. S. SOLDIERS.

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 23d Meeting, Item #6 a)

GENERAL WEDEMAYER suggested that this might be a problem on which the O.W.I. could make a constructive contribution.

GENERAL STRONG indicated belief that some of the difficulty is due to material in the press or on the radio which is based on observation of some untrained individual or on remarks of an official which have leaked out. COLONEL DONOVAN stated that in either event it would be desirable to have a Joint Board make an inquiry into the conditions and suggest any possible remedy. He believed that it is the function of this Committee to raise the question and to make any constructive suggestions.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the O.S.S. will submit a proposal on this subject to the Subcommittee.

SECRET

8. PUBLICATION OF COMPLETE CASUALTY LISTS.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 23d Meeting, Item 6-c)

COLONEL DONOVAN reported the result of COLONEL BLANKETTY'S investigation which indicated that the Counter-Intelligence Branch of H.I.S. had no objections to publishing complete lists, with certain safeguards. He mentioned also that it was proposed to make a test of public opinion through certain agencies available.

GENERAL STRONG expressed the belief that it would be permissible to publish names and ranks but that in no way should the lists be connected with any particular antecedent action.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the C.S.S. will submit a proposal on this subject to the Subcommittee.

9. TREATMENT OF PERSONS INTERNED BY JAPANESE.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the proposal for a Board of Inquiry to interview persons who had been interned by the Japanese and who are returning to the "GRIPSTOLM" had been placed before GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING and had been disapproved by them.

10. CONDITIONS IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

LT. COL. W. EDDY Naval Attache at TANGIER, reported to the Committee on conditions in FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

J.P.W.C. 23d Meeting

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting Held in Room 234,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
On MONDAY, August 17, 1942, at 1450.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Capt. H. C. Train, USN

Brig. Gen. H. Kroner

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney

Capt. B. J. Rodgers, USN,

ALSO PRESENT:

Colonel E. J. Rogers, Jr.

Maj. J. K. Woolnough

SECRETARY:

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank

SECRET1. AGREEMENT BETWEEN O.S.S. AND BRITISH S.O.E.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 27; 27/1)

THE COMMITTEE discussed the action of the Joint Staff Planners in their meeting on August 12, 1942, with particular regard to paragraph 2 (e) and (f) of the proposed agreement. GENERAL WEDEMAYER explained that this question had arisen in connection with production of the Sten Gun and that the Joint Staff Planners did not wish to have demands for equipment coming from this Committee that had not been integrated with the overall procurement objectives.

COLONEL DONOVAN agreed with that position and stated that he proposed to submit three sets of requirements for approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, viz., requirements for (1) secret communications, (2) secret technical material, and (3) research and production.

The question was raised as to the desirability of pooling all resources of O.S.S. and S.O.E. on the basis that since the United States is producing most of the war material to be used, there would be no quid pro quo in such an arrangement. COLONEL DONOVAN explained that pooling of resources would apply to particular operations only in which each side would contribute what it could. He suggested that paragraphs 2 (d), (e), and (f) could be omitted.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(a) Agreed:

- (1) To resubmit a proposed agreement to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with paragraphs 2 (d), (e), and (f) omitted, on the basis that the O.S.S. will deal with the British on those subjects as any particular situation arises.
- (2) To change the Recommendation to condition approval of the agreements on the statement "that all activities pertaining to military operations in the various theaters be subject to the recommendations of the Commanders of those theaters."

- (b) Directed the Secretary to transmit the agreement to the Joint Staff Planners with the changes specified above.

2. FRENCH WEST AFRICA - TRADE AGREEMENT.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 20th Meeting, Item #6;
21st Meeting, Item #8, 22d Meeting,
Item #4)

COLONEL DONOVAN read a report on the situation in FRENCH WEST AFRICA which stated that the French Governor-General there refuses to accept an American Economic Mission including control officers because he fears that the Germans would demand the right to station an equal number of officials in the area. It is believed that he could only be persuaded to accept such a Mission by sending a shipment of supplies to convince him of the

SECRET

good faith of the United States, after which he might be persuaded to cooperate in the desired direction. It might be possible to send one clerk to superintend the distribution of such supplies. COLONEL DONOVAN indicated further that such a shipment would not increase the tempo of our activities in FRENCH WEST AFRICA since negotiations for this trade agreement have been going on for some time.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that further report will be made on the proposal to furnish supplies to FRENCH WEST AFRICA.

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA - ECONOMIC PLAN.

COLONEL DONOVAN reported that in addition to the four United States ships which are now carrying supplies to FRENCH NORTH AFRICA under an exchange arrangement, a proposal had been made by a Frenchman who had money on deposit in the U. S. that two additional ships should be chartered to transport additional supplies to that territory. He regarded this plan as desirable on the basis that the ships be used for a straight economic effort, and without any attempt to include intelligence activities, as a decoy to the Germans.

The material to be transported would be a small amount of aviation gasoline, kerosene, medicine, cotton goods and food in return for which these ships would load cobalt for the United States.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the O.S.S. has submitted this proposal direct to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

PLAN FOR SYRIA.

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 20th Meeting, Item #4; 21st Meeting, Item #4)

COLONEL DONOVAN reported that he had asked the State Department to formulate the U. S. comprehensive policy for that area, and that this statement will be sent to this Committee at an early date.

He proposed that if it is found impossible to arrive at once at an agreement among the various interested parties on the propaganda basis to be used in SYRIA, it would be desirable to send COLONEL HOCKINS immediately to that area as the head of an Economic Mission. He would have assistants with experience in agriculture and in Lend-Lease administration and would be directed to ascertain what economic aid could be given to the population. Under this cover it would be possible for him to initiate conversations on other activities.

In this connection, COLONEL DONOVAN proposed that the HON. DAVID BOWEN-LYON, Deputy Director of the British Political Warfare Executive, attend a meeting of this Committee for discussion of propaganda objectives in SYRIA, for the purpose of having his assistance in formulating a directive on this subject to the C.W.I.

SECRETTHE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the O.S.S. will submit a written report on these proposals.

5. ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.

COLONEL DONOVAN presented to the Committee a report which is being made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Office of Strategic Services, and explained in detail the operations of the various branches.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that copies of this report, as well as copies of tables of the organization of the Strategic Command, will be available for the Committee's next meeting.

6. NEW PROJECTS.

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that he intended to make proposals to the Committee on three new subjects, viz.,

(a) Conflict between British and United States.

It seems desirable that this Committee request the appointment of a group of officers to inquire into the reasons for such conflicts, since they may be incited by Axis agents, and to propose any possible remedy.

(b) Cruel Treatment of Prisoners of War by Japanese.

It is suggested that proper use of these reports be made as an item in psychological warfare. Specifically a Board of Inquiry should be appointed to consist of representatives of several Government departments, which will meet the ship coming in from Brazil with Americans who have been held as prisoners of War by the Japanese. This Board should take statements under oath from all these persons, study the record, and prepare an opinion as to whether the treatment accorded the prisoners is clearly a part of Japanese war policy or whether it is the action of individual officers.

(c) Publication of Casualties.

It is proposed that this Committee consider changing the policy of publication of casualty lists for limited geographical areas and to substitute the practice of publication of complete lists.

7. CONFERENCE WITH LT. COLONEL EDDY.

COLONEL DONOVAN reported that LT. COLONEL EDDY, Assistant Military Attache at TANGIER, will return this week.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Requested that COLONEL EDDY attend its meeting next Monday.

SECRETJ.P.W.C. 23d MeetingCOPY NO. 1JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEAGENDA

For the MEETING to be held in Room 234,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building
on MONDAY, August 17, 1942, at 1430.

1. AGREEMENT BETWEEN O.S.S. AND BRITISH S.O.E.
(Ref. J.P.W.C. 27; 27/1)
Discussion of request of Joint Staff Planners.
2. FRENCH WEST AFRICA - TRADE AGREEMENT.
(Ref. J.P.W.C. 20th Meeting, Item #6;
21st Meeting, Item #8; 22d Meeting,
Item #4)
Progress report by COLONEL DONOVAN.

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETCOPY NO. 1J.P.W.C. 22d MeetingJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting Held in Room 234,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on MONDAY, August 10, 1942 at 1430.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Brig. Gen. H. Kroner

Capt. H. C. Train, USN

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Capt. B. J. Rodgers, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Colonel E. J. Rogers, Jr.

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Lt. Colonel C. C. Blakeney

Maj. J. K. Woolnough

SECRETARIAT:

Lt. Colonel A. H. Onthank

SECRET1. AGREEMENT BETWEEN OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES AND
BRITISH SECRET OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE.

(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 27)

COLONEL DONOVAN explained the reasons for the subjects included in the basic paper. He reported that liaison is presently accomplished in Washington through Colonel Frank, of the British Army, with four men who keep in touch with O.S.S., and in London Colonel Gunther, U.S.A., representing the O.S.S., is on the staff of the Theater Commander and maintains liaison with the S.O.E.

CAPTAIN TRAIN requested that paragraph 2 (c) (2) include the South Pacific Theater.

COLONEL DONOVAN, in answer to a question from GENERAL WEDEMEYER, agreed to provide at the Committee's next meeting certain diagrams and other information which will clarify the extent of O.S.S. operations and the agencies with which it works.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER referred to a message from the European Theater Commander which requested that certain arrangements be made concerning the coordination and approval of plans for subversive activities, including propaganda. He indicated his willingness to recommend approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the agreement between the O.S.S. and the S.O.E. provided this agreement were made subject to all points covered in the message from the European Theater Commander. GENERAL KRONER indicated his agreement with this attitude.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the approval of tentative agreements entered into by the O.S.S. and the British S.O.E. in June, 1942 as summarized in J.P.W.C. 27 and detailed in the annexes thereto, on the condition that all activities covered therein be subject to the recommendations of the European Theater Commander as stated in the message Number 941 of August 7, 1942.

2. O.S.S. PHOTOGRAPHIC UNIT FOR ENGLAND.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 21st Meeting, Item #6)

GENERAL WEDEMEYER indicated that no action had been taken in this matter because it had been considered of an inappropriate nature to bring before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was some question regarding the possibility of making decisions on matters of this sort in operational channels.

COLONEL DONOVAN stressed the point that the photographic unit is ready, and that it will be attached to the European Theater Commander and be under his direction, upon arrival in England.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that GENERAL WEDEMEYER will endeavor to obtain decision to send the O.S.S. photographic unit to England in operational channels of the War Department or of the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SECRET

3. PLAN FOR SYRIA.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 20th Meeting, Item #4; 21st Meeting, Item #4)

COLONEL DONOVAN outlined in detail the plan under which COLONEL HOSKINS is to operate in conjunction with the State Department diplomatic representative in SYRIA. He stated further that he had conferred with representatives of G-2 and O.N.I. for the purpose of discussing a directive to be given to the O.W.I. representatives who will accompany this Mission to Syria.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that no action will be taken on the plan for SYRIA until it has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and thereafter has been submitted to British representatives in Washington.

4. TRADE AGREEMENT FOR FRENCH WEST AFRICA.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 20th Meeting, Item #6; 21st Meeting, Item #8)

COLONEL DONOVAN discussed the background of this problem and reported that ADMIRAL LEAHY had conferred with State Department officials concerning the necessity for such economic assistance.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that COLONEL DONOVAN would submit a proposed agreement at the Committee's next meeting.

5. EXPORT OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT TO NORTH AFRICA.

COLONEL DONOVAN reported that he has conferred with the Board of Economic Warfare concerning the latter's refusal to grant an export license to the Western Electric Company for shipment of \$270.00 worth of spare parts for moving picture sound equipment in FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

He has protested this action on the basis that it prevents the population there from seeing and hearing American films. He will report the result of this action to the Committee.

SECRETCOPY NO. 1J.P.W.C. 22nd MeetingJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEAGENDA

For the MEETING to be held in Room 234.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building
on MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 1942 at 1430.

1. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
AND BRITISH SECRET OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 27)

Discussion of recommendations of Subcommittee.

2. PLAN FOR SYRIA.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 20th Meeting, Item #4; 21st
Meeting, Item #4)

Progress report by COLONEL DONOVAN.

3. TRADE AGREEMENT FOR FRENCH WEST AFRICA.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 20th Meeting, Item #6; 21st
Meeting, Item #8)

Progress report by COLONEL DONOVAN.

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

COPY NO. 1SECRETJ.P.W.C. 21st MeetingJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEAGENDA

For the MEETING to be held in Room 234,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on MONDAY, August 3, 1942, at 1430.

1. FUNCTIONS OF O.S.S.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 21/D; 21/1; 21/2)
Discussion of J.P.W.C. 21/2.
2. GUARANTEE OF PENSIONS OF FRENCH FORCES IN AFRICA.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 24)
Discussion of J.P.W.C. 24.
3. ABD-AL-KARIM
(J.P.W.C. 25)
Discussion of proposals to be made by COL. DONOVAN.

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETCOPY NO. 1J.P.W.C. 20th MeetingJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held in Room 234,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on MONDAY, July 27, 1942 at 1430.

PRESENT

Hon. W. J. Donovan	
Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong	Capt. H. C. Train, USN
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer	Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN
Colonel P. G. Black	Capt. B. J. Rodgers, USN

ALSO PRESENT

Colonel A. S. Novins
Major J. K. Woolnough

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRET1. SCIENTIFIC SABOTAGE SERVICE.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 23)

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that the recommendations in the memorandum of the Military Intelligence Division are already being carried out by the O.S.S., which has obtained the service of a physicist for this purpose. A number of contracts have been let especially for demolition plastics, suitcase radios and explosive pencils. The O.S.S. is making this material available to the Army Engineer and Ordnance Department and to its liaison officers with the Navy Department.

THE COMMITTEE:

Took note that the recommendations of this paper are already being put into execution by the O.S.S.

2. FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES--
SCHOOLS AND GUERRILLA UNITS.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 21/D; 21/1; 21/2)

COLONEL DONOVAN circulated a study which described the training in Germany and the orders given to the eight German saboteurs who are now on trial before the Military Commission.

The Subcommittee report, J.P.W.C. 21/2, was discussed in detail. Under the subject of training GENERAL STRONG requested that a preliminary section be added to give a general picture of why the training is given, what it is, and where the trainees are to be used and when. COLONEL DONOVAN agreed, and pointed out that guerrilla training is of a different type from training of saboteurs to some extent because the guerrilla units are militarized.

In discussing the types of individuals to be recruited, COLONEL DONOVAN brought out that saboteurs are being recruited from Americans of foreign birth or from foreign nationals and are being given seven weeks training. It is his desire to recruit the militarized guerrilla units from members of the U. S. Army and Navy who have had at least three months training as well as from foreign nationals in the British Army.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER noted that if the Committee approved this training schedule it had thereby approved the organization by the O.S.S. of militarized guerrilla units.

GENERAL STRONG questioned the wisdom of giving the same type of training to two sets of persons whose aims are different, such as the saboteurs, whose main objective is demolition, and the guerrilla units, which will operate mainly against persons. COLONEL DONOVAN stated that both groups will deal largely with demolition activities but that they must have different training than that given to U. S. Army and Navy organizations because saboteurs and guerrillas will go behind the lines to stay and not to come out.

Answering COLONEL BLACK'S question as to the source of British S.O.E. agents, COLONEL DONOVAN stated that they are coming mainly from the armies of the Governments in exile and that he hopes to tap these same sources for saboteurs to be trained by the O.S.S.

S E C R E T

GENERAL WEDEMEYER asked if there is any duplication in the training given by O.S.S. and that which COLONEL TRUSCOTT is preparing to give to U. S. Ground Forces. COLONEL DONOVAN pointed out that the O.S.S. guerrilla units will be language groups and will have specialized training, which will not apply to the U. S. Ground Force units.

In discussing the method of allocating graduates from O.S.S. schools, GENERAL STRONG stated that arrangements should be made for theater commanders to indicate their needs far enough in advance to permit training saboteurs and guerrilla units for specific operations. GENERAL WEDEMEYER suggested a change in the proposed report to take care of this procedure. CAPTAIN RODGERS pointed out that the U. S. Marines should be given training in this type of guerrilla warfare.

With respect to the need for Army and Navy instructor personnel, COLONEL DONOVAN stated that both instructors and trainees taken from the U. S. Army and Navy would stay with the O.S.S. units and would not be returned to their previous organizations, because of the need of developing team spirit in the guerrilla units as well as the need to return them to the O.S.S. for rest and further training when their original assignments had ended. GENERAL WEDEMEYER suggested that the basic paper be changed to indicate that additional increments of Army and Navy instructors will be needed if the organization of militarized guerrilla units is authorized.

Various other changes were suggested including a clarification of the means of liaison between the chief representative of the O.S.S. on the staff of a U. S. theater commander with similar officers on the staffs of foreign commanders.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Directed that the basic paper be redrafted to include the changes specified, and that it be circulated for informal approval before being submitted to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff through the Joint U. S. Staff Planners.]

3. TRANSPORT OF SUPPLIES TO MIDDLE EAST FOR GREEKS AND YUGOSLAVS.

COLONEL DONOVAN requested advice as to the means of transporting supplies which had been authorized for the Greeks and Yugoslavs. Of the thirty tons sent from the United States, mainly canned goods and medical supplies, ten tons have reached CAIRO and twenty tons are now at LAGOS, NIGERIA. The Greek and Yugoslav representatives have been promised these supplies by the President, and COLONEL DONOVAN pointed out that if delivered they would be a potent instrument of psychological warfare.

GENERAL STRONG said that all available space has been blocked out for supplies to maintain air and tank units in the Middle East, and that until there is a break in the operations there it seems essential that first priority must be given to these parts. It is possible that when the pressure is off it might be practicable to consider transporting those supplies by air to their destinations.]

SECRET

GENERAL WEDEMAYER suggested that the theater commander should be contacted for his opinion.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the Operations Division, War Department, would communicate with GENERAL MAXWELL to inform him that these supplies are available and to ask his decision as to the possibility of air transport to take them to their final destinations.

4. AID TO SYRIA.

COLONEL DONOVAN brought up the question of formation of groups of resistance in SYRIA and SAUDI ARABIA. The O.S.S. has arranged with MR. HOSKINS to visit SYRIA to initiate such activities; and even though this area is under British control, he believes that the project is practicable. He stated, however, that the State Department has authorized O.W.I. to send two men to SYRIA to work with the consul there, and he questioned the purpose of sending these two O.W.I. representatives.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Requested COLONEL DONOVAN to discuss this matter with the State Department and with the O.W.I. and to report back his findings to this Committee at its next meeting.

5. LOBITO BAY PROJECT.

COLONEL DONOVAN gave information that two German cargo vessels of about four thousand tons each, with cargoes of copper, wood and general cargo, are anchored at LOBITO BAY, PORTUGUESE WEST AFRICA (ANGOLA) under close watch of the Portuguese Government. It has been suggested that it would be feasible to enter the bay with tugs and capture the vessels. COLONEL DONOVAN would like the O.S.S. to try out this project, but the State Department would probably refuse permission. He raised the question of whether conversations should be initiated with the State Department or whether the O.S.S. should take a chance and go ahead with the project.

COLONEL BLACK pointed out that this would be a violation of Portuguese neutrality and asked whether the project would be worth it. He indicated that it might jeopardize relations with Portugal and might have an effect on other possible plans.

GENERAL STRONG stated, and CAPTAIN TRAIN agreed, that it would be impossible to get official permission to execute this project and that even though it were done without permission and was successful it might react seriously on the O.S.S.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to take no action on this proposal.

S E C R E T6. TRADE AGREEMENT FOR FRENCH WEST AFRICA.

COLONEL DONOVAN announced that the State Department had taken up with the O.S.S. and the Board of Economic Warfare the possibility of making a trade agreement for FRENCH WEST AFRICA similar to the one operating in FRENCH NORTH AFRICA. The O.S.S. would be requested to recruit men for the economic control officers. At present the State Department and Board of Economic Warfare have differences on this question.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that COLONEL DONOVAN would keep it advised on this subject.

7. O.S.S. CAPABILITIES IN FRENCH NORTHWEST AFRICA AND IBERIAN PENINSULA.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER requested information as to what the O.S.S. is doing now and what are their capabilities in these two places.

COLONEL DONOVAN reported that in FRENCH NORTHWEST AFRICA the O.S.S. is working on a plan for use of pamphlets and propaganda which will be ready by next week. The propaganda could be put on the radio in about two days after receiving approval and pamphlets could be disseminated in about a week after the plan had been approved.

Nothing has been done to affect the Arabs because of an agreement with the French in that respect.

A considerable quantity of military supplies have been stored in GIBRALTAR for use in FRENCH NORTHWEST AFRICA in event the Germans invade, and Committees have been formed to organize resistance.

In the IBERIAN PENINSULA the O.S.S. has placed five intelligence agents and two special operations agents. The approaches of the Communist groups, who are ready to start trouble, have been resisted. The O.S.S. had arranged for newsreels and other propaganda material to be sent in, but the O.W.I. has taken over these projects. It is suggested that Assistant Military or Naval Attaches be placed in MADRID and LISBON for intelligence and other services.

COPY NO. 1SECRETJ.P.W.C. 19th MeetingJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEMINUTES of Meeting held in Room 213,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on WEDNESDAY, July 22, 1942 at 1100.PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Colonel P. G. Black

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr.

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Capt. B. J. Rodgers, USN

ALSO PRESENT:

Maj. J. K. Woolnough

PRESENT FROM O.S.S. FOR ITEM #1:

Lt. Col. M. P. Goodfellow

Lt. Col. G. H. Williams

Cdr. W. H. Vanderbilt

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

S E C R E T

1. FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.
 (Ref. - J.P.W.C. 21/D; 21/1)

COLONEL DONOVAN pointed out that the first memorandum enclosed in J.P.W.C. 21/1 had not yet been acted on by the Subcommittee but that the second memorandum had been approved by the Subcommittee with recommendation that the 416 grades and ratings be furnished to the O.S.S. He explained that there is presently a shortage of enlisted men for administration, security, and instructional duties at the eight school - camps, and that because of that shortage only four of these camps are now operating.

LT. COL. WILLIAMS described the functions of each of the schools and the type of instruction being given in them. About two hundred instructors and students have been trained so far and about sixty students are now in the schools. The system is parallel to that used by the British and in fact all the instructors have gone through British schools.

GENERAL STRONG suggested that the "Propaganda School" be renamed "The Personnel Relations School" in order to avoid any seeming duplication of the functions of the O.W.I.

COMMANDER VANDERBILT outlined the methods of recruiting and investigations made for new students, indicating that the Army and Navy have been drawn upon as well as some personnel from the foreign groups of the British Army.

LT. COLONEL WILLIAMS also discussed the bases of operations and the allocations of agents to various countries. An agreement has been made to supplement the British effort in these special activities, so that if the United States takes over an area the British can turn over their organization to the U. S. command, and vice versa.

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that the 416 grades and rates requested were the minimum to establish the schools on an operating basis, but that it will take care of future expansion for the schools for subversive training only and not for any expansion for training guerrilla groups. It was not considered feasible to use civilians for the duties for which Army personnel had been requested.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Agreed to recommend that The Adjutant General allot an additional 416 grades and rates of enlisted men to the Strategic Services Command, in the numbers specified in the letter of July 7, 1942 from the Office of Strategic Services to The Adjutant General.
- (b) Requested that the O.S.S. change the name of the "Propaganda School" to "Personnel Relations School."

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2. DIRECTIVE FOR OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES REGARDING
OPERATIONS IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 18/1)

COLONEL DONOVAN reported that this paper had been returned by the Joint Staff Planners for the purpose of insuring (a) that the activities of the Office of Strategic Services, as proposed in the subject paper, were in its proper sphere, (b) that the venture had been coordinated with British activities in that area.

He quoted a Memorandum of April 21, 1942, which stated that the J.C.S. were in accord with the policy of spending funds judiciously for the purpose of initiating and maintaining operations in that area. Pursuant to that understanding the O.S.S. has arranged with the British to store material at Gibraltar for later use in FRENCH NORTH AFRICA whenever the time is appropriate.

ADMIRAL COOKE, referring to paragraph three of the proposed directive, questioned whether the J.C.S. have any authority to wage economic warfare or to authorize the O.S.S. to do so. In this connection COLONEL DONOVAN agreed that it is not the function of the O.S.S. to guarantee economic assistance and that the only functions it had performed in this connection had been to bring together the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare to arrange certain shipments of goods to FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

Regarding paragraph four, ADMIRAL COOKE believed that the British agency involved should be designated.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(a) Directed

- (1) That paragraph three of the Directive be changed to indicate that the Board of Economic Warfare in conjunction with the State Department has arranged for economic assistance to this area.
- (2) That in paragraph four, the British agency involved to be designated as "the British authorities at Gibraltar."
- (3) That the Secretary embody these amendments in the Directive and forward it to the Joint Staff Planners recommending approval.

3. DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 20; 20/2d Draft)

ADMIRAL COOKE stated that he had received a request of the O.W.I. for appointment of a Naval officer for the Planning Board of that organization in order to provide operational guidance for propaganda. He questioned whether this request fitted the line of demarcation between the J.P.W.C. and the O.W.I.

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COLONEL DONOVAN related the results of an interview with Mr. ELMER DAVIS, Director of the Office of War Information, indicating: (a) That Mr. PHILLIPS had been sent to London to be the representative of the O.S.S., and that the PRESIDENT had given him the rank of Minister so that he could execute certain political functions. These have no direct relationship to propaganda. (b) As to the respective spheres of J.P.W.C. and O.W.I. Mr. DAVIS had generally agreed with the definition of Psychological Warfare that is now before the Committee, and had also agreed that O.W.I. functions did not reach into the theater of operations. (c) Mr. DAVIS had requested that Mr. EDMOND TAYLOR act as the O.S.S. liaison with O.W.I.

Consequently COLONEL DONOVAN suggested that it might be the best policy to operate for some period without trying to exactly delimit the field of propaganda between J.P.W.C. and O.W.I.

GENERAL STRONG expressed the belief that it might be well for the J.P.W.C. to have a conference with representatives of O.W.I., S.E.W., O.I.A.A., and the State Department to find whether we speak the same language and are working in our own back yards. COLONEL DONOVAN thought it would be better to define propaganda by a course of conduct rather than to attempt an exact definition.

COLONEL BLACK questioned the provision in paragraph 3-b for the liaison for the Joint Chiefs of Staff with O.W.I. being assigned to O.S.S.; he thought it should be either the J.P.W.C. or an officer from the Army or the Navy. COLONEL DONOVAN stated that he did not urge liaison be by the O.S.S. but believed that the Subcommittee could not be an operational group.

A discussion ensued on the place of propaganda in the theater of operations and the need for support of local propaganda activities from outside sources. COLONEL DONOVAN stated that it is doubtful whether the plans for propaganda to back up local activities in a theater of operations could or should be drawn up by O.W.I., but that they should be prepared by the J.P.W.C. and presented to the O.W.I. to execute.

Various suggestions were made for possible conferences with Mr. DAVIS in order to achieve a working agreement with the O.W.I. as to fields of propaganda. GENERAL WEDEMAYER expressed the belief that an agreement should be reached either (a) at a general meeting here or (b) by referring this paper to Mr. DAVIS.

GENERAL STRONG suggested that this paper be tabled and that the Committee wait for a specific case of misunderstanding between J.P.W.C. and O.W.I. which may then be used as a basis for clarifying the field of propaganda planning and activity.

THE COMMITTEE: -

Directed that this paper be tabled.

4. "DRAGON PROJECT"
(Ref. - J.C.S. 66; J.P.W.C. 22)

GENERAL STRONG read the contents of messages sent to and received from GENERAL STILLWELL concerning this proposal. The reply indicated possibility of misunderstanding as to the objectives and means to be taken.

SECRET

After discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Directed that this project be referred to the Joint U. S. Intelligence Committee, who should also be informed of the messages sent to and received from GENERAL STILWELL in this respect.

5. DESIGNATION OF MEMBER TO SERVE ON COMMITTEE ON WAR INFORMATION POLICY
(Ref. - J.C.S. 68, par. 1-d)

It was announced that ADMIRAL COOKE has not yet designated an officer to act in this capacity.

6. FUTURE MEETINGS

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to meet hereafter on Mondays at 1430.

S E C R E T

COPY NO. 1

J.F.W.C. 18th Meeting

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held in Room 213,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on WEDNESDAY, July 15, 1942, at 1100.

PRESENT

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer

Colonel P. G. Black

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Capt. B. J. Rodgers, USN

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all activities. It emphasizes that this is crucial for ensuring the integrity and reliability of the information collected.

2. The second part of the document outlines the procedures for collecting and analyzing data. It details the steps involved in gathering information from various sources and the methods used to process and interpret the results.

3. The third part of the document describes the organizational structure and the roles of the personnel involved in the project. It highlights the coordination and communication required between different departments and individuals.

4. The fourth part of the document provides a summary of the findings and conclusions drawn from the study. It discusses the implications of the results and offers recommendations for future research and action.

5. The final part of the document contains a list of references and a bibliography. It includes citations to various sources of information used in the study, as well as a list of related documents and reports.

SECRET

2. DESIGNATION OF MEMBER TO SERVE ON COMMITTEE ON
WAR INFORMATION POLICY.
(Reference: J.C.S. 68, paragraph 1-d.)

COLONEL DONOVAN requested that this matter be settled between the Army and Navy. GENERAL WEDEMAYER thought that it would be preferable to designate the Navy member representing operations. CAPTAIN RODGERS agreed to discuss that idea with ADMIRAL COOKE and to notify the Secretary of the decision.

USN

3. DIRECTIVE FOR OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES RE
OPERATIONS IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.
(Reference: J.P.W.C. 18/1.)

A history of this project was given by COLONEL DONOVAN, together with an explanation of the cooperative relations with the British in this area. COLONEL BLACK stated that the previous Committee had believed that this directive called for a minimum of desirable preparation.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Approved the directive.
- (b) Directed that it be sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the Joint Staff Planners, recommending approval.

4. FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.
(Reference: J.P.W.C. 21/D.)

COLONEL DONOVAN read a letter from GENERAL MARSHALL, dated July 13, which discussed some of the same points as this directive. He stated that he will furnish information of the organization and functions of the O.S.S. to this Committee.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Referred this directive to the J.P.W.C. Subcommittee for consideration and report.

5. "DRAGON PROJECT."
(Reference: J.P.W.C. 22.)

Without discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Deferred consideration of this proposal until its next regular meeting.

SECRETCOPY NO. 1J.P.W.C. 17th MeetingJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of MEETING held in Room 213,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on WEDNESDAY, July 8, 1942 at 1500.

PRESENT:

Hon. W. J. Donovan

Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong

Rear Adm. T. S. Wilkinson

Brig. Gen. T. T. Handy

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr.

ALSO PRESENT:

Colonel O. N. Solbert

Capt. H. C. Train, USN

Colonel P. G. Black

Capt. A. V. Pickhardt, USN

Colonel A. C. Wedemeyer

Capt. B. J. Rodgers, USN

Lt. Col. R. L. Vittrup

Cdr. L. R. McDowell

AND FROM O.S.S. FOR ITEM #1:

Lt. Col. M. P. Goodfellow

Lt. Col. G. H. Williams

Major D. K. E. Bruce

Dr. J. P. Baxter

Capt. F. Milner, R. E.

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

SECRET1. OPERATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.

COLONEL DONOVAN indicated the desirability of acquainting members of the Committee with the general program of the O.S.S., and introduced four of his assistants. LT. COL. WILLIAMS exhibited and explained the use of certain special weapons and materiel. DR. BAXTER described the organization and work of the Research and Analysis Branch and its relations to other agencies. MAJOR BRUCE explained the operations of the Special Intelligence Section, making clear that field agents are under the control of theater commanders. LT. COL. GOODFELLOW outlined the functions and projects of the Special Operations Section, and also clarified the relation of these activities as supplementary to the British operations in British theaters.

2. GENERAL PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

COLONEL DONOVAN submitted his definition of psychological warfare as:

The strategic employment of all means, other than recognized military operations, that tend to destroy the political structure of the enemy and with it his will to resist.

Under that definition he pointed out that the question arose as to the relationship between the Office of War Information and the Joint Chiefs of Staff inasmuch as propaganda directly affects military strategy.

ADMIRAL WILKINSON stated his belief that the whole field of psychological warfare is the province of this Committee, and that since propaganda is one part of that field, it is the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to guide the O.W.I. as to propaganda which might affect military operations.

ADMIRAL COOKE suggested that this Committee draw up a proposal delimiting the field of psychological warfare as between the O.W.I. and the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff, and if it is approved by the J.C.S., that it be submitted to the O.W.I. as a basis for a working agreement.

GENERAL STRONG recommended that the J.P.W.C. Subcommittee be directed to draw up a definition of psychological warfare and a statement of the means to accomplish it for submission to this Committee at its next meeting. After approval by the J.C.S. the various spheres of activity could then be delineated.

COLONEL SOLBERT reported that the O.W.I. intends to have a planning board composed of representatives of the War, Navy, State and other Departments to draw up propaganda plans for areas and countries which will be sent to this Committee for advice and approval of the J.C.S. as broad directives.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Directed the J.P.W.C. Subcommittee to submit to this Committee for its next meeting:

- (a) A definition of psychological warfare with a statement of means to be employed to accomplish it;

SECRET

- (b) A classification of areas for various types of psychological warfare;
- (c) A recommendation of the agencies which should prepare psychological warfare plans.

3. PENDING PROJECTS.

Without discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to refer the following proposals to the J.P.W.C. Subcommittee for consideration and recommendations:

- (a) JAPAN - PROPAGANDA PLAN
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 15; 2d Draft of Plan)
- (b) DIRECTIVE FOR COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
RE OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 18/2d Draft)
- (c) MEASURES IN EVENT OF RUSSIAN COLLAPSE
(Ref. - J.P.W.C. 17)
- (d) PLAN FOR OBTAINING INTELLIGENCE FROM JAPAN
AND JAPANESE-OCCUPIED TERRITORY
(Ref. - J.C.S. 66)

4. DATE OF MEETINGS.

It was agreed to hold future meetings of this Committee on Wednesdays at 1100.